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A bstract
This thesis discusses the three issues that are important to macroeconomic policymakers. 
First, I examine the role of inventories over the business cycle. Despite accounting for 
less that 1% of the level of GDP, inventory changes have made up almost 50% of the 
post-war volatility of US GDP growth, and yet most models of the business cycle exclude 
inventories. I develop a dynamic business cycle model that incorporates distribution 
inventories as well as simple storage inventories. I find that the behaviour of inventories 
in this model matches the aggregate data well. However, there is little evidence that 
improved inventory management contributed to the decline in macroeconomic volatility 
over the last quarter of a century.
Second, the optimal design of a monetary policy committee (MPC) is examined as to 
whether such committees should include a mix of members from outside (external) as 
well as inside central banks (internal). Using a new theoretical model of voting behaviour 
on a mixed committee, it is shown that, under certain circumstance and behaviour, the 
presence of external committee members may be beneficial. However, using the voting 
record of the Bank of England’s MPC, reveals a problem; there is evidence of an agency 
problem which may eliminate any benefit to the appointment of external members. These 
results undermine the current intuition as to why such mixed committees should be 
employed by policymaking institutions.
Finally, I investigate the effect of policy uncertainty on household saving using a quasi­
natural experiment from Germany in the late 1990s. Around the 1998 election, there was 
a marked increase in uncertainty; using the fact that civil servants were largely unaffected 
by this policy uncertainty, we show that households reacted to the increase in uncertainty 
by saving more and, where possible, by working more via the margin offered by part-time 
employment.
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Introduction
These are extremely challenging times for the macroeconomy, and, as a result, these are 
also very challenging times for macroeconomic policy.
This is not a thesis about current events, but this is a thesis about macroeconomic 
policy and economic performance. Over the four chapters, I examine a number of top­
ics that, as I will illustrate below, are at the heart of some of the important debates 
about macroeconomic policy. In each chapter, I try to isolate, and examine, a particular 
phenomenon in a way that is new, or innovative, relative to our current understanding.
In doing this, I use many different tools. The thesis contains both theoretical con­
tributions, as well as more applied work. Even within the applied work, I make use of 
calibration techniques, household micro data, and a panel of voting records from the 
Bank of England’s MPC. The reason for this variety is simple; I try to use whichever 
method is most suitable to answer the questions that interest me. I, therefore, view the 
heterogeneity of the approaches used in this paper as a strength.
Inventories, the business cycle and the Great M oder­
ation
Prior to the current “credit crunch”, it was increasingly thought that the business cycle 
was dead. We were living in a period that was known as the Great Stability, or Great 
Moderation, or even the NICE years1. In the US, the decline in macro volatility, since 
at least the 1980s, had been pointed out by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Stock 
and Watson (2002), and Blanchard and Simon (2001). Benati (2004) provides evidence 
that the UK economy also experienced a period of great stability. Recent developments 
have led to a marked increase in business cycle volatility, and many people now question 
whether the Great Moderation is over. In order to be able to answer this, and potentially 
to know whether, or how, we will return to the more stable times experienced recently, 
we first need to understand what caused the Great Moderation period. There are many
1NICE stands for Non-Inflationary, Consistently Expansionary.
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suspects including better monetary policy (“good policy hypothesis”) and simply less 
volatile shocks hitting the economy (the “good luck” hypothesis).
I investigate the role of inventories over the business cycle in Chapter 1, and their role, 
if any, in the Great Moderation in Chapter 2. It has long been recognised that inventories 
are a major component of business cycle volatility: “At the macro level, economists have 
known (but periodically forgotten) since Abramovitz (1950) that inventory movements 
are dominant features of business cycles” (Blinder and Maccini 1991).
In order to explore the implications of inventory management techniques on macroe­
conomic volatility in Chapter 2, we first require a model of the inventory behaviour that 
captures those motives for inventories that we believe have changed. In Chapter 1, I 
develop such a model within a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) envi­
ronment. I focus on inventories in motion; that is, those inventories that are associated 
with the time delay between production and consumption of a good.
In Chapter 1, I lay out my model and explain the Parameterised Expectations Algo­
rithm (PEA) that I use to solve it. This in itself is a significant contribution. Although 
it has long been recognised that inventories play an important role in the business cycle, 
modelling inventory behaviour in a general equilibrium context has not fared so well in 
terms of matching the key features of inventories at the macroeconomic level. Though 
highly stylised, it is able to successfully match (at least qualitatively) a number of key 
facts about the behaviour of inventories, including (i) generating an inventory adjustment 
component that, though small, contributes a great deal to GDP growth volatility; (ii) 
sales are less volatile than production; and (iii) a counter-cyclical inventory-sales ratio.
In the wider context of Real Business Cycle (RBC) models, I find that my inventory 
channel also generates a substantial amount of internal propagation of TFP shocks. My 
model requires less exogenous volatility in order to match the volatility of GDP compared 
to a standard RBC model.
In Chapter 2 ,1 first explore the evidence that supports the belief that inventory man­
agement has played a role in the Great Moderation. This includes the fact that in terms 
of the decline in the variance of quarterly GDP growth, we can attribute approximately 
30% to the reduction in the volatility of the inventories adjustment component. One 
suggestion is that improvements in inventory management techniques, made possible by 
advances in information and communications technology, have driven these changes Mc­
Connell and Perez-Quiros (2000). While I am not the first person to consider the role of 
inventories in the Great Moderation, I make use of the model I developed in Chapter 1 to 
explore how reductions in the costs associated with inventory-in-motion map into what 
we observe from macroeconomic aggregates during the Great Moderation.
Mapping the salient features of the improvements in inventory management into the
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parameters of my model, I find that although the inventory management changes are 
useful to match aspects of the changes in inventory behaviour over the period, they play 
no role in the reduction of the variance of GDP growth. In my model, the “good luck” 
hypothesis is a more likely explanation for the Great Moderation decline in volatility of 
GDP growth. However, the “good luck” hypothesis alone fails to match other develop­
ments in the aggregate data. These other developments are more closely matched by the 
inventory-management explanation. I therefore conclude that the two explanations have 
played a role in shaping macroeconomic behaviour since the mid-1980s.
M onetary Policy C om m ittee Behaviour
There are many aspects to the “good policy hypothesis” posited above. Traditionally, the 
macroeconomics literature has focused on the extent the Central Bank follows an ‘active’ 
versus a ‘passive’ monetary policy rule. While more activist monetary policy may or may 
not have contributed to the Great Moderation, Chapter 3 looks much more specifically 
at an institutional change which has coincided with (part of) the drop in macroeco­
nomic volatility in the UK; the implementation of monetary policy by an independent 
mixed committee of experts. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) ar­
gue that reduce macroeconomic volatility is driven by improvements in the institutional 
framework, which then leads to improvements in macro-policy.
Figure 1 shows the decline in the volatility of UK inflation and GDP growth using a 
3-year rolling standard deviation. It also identifies distinct periods of different monetary 
regimes in the UK using grey shading. Since 1997, an independent, nine-person Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) has determined monetary policy within an inflation-targeting 
framework. This has been the most stable time in UK macroeconomic history (Benati 
2004). Using a committee to determine the policy interest rate is not unusual - Pollard 
(2004) finds 92% of surveyed central banks now use such comittees. What is relatively 
unusual about the Bank of England MPC is that it consists of both internal members 
(certain Bank of England staff who also have management responsibilities within the 
Bank) and external members (economic experts who are employed on a part-time basis 
in a monetary policy role). A similar set-up is used in South Korea and the Reserve Bank 
of Australia.
In order to explore the role of external MPC members, this chapter first develops a 
model in which MPC members communicate their views about the current state of the 
world. The members each also hold views about the economic structure; in particular, 
they may differ in the opinion of the natural rate of interest. This model provides two 
justifications for appointing both internal and external members:
16
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1. If different members have different dimensions of expertise, then mixing them to­
gether can improve the outcome for the committee designer; and
2. Where the committee designer cannot observe member beliefs about the economic 
structure, drawing members from two distributions which are likely to lie at ex­
tremes of the distribution of possible views of the economy is more likely to generate 
a moderate median voter.
The first benefit can be attained through a simple advisory role, whereas the second 
relies on external members having a vote.
The second half of the paper carries out an empirical test of the model’s predictions 
using the voting records of the Bank of England’s MPC. Using a large panel, the results 
of estimated fixed-effects regression models indicate that members’ behaviour is not con­
sistent with our ideal voting behaviour model. Members initially fail to moderate each 
others view; there is evidence of a bedding in period during which the external members 
seem to always agree with internal members.
Then, using a quasi-natural experiment - an approach that is extremely popular in 
applied microeconomics - we find evidence that career concerns may drive this behaviour. 
This is interesting as previous evidence by Meade and Stasavage (2008) found evidence
— ■ -  Rolling (3 year) variance of GDP growth 
-  -  -  Rolling (3 year) variance of Inlfation (LHS)
Figure 1: Volatility and the Monetary Policy Environment
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of career concerns on a non-mixed committee in the context of the US Federal Reserve’s 
Federal Open Market Committee.
Though interesting in their own right, these findings are much more powerful in the 
context of our model. The first finding tells us that the appointment of external members 
in a voting capacity cannot be justified from a welfare point of view. Instead, as much 
benefit would be derived from external advisors. The second result, the importance of 
career concerns, means that not only is the benefit of appointing members with different 
views about the economic structure reduced, but, if there is less learning about the 
economic shocks, then any benefits from information sharing may also be impeded.
The policy implications of this analysis is striking. In terms of monetary policy, 
although the mixed committee has been designed in order to try to make better decisions, 
our analysis suggests that it may make no difference at all, and, at its extreme, it may 
make decision-making worse. This is clearly not what the Treasury had in mind in 1997 
when the MPC was first established. However, our results also indicate that a policy 
of no external reappointments might offset the career concern associated with seeking 
reappointment.
In a more general context, if members on the MPC do not appear to vote in line with 
the predictions of our model, despite the institutional set-up being designed to be a close 
to optimal as possible, it is even more likely that voting on other committees, such as 
political committees, is even less likely to be optimal. These results place a question mark 
over the general move toward mixed committees in monetary policy and other forms of 
decision-making.
Policy U ncertainty and Precautionary Saving
The final chapter explores the effects of policy inaction rather than the effects of policy 
actions. Prolonged political debates about many policies are common. Underlying these 
debates, which postpone the adoption of reforms, is often a “war of attrition” among 
various groups in society, each trying to protect itself and to shift the burden of the 
reforms on someone else. A typical case is the reform of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension 
systems in countries. There is rarely a disagreement on the need to change the existing 
rules, but as one reform plan after the other is considered, decisions keep being been 
postponed because the government is unable to agree on how the burden should be 
shared between various groups in society and in particular between the young and the 
old.
People do not simply sit and wait while the debates and the “war of attrition” con­
tinue. Rather, households and businesses may respond to an increase in uncertainty.
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Chapter 4 studies how German households responded to the uncertainty induced by the 
1998 election. While the election was extremely close and difficult to call (James 2000), 
the policies to be adopted by either of the potential winners differed greatly. This was 
especially true concerning the two key issues surrounding the election - pension reform 
and unemployment.
This is an empirical paper which makes use of similar econometric techniques to 
Chapter 3. Using a quasi-natural experiment of the close German election, we examine 
the increase in precautionary saving that resulted among affected households. We use 
the households that are headed by civil servants as the control for the other “treated” 
households.
The finding is that German families reacted to the uncertainty by saving more. In 
addition, household members who had been working part-time increased their working 
hours. The conclusion is that “waiting and seeing”, or simply prolonging debates and 
avoiding making hard decisions, may in fact lead to unexpected reactions by households.
In terms of the current crisis, this may be directly relevant. It took six months after 
the collapse of Bear Stearns before the US Treasury was able to act on their ideas to 
inject capital into the rest of the banking system. In that time, the crisis had deepened 
and Lehman Brothers collapsed.
Implementing macroeconomic policy is not easy. These chapters suggest that (i) 
policymakers may or may not have done anything in order to generate the stable economic 
performance of the last quarter century, but, (ii) in trying to do doing something right, 
choosing an imperfect structure for a Monetary Policy Committee could worsen, rather 
than improve, decision-making; and (iii), as the final chapter shows, not doing anything, 
when it is known that something has to be done, can also generate unforeseen outcomes.
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Chapter 1
Inventories in Motion: 
A N ew  Approach To Inventories 
Over The Business Cycle
“Over the past decade, we have witnessed profound changes in many aspects 
of logistics. None of the developments, however, has been as striking as the 
recent trend toward managing ‘inventory in motion’ - that is, managing in­
ventory while it is still in transit instead of waiting until it arrives at the 
warehouse” . Copacino, 1988
“Relative to its importance in business fluctuations, inventory investment 
must be the most under-researched aspect of macroeconomic activity “. Blin­
der, 1981
1.1 Introduction
A bottle of beer purchased by a consumer in a shop, or at a bar, was produced some time 
before this consumption. In fact, the standard model followed by beer producers involves 
four distinct steps in the distribution chain. Beer is produced in the brewery and becomes 
a finished good (although it often gets transported in large trucks to a separate plant for 
bottling and labeling). The bottles or cans of beer get shipped to a beer distributor who 
allocates them to regional wholesalers. These wholesalers break up the shipments into 
smaller units and pass the beer onto the local retail units (bars and shops). Finally, the 
retailer provides the goods in smaller quantities for the consumer to enjoy. This process 
is not instantaneous - there are large lags at each stage of the process. In fact, Budweiser, 
as an example, having reduced the lags involved in distribution of its beer, now labels
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bottles according to when the beer was produced - this is their “Born On” date. The lag 
between the “Born On” date and the date it is available for purchase is usually between 
four and ten weeks, though it can be up to a year.
This distribution model, or a variant of it, is used in many industries. In fact, the 
beer distribution model is a key example used in the supply chain management literature 
to describe the importance of inventories in the distribution chain and has given rise to 
a supply-chain game used in the teaching of inventory management (see Forrester (1961) 
and Sterman (1988)). This is because, from the moment it is produced, and as it moves 
along the distribution chain, the beer is an inventory1. As illustrated by the opening 
quotation by Copacino, it is the management of such distribution inventories, the so- 
called “inventories-in-motion” , that has been a focus of the supply chain field for the last 
30 years2, but has thus far been ignored by macroeconomists. In this paper, I develop a 
model of inventories based on such distribution chains. I explore how well such a model 
can give rise to macroeconomic inventory behaviour that matches the aggregate data.
Inventory adjustment has long been recognised as a major source of business cycles3; 
inventories account for almost half of the volatility of GDP growth. Macroeconomists, 
therefore, have long searched for a convincing explanation for the behaviour of inventories 
at the aggregate level; Metzler (1941) and Abramovitz (1950) are key early references in 
this regard. After the second World War, the study of optimal inventory policy at the 
level of the firm became an active area of research in management science; early papers 
include Arrow et al (1951), Bellman (1956), and Mills (1957). However, in the late 1960s, 
and through the 1970s, inventory research slowed. A revival of the research effort in the 
1980s, in part prompted by the views expressed in the above quote from Alan Blinder, 
highlighted the inadequacy of the dominant models of the day (particularly the production 
smoothing model) to explain the stylised facts of inventory behaviour, but little consensus 
was reached on a canonical model for aggregate inventory behaviour. In fact, Christiano 
and Fitzgerald (1989) concluded that successfully modelling aggregate business cycle
1In fact, even before it is produced, beer gives rise to inventory holdings. The hops, malt barley, 
yeast, rice and water that make up the ingredients of the beer are likely to be held as input inventories 
by the brewery. I do not examine input inventories in this paper, though the analysis in this paper could 
be extended to consider such inventories.
2 A more recent quote comes from Art Mescher (CEO of Descartes Systems and winner of the Council 
of Supply Chain Management Professionals 2008 Distinguished Service Reward). He said: “As supply 
chain professionals, we are now chartered with managing a global set of resources in motion. Our scope is 
expanding once again. People, resources, truck drivers, field services workers, merchandisers, warehouse 
workers. All resources in motion” (Gilmore 2008).
3 In this paper I shall use the term inventories for what are known more commonly in the UK as stocks 
of goods. In fact, one of the early references to their importance also draws out this distinction: “Recent 
American experience has also afforded good examples of the part played by fluctuations in the stocks of 
finished and unfinished goods - “inventories” as it is becoming usual to call them - in causing the minor 
oscillations within the main movement of the trade cycle” (Keynes, 1936).
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movements could (and should) proceed without trying to model any speculative inventory 
holding.
The existing models of inventories in use by macroeconomists can generally be clas­
sified as either firm-level analyses, or general equilibrium analyses. One of the strengths 
of the firm-level models is that the motivation for firms to hold inventories are generally 
quite simple and easy to relate to the real world. The main problem with the firm-level 
approaches is that they generally use a partial equilibrium analysis; this means that they 
miss important feedback from decisions about inventory policy to other elements of the 
model such as sales volatility.
While general equilibrium models overcome these missing links, they do so at a cost. 
In particular, in order to avoid the added complexity associated with the modelling of 
these interactions, it is necessary to take short-cuts which limit the models’ usefulness 
for analysing the central role played by inventories in the business cycle. For example, 
the early general equilibrium models of inventory behaviour ensured that the models 
generated inventory holding by including inventories as a factor of production (Kydland 
and Prescott (1982)), while Kahn et al (2002) instead use a model in which inventories are 
part of the household utility function4. While both of these approaches make the solution 
of the model easier (by admitting an interior solution to the maximization problem), 
because firms/consumers are forced to hold inventories, neither is a suitable approach 
from which to evaluate how recent changes in inventory management have affected the 
holdings of inventories5.
My first contribution in this paper is, therefore, to solve a general equilibrium model 
of inventories in which the underlying motives for inventory decisions are important in 
the real world6. The first motivation, related to the opening quote by Copacino, is that 
a large amount of the inventory stocks in a modern economy are those goods which are 
finished and in the distribution chain but which have not yet reached their final con­
sumer. Hence, these inventories are not speculative (and so not subject to the finding of 
Christiano and Fitzgerald), but rather are a natural link in the chain between produc­
tion and consumption. Two well-known inventory management approaches associated 
with such inventory-in-motion are the “Just-in-Time production” approach and “The 
Walmart Approach”. The simple approach taken in this paper is that there are natural
4Other notable papers in the Real Business Cycle (RBC) and inventories literature are discussed in 
the Blinder and Maccini survey article (Blinder and Maccini 1991).
5For example in Kahn et al (2002), as noted by the authors, the steady-state inventories-sales ratio 
is determined by a parameter of the utility function (the weight of consumption relative to inventories 
in utility) and therefore “the improvements in IT do not translate into a lower inventory-sales ratio in 
the model, even though they appear to do so in the data.”
6In Chapter 2 ,1 also make use of the fact that these inventories can be directly related to the suggested 
improvements in inventory management techniques.
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delays between consumption and production. However, it is possible to overcome these 
distribution lags by paying for immediate delivery Such early delivery is used to smooth 
consumption. After periods of low productivity, when there is not as much freight coming 
through the distribution chain from earlier periods, the firm will choose to bring forward 
delivery of some goods in order to consume them today.
There is limited direct data on the extent of these distribution chain delays. An 
industry report which is famous for laying the seeds for the movement known as “Efficient 
Consumer Response (ECR)” , estimated that, in the dry grocery industry, the delays 
between orders being received by suppliers and goods becoming available on retailers 
shelves (where they may still stay for a period before being consumed) was 104 days 
on average (Kurt Salmon Associates, 1993). The report also showed that, by adopting 
more efficient distribution practices, the industry could reduce costs significantly each 
year. For the apparel industry, the same delays are even longer at one year or longer (see 
Fisher and Raman (1996), and Blackburn (1991)). But firms can, and do, rush goods 
through the distribution chain and these decisions affect the level of inventories.
The second reason for holding inventories that I consider is simply to store goods. 
The intuition is that, under the storage motive, inventories help to smooth positive pro­
ductivity booms - high productivity today induces the agent to work more and then store 
more in order to carry the gains from high productivity to later (lower productivity) 
periods. Only one of the two motives will be used at any given period by a firm. The 
distribution motive is such that if consumption is very low today (so marginal utility is 
very high), but tomorrow we expect to have higher consumption, then it might be opti­
mal not to wait for the delivery and instead to pay extra to have some goods delivered 
immediately. In section 1.3 of this paper, I use a simple 2-period endowment model to 
present the full intuition of both of these inventory motives before I embed them into an 
infinite-horizon real business cycle framework and carry out the full general equilibrium 
analysis in section 1.4.
Although conceptually the two motives explained above are simple, the main problem 
is that both motives involve frequently binding non-negativity constraints. This makes 
the model highly non-linear and an unsuitable candidate for log-linearisation (a typical 
approach used to solve real business cycle models). I overcome these problems by using 
a version of the Parameterised Expectations Algorithm (PEA) which was pioneered by 
Wright and Williams (1982, 1984). This involves approximating any expectation terms 
in the optimality conditions using a polynomial in the state variables and can easily be 
implemented despite the potentially binding constraints (Christiano and Fisher, 2000). I 
discuss the numerical solution in more detail in section 4, as well as in an appendix to 
this paper.
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An objection to the simple motivations that I propose is that while the typical unit of 
time in business cycle analyses is one quarter (driven mainly by data availability), firms 
rarely have a distribution cycle that is three months long and, moreover, the horizon for 
the decision to carry extra inventory over (or to run down built-up inventories) is also 
likely to be shorter than a full quarter. This makes the assumed motives seem unlikely 
for a quarterly model. In this paper, as discussed with the calibration of the model in 
section 1.6, I calibrate a higher frequency (monthly) model and then aggregate the data 
to explore the consequences at quarterly frequency. This paper, therefore, contributes to 
the literature that examines the effects of time aggregation on macroeconomic modelling, 
such as Aadland (2001), Heaton (1993) and Lippi and Reichlin (1991).
I then compare the quarterly predictions generated by my model with the equivalent 
predictions from an equivalently calibrated model in which agents cannot actively manage 
inventory. I find that the simple and highly stylised model that I have solved is able to 
match a number of the key facts about inventory behaviour at the macro level. Further, 
the inventory model actually generates greater amplification of shocks compared with a 
similar model in which the agent has no control over delivery speed. This means that my 
inventory model can match the behaviour of aggregate GDP with less assumed volatility 
of shocks. These comparisons are discussed in Section 1.7.
In section 1.8 I first examine why the use of storage, despite attempting to make it 
more attractive, remains elusive. I then show that the amplification that I generate with 
my baseline model is robust to lower assumed labour elasticity and a greater degree of 
risk aversion. Section 1.9 concludes the paper.
1.2 Inventories and the M acroeconomy
The importance of private inventories, defined as “materials and supplies, work in process, 
finished goods, and goods held for resale” (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2008), in the 
behaviour of business cycles, as outlined above, is well known (the survey article by 
Blinder and Maccini (1991) contains the main the references in this regard). Table 1.1 
shows that the conclusions of very early research still apply when looking at data from 
the post war years; it shows that despite making up, on average, less than 1% of nominal 
GDP7 and contributing only about 2% of GDP growth (O.lpp), inventory investment has 
accounted for 43% of the volatility of real GDP growth.
7The maximum share of inventory investment in GDP over the sample is 4%, and the minimum is 
- 2% .
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Table 1.1: Contributions to US GDP growth, 1960-2007, S.A.A.R.
Description Share of Average contribution to:
Nominal GDP GDP Growth Variance of GDP growth
% PP % of total % of total
GDP 100 3.4 100% 16.3 100%
Consumption 64.6 2.3 68% 3.0 24%
Investment 15.4 0.6 19% 2.1 17%
Government Expenditure 20.3 0.5 14% 0.8 6%
Net Trade -0.9 -0.1 -2% 1.4 11%
Inventory Investment 0.6 0.1 2% 5.2 43%
Covariance - - - -0.2 -2%
1.2.1 Stylised  Facts o f Inventory Behaviour
There are a number of other well-known stylised facts about inventory behaviour over 
the cycle which numerous empirical studies have documented (see, for example, (Blinder 
1986)). The two main facts are:
Fact 1.1 Production is more volatile than sales;
Fact 1.2 Production and inventory investment are positively correlated.
In fact, it was these facts that undermined the production-smoothing model which 
was the main focus of research interest initially. Within this framework, first proposed 
by Holt et al (1960), the accelerator idea of Metzler could be attributed to a firm-level 
optimisation in which costs were quadratic. This meant that it was in the interests 
of firms to smooth production (to minimise costs) and so inventories played a buffer 
role within this context. However, the excess volatility of production relative to sales 
undermined these models. Blanchard (1983) examines the behaviour of inventories within 
the automobile sector using a framework of both costs of changing production and costs 
of deviations from a target level of inventory-sales ratio, and concludes that inventories 
are, in fact, a destabilising force on output. Although attempts were made to salvage 
this framework, such as Miron and Zeldes (1988) and Ramey (1991), this approach has 
received less interest in recent years.
Another approach, used in the general equilibrium analyses, include inventories either 
as a factor of production (as in Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Ramey (1989)) or as 
an argument of the utility function (such as in Kahn et al (2002)). The main downside 
of this approach, especially if one wishes to investigate the volatility of inventories, is
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that inventory behaviour only changes if we change the parameters of the model or the 
functional form of the production/utility function.
The two main approaches used in recent analyses are those which assume a stock-out 
avoidance motive and the (s, S) model of fixed costs of ordering or producing goods. 
The former, pioneered by Kahn (1987), assumes that firms hold inventories to avoid a 
(costly) stockout in which demand exceeds products available for sale. Using a partial 
equilibrium framework, he showed that serially correlated demand shocks could explain 
the fact that production was more volatile than sales. Although Kahn’s original work 
was a partial equilibrium analysis, Shibayama (2008) embeds this motive in a full general 
equilibrium business cycle model and finds that his model can help to match the behaviour 
of inventories at the aggregate level.
The other main approach, the (5 , S) model, has been popular for many years and 
the approach is used in many applications, of which inventory analysis is just one (for 
example, Blinder (1981) uses the approach to model retail inventories). The basic idea 
is that there is a fixed cost associated with ordering goods (final or intermediate) and 
therefore the optimal behaviour for firms is to bunch orders and follow a rule whereby 
they only reorder once inventories fall to an optimally-determined lower bound (s). The 
firm reorders an amount that is enough to restore inventories to an upper bound level 
(S ). More recent contributions, such as those of Khan and Thomas (2007b), use complex 
numerical methods in order to get around the difficulties that arise in extending this 
analysis to general equilibrium models. Despite the intuitive appeal at the firm level, 
the problem with these models relates to aggregation; it is not clear that an economy in 
which a large number of firms behave according to an (s, S) inventory policy would lead to 
aggregate (macro) behaviour that mimics the (s, S) behaviour once we aggregate across 
time and/or goods. Khan and Thomas (2007b) need to assume firm-level idiosyncratic 
shocks each period to the cost of reordering in order to generate aggregate effects - this 
seems like an unlikely assumption.
In another paper, Khan and Thomas (2007a) compare general equilibrium approaches 
to the stockout avoidance motive and their (s, S) approach using the idiosyncratic reorder 
cost shocks, They find that, under reasonable assumptions about shocks hitting the 
economy, the (s ,S ) model performs better. They argue that the general equilibrium 
framework is important; introducing inventories in their model endogenously lowers the 
volatility of sales and this offsets the increased output volatility of introducing inventories 
that are positively correlated with sales (Khan and Thomas, 2007b). In this paper I use 
a general equilibrium framework .
Further research has also highlighted, in addition to the two facts of inventory invest­
ment and the characteristic of being a small but volatile component of GDP, two further
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challenges for any model of inventory behaviour over the business cycle. Firstly, Khan 
and Thomas (2007b) emphasise that the inventory-sales ratio is counter-cyclical.
Secondly, there has been a resurgence of interest in the relationship between the real 
interest rate and inventory investment. Most models of inventory behaviour predict a 
negative relationship between the real interest rate and inventory investment, but the 
empirical evidence fails to support such a relationship. Maccini et al (2004) argue that 
the failure of empirical tests to uncover a negative relationship is due to the highly 
persistent nature of the real interest rate; firms will only be concerned with long-run 
changes in the real interest rate brought about, for example, by regime changes. Under 
my model, as I discuss below, changes in the real interest rate are positively related to 
inventory investment. Where data are generated in a world in which my inventory motive 
operates alongside other inventory motives traditionally emphasised in the literature, it 
may be difficult to uncover a clear relationship between the real interest rate and inventory 
investment.
I find that my model, at least qualitatively, matches all of these main facts.
1.2.2 W hich  Inventories?
The existing literature has argued over which form of inventory holding is the most 
important and thus the correct one to model. As pointed out in Blinder and Maccini 
(1991), and reproduced in Table (1.2) below, retail inventories and inventories of materials 
and supplies in the manufacturing sector are the most volatile components of inventory 
investment (although they are also the biggest). This suggests that these two forms of 
inventory holding are the most useful avenues of research to explain the role of inventories 
in business cycle volatility. Khan and Thomas (2007b), however, argue that the focus 
should be on manufacturing inventories rather than retail or wholesale inventories.
In this paper, I focus on finished good inventories, although the motives could be 
extended to work in progress (over which firms may enjoy greater control to determine 
when these goods are finished) or to materials and supplies. In terms of the distinction 
between manufacturing, retail and wholesale inventories, such as that emphasised in 
Blinder (1981), I have not taken a view in this paper. For simplicity, I model a single 
good and a single sector; the distribution sector is a black-box in my model. Furthermore, 
the main motive in this paper, inventories that arise as part of the distribution chain, 
consist of all retail and wholesale inventories, finished goods in the manufacturing sector, 
as well as some materials and supplies inventories. It is not economically important 
whether the final goods are stored in a room at the manufacturing plant, on pallets in a 
wholesalers, or on a retailer’s shelves (Summers 1981). Similarly, the distinction between 
different types of manufacturing inventories is always economically relevant. For example,
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Table 1.2: Volatility of Inventories (Source: Blinder and Maccini, 1991)
Description % of total inventories % of variance of inventories
Manufacturing and Trade 100 100
Manufacturing 60.8 46.3
Finished goods 16.6 5.7
Work in Progress 19.4 9.6
Materials Sz supplies 24.8 20.3
Covariance terms 10.8
Wholesale Trade 17.1 8.9
Retail Trade 22.1 24.3
Covariance terms 20.4
if a steel manufacturer sells steel bars to another firm who holds them as inventory to use 
later in production, the bars are counted as “Materials Sz Supplies”; on the other hand, 
if the steel bar producer had held the metal bars on their premises, they would be listed 
as “Finished Goods”.
To summarise, the success of my model will be judged on how well it can match the 
behaviour of inventories along the following dimensions:
• Inventory adjustment is a small component of GDP growth, but it contributes a 
great deal to its volatility;
• Sales are less volatile than production;
• Production and inventory investment are procyclical;
• The inventory-sales ratio is counter-cyclical;
• No clear negative relationship exists between inventories and the real interest rate.
1.3 The Basic M echanisms of the M odel
The model of inventories which I propose in this paper is not meant to be an attempt at a 
canonical model. Rather, my aim is to develop a reasonably simple model which matches 
the aggregate data, and particularly one that captures the consequential nature of some 
of the distribution chain inventories associated with the inventory-in-motion concept. I 
additionally focus on the use of storage inventories as a complement to firm adjustment 
of distribution inventories. To illustrate these simple mechanisms, I will first explain
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the basic modelling devices, one at a time, within the context of a 2-period, stochastic 
endowment economy8.
In explaining both inventory motives, the 2-period environment is the same and so I 
shall first elaborate on this, before explaining the specific modelling devices I employ.
The economy is characterised by a single consumption good from which utility is 
derived; in each period, there is an endowment of consumption goods given by:
yt = at * = 1,2
where at is the endowment of goods. The consumption choice is given by c* and consumer 
preferences are given by:
U =  Et [U (Cl) + (3.g2.U (c2)}
cl-7
where U (cr) = 1 - 7
where g2 is a shock which affects the marginal utility of consumption (taste shock) in 
the second period (for expositional purposes, I assume that gi = 1). I introduce taste 
shocks at this point as I will draw on them in the Chapter 2. The endowment can take 
two values - high (aH) and low (aL), and is driven by a Markov process:
a2 = <
iH w.p. ph if a>\ = aH 
w.p. (1 — ph) if ai =  aH 
2H w.p. p l  if «i = aL 
w.p. (1 — pl) if ai =  aL
( 1.1)
Inventories as Freight
The main inventory motive that I examine is the role of distributional inventories - 
inventories which are held simply while the goods are distributed9. For simplicity, there 
is no cost of holding inventories in this form; goods, once produced, take one period 
to be distributed free of charge. The amount of goods in the pipeline in period t and 
carried into period t + 1 is given by / t+1 (for freight, and using the same time subscript 
as is common for capital stock in RBC models). However, the agent has the option to 
distribute the good more quickly at a cost; the agent must, therefore, choose a fraction
8For the sake of simplicity, I ignore the role of capital and labour supply decisions; I reintroduce these 
decisions in the main model in Section 1.4.
9Related to the title and the quotation at the beginning of this paper, there is much discussion within 
the supply chain management literature about the concept of managing “Inventory in Motion” as being 
synonymous with the function of distribution logistics.
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h (0 <  k  < 1) of today’s production to deliver immediately at a cost (paid for in period 
t)10. Therefore the stock of consumer goods in freight at the end of period t (and so will 
be available in period t + 1) is given by:
f t + i =  ( l  -  h ) - y t
I assume that some freight is given in the first period (/i). Consumption in each period 
is derived from the budget constraint:
c t  =  k - V t  +  f t ~  J  ( k )  •Vt
where J  (k) is the per unit cost of immediate delivery, which I assume to be convex11. 
As k  > 0 (agents are not allowed to use distribution in order to defer consumption), I 
therefore have a non-negativity constraint and will need to solve the model using Kuhn- 
Tucker optimisation and considering whether the constraint binds or not.
The optimisation is:
max U =  Ei [U (ci) + p.g2.U (c2)]
{ C 1 ,C 2 ,1 1 ,1 2 }
s.t. Cl =  [ i i -  J  (ii)] .2/1 + /1
c2 =  [i2 -  J  (t2)] ,y2 +  (1 -  Li).yi
k > 0
The equilibrium of this model is:
«! =  J ' M  (1.2)
= 1 (1.3)
Ci = [k — J  (^ 1)] -2/i + /1  (1*4)
c2 =  [l2 -  J { t2)] -2/2 + (1 -  k)-Vi (1-5)
«i > 0 , k  > 0 (1.6)
The agent will always choose to deliver as much as possible in period 2 and this
10An alternative approach which leads to an equivalent set up assumes that firms choose an amount 
of the good to deliver early (£t =  LtVt)-
11I assume that J  {it) =  w. (it )2 , where w  is a cost function parameters; higher w  will increase the 
cost of immediate delivery. I constrain this parameter such that w >  (1 — (3) as this ensures that the 
agent will never choose it >  1 .
Under the alternative approach of choosing an amount of the good to deliver early (Ct), convex costs 
imply that the unit cost of early delivery rises where the size is normalised by total output, i.e. cost per 
unit is Vt
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maximum is given by equation (1.3). Solving the model in period 1, with a potentially 
binding constraint, is relatively simple (see, for example, Christiano and Fisher (2000)). 
I first solve the model by assuming that the non-negativity constraint on i\ binds and 
then check whether «i, given by (1.2), is non-negative; if it is, the model is solved. When 
the non-negativity constraint binds, the agent consumes only the freight brought into the 
period and chooses to allow all recently produced output to carry into the next period. If 
the model is not solved («i =  0, 0 < it < 1), then equation (1.2) yields an Euler equation 
for the optimum amount of output to bring forward:
U'c ((‘1 -  J  M )  -Vi +  f i )  [1 -  J' (M)] =  /3E, \g2.U'c ((t2 -  J ( h )) .3/2 +  (1 -  t,).jft)]
That is, we balance the gain in terms of higher consumption today with the cost in terms 
of lower freight delivered tomorrow and the higher costs of delivery. There are three main 
factors which affect the decision to deliver goods early. There are 3 main variables which 
affect the decision to deliver goods early:
F u tu re  p roductiv ity  In periods of low productivity/endowment (relative to the fu­
ture), it will be desirable to deliver some of today’s output that would otherwise 
only come available in the next period. As such, the more volatile the swings in 
productivity are, the more likely that stocks levels will be adjusted by bringing 
forward delivery. In my simple model, this amounts to a low value for pn (or a 
high probability that a period of high productivity is followed by a period of low 
productivity). In a standard RBC model, the parameters of the TFP process (the 
AR(1) coefficient and the variance of the shocks) will determine the incidence of 
stock holding.
F u tu re  T aste Shocks The higher we expect the taste parameter (#2) to be in the future, 
then we will wish to leave more inventory in freight in order to ensure that we have 
more to consume in the next period. This means we consume less today (when 
marginal utility is relatively low) and more tomorrow when the marginal utility is 
higher. This enables the agent to smooth their marginal utility across the periods.
T he cost of early delivery Costs of early delivery measured using the parameter w in 
J  (it) determine the extent of the loss of output from choosing to delivery goods 
early. Higher w makes early delivery less likely (and, therefore, freight inventories 
are more likely to arise).
T he tim e discount ra te  The less the agent values consumption in the next period, 
the more likely she is to delivery goods early (and so she is less likely to hold 
inventories).
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This simple motive satisfies the two key facts about inventory behaviour:
1. Early delivery is used to smooth consumption and thus the option to reduce pipeline 
stocks at a cost, means that consumption will be less volatile even where current 
or recent production is low (so long as future production is expected to increase);
2 . After periods of low productivity, when stock available for consumption is low from 
earlier periods, the agent will choose to bring forward delivery of some goods in 
order to smooth consumption. This means that lower productivity, and hence 
output, will coincide with a decline in pipeline inventories; changes in inventories 
(inventory investment) are procyclical.
Inventories as Storage
The second motive involves using inventories as a storage device12; in times of high 
productivity, people may choose to produce more than they wish to consume at that 
time in order to store some of the good for consumption at another time, for instance, at 
a time of much lower productivity. The effects of this type of inventory behaviour may 
be purely deterministic. For example, consider a manufacturer who knows that demand 
for their goods will be especially high in January, but also that productivity may be 
extremely low over Christmas (as many workers are on holidays at times over Christmas 
and New Year). The producer uses the relatively high productivity of November and 
the first weeks of December to build up extra inventories in order to meet demand when 
productivity is low.
In the model, I now ignore the effects of distributional inventories, and focus on the 
representative agent’s ability to store consumption goods at a cost. The amount of goods 
stored in period t and carried into period t +  1 is given by st+i (for storage). The cost 
of st+1, paid in period t + 1, is given by a simple iceberg cost (f) which can be thought 
of as loss, theft or damage resulting from the stock storage13. Therefore the evolution of 
stored consumer goods (storage inventories) is given by:
st+i =  2/t +  (1  -  v).st -  (k
Crucially for the solution of the model, storage is required to be non-negative - st+1 > 0. 
Storage brought into the first period, which is like a bonus endowment in period 1, is 
given by Si > 0 .
12A similar story is briefly discussed at the firm level by Blinder and Maccini (1991).
13The basic analysis is unchanged by the inclusion of a convex cost term (g.(st+ i)2) to capture ware­
house expenses and output losses through the use of labour in the physical handling of the storage.
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We can solve this model by backward induction. In period 2, no storage will be desired, 
and everything available for consumption (output and stocks less costs) is consumed. 
There is no decision to make once the endowment is realised (S3 = 0, and C2 =  a2 +  (1 — 
l>).S2). In period 1, therefore, the consumer faces the following maximisation problem:
maxU = Ei [U (ci) + (3.g2.U (c2)]
{S2,C1>
s.t. s2 = ai +  (1 — r;).si — ci
c2 =  a2 +  (1 -  v).s2
s2 > 0
This model can be solved using standard Kuhn-Tucker optimisation, and the equilibrium 
of this model is given by:
= U'e (cl ) - P ( l - v ) . E 1 \92.U'c (c2 )] (1.7)
s  f =  ai +  (1 -  v ) . S !  -  c 1 i f  /zi =  0 
2 \  =  0 i f  fix >  0
s2 = ai + (1 -  v).s i  -  ci (1.9)
c2 =  a2 +  (1 -  v) .s2 (1-10)
Mi > 0 , s2 > 0 (1.11)
As with the distribution motive, I first solve the model by assuming that the non­
negativity constraint on s2 binds and then I check whether mi, given by (1.7), is non­
negative; if it is, the model is solved. If it is not solved (//1 =  0), then equation (1.7) 
becomes the key behavioural relationship:
U'c (ai +  (1 — t!).<si — s2) =  (3(1 — u).Ei [g2.Ufc (a2 +  (1 — ^)-52)] (1-12)
The key factors affecting the decision to store goods early are expected future produc­
tivity, expected future tastes, the cost of storage (u), and the time discount rate. These 
are very similar to the factors affecting the distribution inventory decision. However,
this motive operates in the opposite direction. If we choose to store goods, then we will
do so until the marginal utility loss today from not consuming, is equal to the expected 
marginal utility benefit of having that extra good for consumption in the next period. 
If consumption is very high today (so marginal utility is very low), but we expect to 
have lower consumption tomorrow, then we may choose to store some of the goods for 
consumption in the next period. The constraint on storage binds when we would wish 
to consume more today because we expect consumption to be higher tomorrow, but we
33
cannot bring forward the endowment. This is the opposite of the early delivery decision.
In the absence of variation in productivity and tastes, there is no storage. This means 
that in a non-stochastic steady state with constant productivity, no inventories are held 
for storage. However, even when productivity changes are deterministic (such as seasonal 
variation), this model generates stock holding behaviour. Moreover, such a storage model 
also matches two of the key facts about inventory behaviour:
1. As stocks are used to smooth consumption, their introduction will mean that pro­
duction is more volatile than sales (consumption);
2. The build-up of inventories is strongest in periods of high productivity; hence 
changes in inventories (inventory investment) are likely to be procyclical.
D iscussion  o f th e M ain M odelling C hoices
Before I develop the full model using both these motives, it is worth pausing and consid­
ering what each of my two motives captures. Regarding the distribution motive, there is 
no reason to think that this simply refers to items in a long transportation. Rather, the 
process of delivery from factory to consumer includes, in addition to the transportation 
leg, any finished good inventories in the factory awaiting delivery and, particularly, those 
goods that are on the shelves of retailers (or on the pallets of wholesalers).
One potential criticism of this motive is that it is effectively equivalent to the approach 
of Kydland and Prescott (1982) (and others) who have included inventories as a factor 
of production. In particular, in my model, the amount of goods that are available for 
consumption today, depends on the inventories brought into the period as freight (and, 
of course, any storage too). In one respect, this is analogous to the inventories in the 
production function and therefore I have simply added the complication of not having 
an internal solution, with little gain in terms of the modelling strategy. However, there 
is one important difference between the my model and that of Kydland and Prescott; in 
my model, it is the marginal product of capital (and its expected future path) that will 
determine the behaviour of inventories, while the causality runs the other way with the 
inventories in the production function models.
The storage motive can be interpreted more broadly as a speculative motive for firms 
to hold inventories. Any decision by the firm to store goods will be taken because they 
expect that there will be a higher return (in terms of utility from consumption) next 
period. Given the general equilibrium nature of the model, there is no such thing as 
a stock-out in my model - if the agent wants more goods, they can get them but the 
cost will be the disutility of longer working hours and the costs of immediate delivery. 
However, to the extent that being forced into this extra cost situation is analogous to a
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stock-out, the storage motive captures the costs of not having enough goods available for 
consumption - a quasi-stock-out.
A final criticism may be that these motives lack a firm level foundation relative to 
the stock-out avoidance or (s,S) model approaches. I, however, view this as one of the 
strengths of the modelling strategy. The problem with, for example, the (s,S) approach, is 
that although the motivation has an intuitive foundation when we consider the behaviour 
of a single producer of a single good, it is not clear that a large number of agents acting 
individually in an (s,S) manner would aggregate to (s,S)-type behaviour for the macroe­
conomy. As mentioned above, Khan and Thomas (2007b) get around this by assuming 
that each producer gets a random draw for the cost of reorder every period and this 
random draw ensures that some agents delay ordering in every period (even to the point 
of shutting down production). Instead, my framework requires only that productivity 
shocks are highly correlated across firms (a standard assumption in the RBC literature) 
in order to allow me to proceed with a representative agent framework in which aggregate 
stocks would mimic the actions of the agent.
I, therefore, believe that although the two motives in my model are very simple, 
they are capturing two important channels for the holding of inventories. Moreover, 
the explicit modelling of these two channels provides a direct model analogue to the 
stories describing the improvement in inventory management that, it is alleged, may 
have driven the Great Moderation - the decline in macroeconomic volatility observed 
in most developed countries in the past 30 years. I return to the issue of the Great 
Moderation in Chapter 2.
1.4 The Real Business Cycle (RBC) M odel
Although the simple model above is useful to introduce the ideas of the inventory motives 
that I wish to explore, it does not take into account the general equilibrium impact of 
changes in decision variables, and in particular, it ignores how changes in the stochastic 
variables induce changes in the inventory decision through labour and capital choices. 
Therefore, the inventory holding motives are embedded into an infinite-horizon RBC 
model. I shall proceed by assuming that there are only productivity shocks; in Chapter 
2 I explore the behaviour of the model under preference (taste) shocks. In this section, 
I will also describe the non-stochastic steady state of the model and how GDP should 
be measured in this model. The next section explains how the model is solved using the 
Parameterised Expectations Algorithm (PEA).
As there are a lot of variables, parameters, and functions to keep track of, Table 
1.3 provides a ready-reckoner for all the main symbols used in the model and a brief
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description of what the symbol represents.
1.4.1 M odel Setup
The RBC model economy is characterised by a single sector which produces storable14 
consumption goods from which utility is derived. This single good is produced using 
capital and labour:
yT = aT (nT)a .k\~a
where aT is the productivity of labour. The labour productivity term follows an AR(1) 
in logs:
In aT+1 =  pin aT +  et+1
where et N(0,ae).
The consumption choice is given by cT and consumer preferences, in the absence of 
taste shocks, are given by:
U = Et Y ^ - U ( C r ,  l - n T)
T — t
where U (cT, 1 — nT) = U (Cr) +  bN (1 — nT) 
c'~y + bi1 -
1 - 7 1 - 7 ? (1.13)
where b is a parameter which determines the relative weight attached to disutility of 
labour in the consumer’s decision.
Both of the previously discussed inventory motives now apply. The agent has the 
option to store consumption goods, as well as an option to determine how goods are 
distributed. The model is such that the each motive operates in a different direction. 
The agent will either wish to consume more, and thus pay for immediate delivery, or they 
will wish to defer consumption from today and so pay to store the goods. As before, the 
amount of goods in the pipeline in period t and carried into period t + 1 are given by 
ft+i, the goods stored in period t and carried into period t + 1  are given by st+1 at a cost 
v. J  (it) is the per unit cost of immediate delivery.
Capital can, at a cost, be made from the single good. These costs of converting the 
consumption good into a capital good (capital adjustment costs) are included in order
14The distinction between durable and storable is an important one, but not one I address in the 
model. The goods in my model do not provide a service flow, although I assume that all goods can be 
stored. In reality, all goods can be stored, although the horizon over which they may be stored differs 
greatly.
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Table 1.3: Parameters and Variables Used in the Model 
V ariable D escription O ther Inform ation
Exogenous Variables A nd T he U nderlying Processes
at TFP variable in period t In aT+i =  p In aT +  et
et TFP shock et ~  N (0, a£)
Endogenous Variables and  Functions
yt Output in period t = at (nt)a .k]~a
kt Capital stock for use in period t
nt Labour input in period t
Ct consumption in period t
st+1 storage carried into period t +  1
it early delivery variable (%) in period t
J  (it) cost function to bring forward delivery to period t =  w.i2
dt+i inventories carried into period t + 1 =  (1 — v).st+1 + (1 — iT)-yr
st stored inventories from period t — 1
f T+1 freight carried into period 14-1 =  (1 — iT)-yr
t+1 adjustment costs of investment - paid in period t f  ( fcT+1~fc^ ~^fcT^
U(c) Utility function in consumption
N(  1 — n) Utility function in leisure
Salest Consumption +  investment in period t
Inventory-sales ratio in period t
Pau-ameters
a Labour share of output
x  parameter of adjustment costs
/3 time discount rate
7  parameter on utility from consumption (c)
77 parameter on utility from leisure (1 — n)
b Relative weight of disutility of labour in utility
w cost of early delivery parameter
v  iceberg cost of storing goods
5 depreciation rate
p TFP shock persistence
N um erical Solution
¥  Update parameter used in numerical solution
(at ,k t,D t; u) Expectation approximation function 
u  Expectation approximation coefficients
©n (at , kt ,D t ; 9) Expectation approximation function
6 Expectation approximation coefficients
(at , kt,D t; ip) Expectation approximation function
ip Expectation approximation coefficients
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to make the option of storing goods attractive. In a standard RBC model, without 
such adjustment costs, all intertemporal storage is achieved via capital accumulation and 
subsequent running down of capital; storage of goods as goods (rather than machines) 
would never be desirable as the return on storage is negative (cost). I therefore assume 
that it is costly to actively adjust (up or down) the level of capital stock. It is not costly, 
however, beyond the loss of production capability, to allow depreciation to passively 
reduce the level of capital stock. Capital adjustment costs are given by:
x  / fct+i -  (1 -  6)kt\ 2
2 V h  )
where kt+1 — (1 — 5) kt is net investment and I shall label the percentage change in the 
capital stock as Ft+i (=  f o + i  ^ ^he assUmed form of adjustment costs mean that 
in steady-state there is a cost to pay15; therefore adjustment costs affect the level of 
consumption in steady state.
Therefore, within each period, the goods available for consumption, storage or invest­
ment are given by: (i) output produced today but delivered immediately (less costs); (ii) 
stored goods brought forward from the last period; and (iii) normally delivered goods that 
have been in freight from the last period but, from which, we subtract the lost output 
due to adjustment costs. Therefore, the budget constraint in each period is:
cT +  sT+i +  kT+1 — (1 — 8)kT = (iT — J  (iT)).yT + (1 — v).sT +  / r — — -^1— j-----------—
where f T+1 = (1 -  iT).yT
yT = aT (nT)a .kl~a
In addition, the model is, of course, subject to the following two non-negativity con­
straints:
sT+i ^  0 
Lt > 0
In order to keep track of total inventories, be they pipeline or storage, I define the 
state variable “total inventories in period t (beginning of period inventories)” as Dt = 
(1 —v).st +ft', the two control variables that make up beginning of period t are determined
15The alternative, such that there is no adjustment costs in steady-state, means that there is an 
adjustment cost to allowing depreciation to take place. If we consider that the adjustment costs derive 
from the costs of rearranging or delaying production during new investment installation, then allowing 
depreciation to take place passively does not seem like it should create costs (beyond loss of production 
capability).
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in the previous period. The full optimisation is laid out in the appendix to this paper; the 
equations defining the equilibrium in period t , using a few reporting variables to make 
the interpretation easier, are:
u 'M )
X
1 + v t+1
[/'(Q +0 f ( i1+1 - J ( L t +1))M PK t+1 +  (1 -  6) +  f  
... +  /?2.Et [U'c (q+2) .(1 -  iw ).M PKt+1]
>H+2
kt+1 
(1.14)
N'n (1 -  th) =  U'c (ct) . ( i t - J  M ) M P L t  +  %  \j3.U'c (ct+1) .(1 -  h ) M P L t] (1.15)
Kt =  Et [0.U'C (ct+1) .yt] - U 'c ( c t ) . ( l - J '  (it)) yt (1.16)
tit =  U'e ( c t ) - p . { l -  v)  .Et \U'C(Ct+x)] (1.17)
ct +  Sf+i +  fcf+j — (1 — 5)kt ~  {it — J (h))-Vt + (1 — v)-$t +  f t ~ (t+i)2 (1-18)
lnat+i =  p ln a( +  £t (1-19)
M P L t = aat (rat)"-1 -fct1-" (1-20)
M P K t+1 = (1 -  a) at+1 (n,+l)a . k ^  (1.21)
kt+i — (1 — S)kt
- n  k  )  ( i -22)
^  > 0, Lt> 0 (1.23)
0, st+1> 0  (1.24)
Though they appear more complicated, these are standard first order conditions. 
Equation (1.15) is the intratemporal Euler equation which determines the optimal amount 
of labour taking account of the fact that the benefit to working (the M P L t , which depends 
on both the capital stock and the level of productivity) is split between this period and 
the next period depending on how much early delivery that is used. Equation (1.14) is the 
intertemporal optimality condition for investment in which the cost of investment today 
(resulting from lower consumption as a result of the investment and the adjustment cost) 
is equalised with the benefit of that investment (including the impact on adjustment costs 
in the future) which again will be spread between period t +  1 and t + 2 depending on 
the choice of how much to deliver next period. Equation (1.18) is the budget constraint, 
(1.19) is the standard productivity process used in RBC models, while (1.20), (1.21) and
(1.22) are designated variables that try to make the conditions more readable.
The key equations in this model are the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier equations associated 
with the early delivery decision (equation (1.16)) and storage (1.17), and the relevant
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non-negativity constraints ((1.23) and (1.24)). When it is desirable to deliver goods early
(it > 0), Kt = 0 and the relevant Euler equation (1.16) becomes U'c (ct). (1 — J' (it)) =
Et \P-U'C ( q + i )] • This equation implies that the expected benefit from bringing forward 
one more unit of consumption at a cost of (1 — J' (it)), should equal the marginal cost in 
terms of lower expected utility of consumption in the next period. In this case, fit > 0 
with no storage being used. On the other hand, where storage is desirable and no goods 
are delivered early, equation (1.17) becomes the relevant Euler equation balancing the 
cost of giving up one unit of consumption today with the benefit of higher consumption 
in the next period (after taking into account the costs of storage).
G D P  M easurem ent
In this model economy, output can be decomposed into its expenditure components using 
the accounting identity which is derived from the budget constraint:
Vt =  <k +  kt+1 — (1 — 8)kt + (Dt+1 — Dt) +  J  (it) .Vt••• (1-25)
— + — (Ft+i) + v.sT
Output growth is given by the percentage change (~ ^ )-
However, this measurement does correspond to the measurement of GDP in the econ­
omy; the business costs (early delivery, storage, and capital adjustment) are intermediate 
consumption by firms and so need to be subtracted from output. This is true if the costs 
have to be paid formally (such as business consultancy costs for the installation of new 
investment) and are hence recorded, but it is also true if the costs were lost output (the 
use of worker time but without producing the usual physical output)16. Therefore:
Vt — J  (h) •Vt *+i)2 “  v ’sr = °t +  h+i ~  (1 -  8)kt +  (A +i -  Dt) (1.26)
N------------------- -'
GDPr
In the analysis of the model presented below, I will use this definition of GDP and 
therefore the GDP growth contributions, which correspond to the Bureau of Economic
16In the latter case, firm output would actually be measured as GDP and no intermediate consumption 
would be recorded. Another case concerns where the firm output is measured perfectly but intermediate 
consumption is mismeasured because the in-house provision of the services is not properly accounted for. 
In this case, the statistical authorities might attribute all output (yt) to final value-added but instead 
mismeasure the expenditure side of the economy. In this case they will need to add a statistical dis­
crepancy equal to the unmeasured parts of spending ( j  (tt) -Vt +  % (F t+ i)2 +  u.sT+i^ ; the discrepancy 
is often included in the change in inventories contribution.
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Analysis (BEA) data and allow the adding up of variance of GDP growth, are given by:
AGDPt  =  Ac, A (k t+1 - ( l - 8)kt) A (A + i~  A )  (l 27)
GDPr_! GDPt_i GDPt_i GDPt_i [ ' J
Steady-State
The deterministic steady-state of this model is given by a time when productivity and 
output are constant and there is no uncertainty17. It is characterised by a situation in 
which:
Ct = c* Vt
at = 1 Vt
nt =  n* Vt
kt+i = k* vt
This steady-state is one in which it is optimal to take early delivery of some goods 
(t* > 0 , and s* =  0). The reason for this is that leaving goods in the distribution chain has 
an implicit cost given by time discounting; if we wait until the next period to receive the 
goods, the utility that we derive from consuming the goods is lower than if we consume 
the same goods today. Optimal immediate delivery of goods balances the costs of early 
delivery with the loss of utility through discounting. The optimal condition (derived 
using Kt = 0 , and (1.16)) is:
1 -  J' (c') =  (3 (1.28)
The higher the discount rate, the more goods we choose to deliver immediately. Further, 
the intratemporal Euler equation for labour allocation (equation (1.15)), the intertempo­
ral Euler equation for investment (equation (1.14)), and the budget constraint (equation
(1.18)) provide three equations in the three remaining unknown steady-state choice vari­
ables (c*,n*,k*). Here, I write these three equations in terms of steady-state variables 
using the reporting variables of y*, M P L *, M P K *, and D*:
17This deterministic steady state solution is not the same as the zero shock outcome to the model; the 
slight difference results from the fact that the expectation function will take account of the probability 
of different shocks and a sustained period without shocks will not cause them to update their views. In 
other words, there is no learning in the model.
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N'n (1 — n*) =  £ / '(c * ) .M P L * (i* (l- /J ) -  J  (P) + P) (1.29)
1 +  T -(1  ~ P ) = f i l l -  f)-M P K *  +  /?(t* -  J (P ) )M P K t +  /3(l-<5) (1.30)k*
c* +  Sk' +  ^ 5 2 =  (1 -J ( t * ) ) .y *  (1.31)
y* =  {n*)a . ( k ' f - a
M P L * =  a(n*)“- 1 .(A:*)1-a
MPK*  =  (1 -  a) (n*)“ . (fc*)_°
£1* =  ( l- t* ) .(n * )“ . (fc*)1_“ (1.32)
1.5 Num erical Solution
The difficulty, however, with using DSGE models stems the complication of solving the 
dynamic behaviour in a system which has conditional expectations in the optimality 
conditions. The expectation terms are usually non-linear functions of both future choice 
variables and the stochastic realisation of future state variables. Given these difficulties, a 
typical solution, popularised by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), is to linearise the system 
(either in logs or levels) around its steady state and hence obtain (local) approximate 
solutions. However, in the face of occasionally/regularly binding constraints, it is unlikely 
that a linearisation around the steady-state will capture the effect of kinks in the policy 
function.
An alternative solution approach is the parameterized expectations algorithm (PEA). 
The PEA, which was first used by Wright and Williams (1982, 1984) and then popularised 
by Den Haan and Marcet (1990, 1994), replaces the conditional expectation in the Euler 
equation with an approximation. The approach then iterates until the approximation fits 
well. This approach is particularly well-suited for the solution of models with occasionally 
binding constraints, as the parameterized expectation means we do not have to solve 
separately for the policy and multiplier functions (see Christiano and Fisher (2000)).
PEA can be implemented in either a stochastic or non-stochastic fashion. Stochastic 
PEA works with simulated data and uses the realised values of the target variable as 
a measure of the expectation. This approach, therefore, depends on outcomes of the 
exogenous shocks used in the algorithm and it is in this sense that it is stochastic. When 
implementing the non-stochastic version, the researcher instead uses a selected grid of 
the possible values for the state variables and then, at each grid point, calculates the 
conditional expectation explicitly using Gaussian quadrature methods. These two dif­
ferences have two major advantages; by using the actual conditional expectation, rather
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than the stochastic realisation, we can eliminate sampling noise and we can use a lin­
ear rather than non-linear regression to estimate the coefficients. Secondly, by carefully 
choosing the nodes used (in particular by making use of Chebyshev nodes and Chebyshev 
polynomials), we gain efficiency. Den Haan (2007) discusses these issues in greater depth.
To solve my model, I need to approximate the three expectations that appear in the 
first order conditions of the model using 0 , and 4/ as the approximation functions as 
follows:
U'c (C+1) ( ( 6,+1 -  J ( k+l))M P K t+1 + (1 -  6) + - g -  -Ft+i
VLn (at ,kt ,D t\u) (1.33)
Et [U'c (ct+2) .(1 -  it+l).M PKt+1] «  0 n (at, ku A ; 6) (1.34)
Et [U'c (ct+i)\ ~  y n {at,ku (1.35)
To implement the PEA algorithm, I use an exponentiated polynomial in the three state 
variables - T F P  (af), capital (kt), and total inventories ( A )18 - as the functional form 
for the approximation of the conditional expectation. For example, for the expectation 
in equation (1.35), I estimate the log of the expectation with polynomial of order L = 
(lz +  1) x (Ik -I-1) x (Id +  1) in the logs of the state variables, with coefficients given by 
ip:
(a*, kt, A,; ip) ~  exp (PL (ln(at), ln(A*), ln(A); VO)
where Pl is a L-th order polynomial. As I use Chebyshev polynomials, the total number 
of coefficients depends on the multiplication of the order of the basis function for each 
state variable. Therefore, if I use simple 1st order basis functions for each of the state 
variables (lz = =  Zd =  1), the approximant will have eight coefficients to estimate19.
Once I have an estimate of these expectations, the model can easily be solved for 
any set of state variables20. The solution, which uses the fact that both non-negativity 
constraints cannot bind at the same time (although they may both not bind in a given
18Because of the nature of the model, total inventories will never be 0; this is helpful in the solution 
of the model as I can take logs of the state D t .
19Namely, the regressors are a constant, ln(at), In (kt), ln(Dt), ln(at) x In (kt), ln(a*) x ln(A)> ln (A ) x 
ln(/ct), and ln(at) x ln (A ) x ln(fct).
20What follows is an overview of the solution method - more complete details are provided in the 
appendix to the paper (page 61).
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period), can be summarised as follows:
1. Assume that the agent does not wish to store any goods but rather wishes to bring 
forward consumption; st+1 =  0 and tt > 0. Use equations (1.15), (1.14) (1.16),
(1.18) and the approximating functions for the expectation terms ((1.33)-(1.34)) to 
solve for the four remaining control variables (c*, nt , kt+1, it)-
I then calculate Kt from (1.16); if < 0, this is the solution. Otherwise, I move to 
step 2.
2. If Kt > 0 then set it =  0, and I check whether the agent wishes to store any extra 
goods. Equations (1.15), (1.14) (1.17), (1.18) and the approximating functions for 
the expectation terms solve for (ct,nt ,kt+i ,s t+i).
Calculate fit from (1.17); ii fit < 0 , the model is solved for that period. Otherwise, 
I move to step 3.
3. Set it = st+1 =  0. I now solve the intratemporal Euler equation, the intertemporal 
Euler equation and the budget constraint for (c*, nu kt+i)- I then confirm that 
neither multiplier is less than zero.
However, it is not sufficient simply to have an approximation for the expectation; 
in order to resemble the rational expectations solution, the approximation should lead 
to a set of beliefs that are consistent with the approximation. Therefore the necessary 
algorithm to implement the Non-Stochastic PEA solution is:
1. I create a discrete three-dimensional grid of the state space. To do this, I define 
bounds within which to restrict the grid in each direction and choose qz,qk, and qj 
as the number of points in each direction of the grid (for TFP, capital and stocks 
respectively). Within each direction, the nodes are given by Chebyshev nodes; this 
means that more points toward the bounds are used and this improves the accuracy 
of the function approximation (Judd, 1998).
2. Using an initial estimate for the coefficients of the approximations (a;0,0°, and -0°), 
I solve the model at each grid point using the steps outlined above. Once I have the 
model solved for each grid point, I can also compute the conditional expectation in 
equations (1.33, 1.34 and 1.35) using Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
3. I now have both state variables, and the corresponding conditional expectations 
based on the initial expectation function, for each grid point. I now fit the expo­
nentiated polynomial of the logarithm of the state variables on the logarithm of the 
three expectations separately using a linear regression to obtain new coefficients 
given by u new, 0nc«', and ipnew.
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4. The parameter vector is updated in the direction of the newly estimated vector:
U)1 =  (1 - ¥ ) .u /> +  ¥.u>"e"'
where ¥  determines the amount of weight placed on the new estimates.
5. I repeat the procedure until the difference between the old and new estimates is 
below a chosen tolerance level (I use 0.00001).
Relative to the standard application of PEA, my expectation functions add one ex­
tra  level of difficulty. Namely, it is problematic calculating the actual value of the 
© (at, kt, Dt] 0) approximation as it contains the expectation of a variable from 2 periods 
ahead (ct+2) :
© (at, kt, Dt] 6) «  E* [U'c (ct+2) .(1 -  Lt+i). (1 -  a) at+1 (nt+i)a .£*+“ ]
This would involve repeating the full Gauss-Hermite quadrature loop a second time within 
each loop of the first Gauss-Hermite quadrature. To avoid this extra computational 
burden, I make use of the expected marginal utility of consumption approximation given 
by equation (1.35). Thus, once I have solved for the optimal decision in period t which 
gives ht+i and Dt+1, it is easy to calculate the possible TFP shocks which yield at+\ 
values and so the range of possible state variables for period t +  1. Given the states, I 
repeat the solution to get the optimal decision under each possible shock and calculate 
the expectation using Gauss-Hermite quadrature as:
Et [U'c (ct+2) .(1 -  ct+1). (1 -  a) at+i (n(+1)“ .k,+“ ] (1.36)
“  E  (at+i> h+i,Dt+1; Tp) . ((1 -  tt+i). (1 -  a) a\+l (nf+i)“ /ct+ai)]
a t + l
The baseline results are reported for a grid that contains a total of 75 points (qz = 5, 
qk = 5 and qd = 3). I have also used a finer grid (245 points) with no material impact 
on the equilibrium. The Gauss-Hermite quadrature is performed using 5 nodes. The 
tolerance level is set to 10-5. I have experimented with Chebyshev polynomials of 
varying degrees; the baseline results use lz = h  = h  = 1-
1.6 Tim e Aggregation and Calibration
Before turning to the calibration of the model solved above, I first discuss the issue of 
time aggregation and how that can impact macroeconomic analysis.
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1.6.1 T im e A ggregation
Although there are examples given above of industries, such as dry grocery and apparel, 
in which it can takeover one year from an order being placed to the good becoming 
available on shelves, not all of this delay is due to inventory-in-motion. Unfortunately, 
aside from anecdotal industry evidence from consultancy reports, there is no hard data 
on the extent of inventory-in-motion. Even though the concept includes delays in the 
distribution chain at different stages of production, it seems unlikely that most goods 
firms have a distribution cycle of one quarter. Moreover, the decision to carry extra 
inventory over, or to run down built-up-inventories, likely has a horizon that is shorter 
than a full quarter. Both of these reasons make the assumed motives seem unlikely for a 
quarterly model.
Instead I choose to calibrate a monthly model. Of course, without hard data, the 
choice of one month, rather than one week, or even one day, may seem arbitrary. I chose 
it for two reasons; firstly, it makes the aggregation to quarterly frequency slightly easier 
which reduces the computation burden of my analysis. Secondly, using an Euler Equation 
approach, Maccini et al (2004) estimate that the average inventory level corresponds to 
four weeks of sales. I therefore calibrate my model such that the inventory-sales ratio 
will be approximately be 1 at a monthly horizon21.
There is a strand of research that examines the effects of time aggregation on macroe­
conomic modelling. There are a number of papers which show that the underlying prop­
erties of a time-series can become distorted when subjected to intertemporal aggregation. 
For example, Granger and Siklos (1995) show that temporal aggregation can lead statis­
tical tests for unit roots to be distorted, and Rossana and Seater (1992) show, using real 
wage data, that temporal aggregation can wrongly lead the time-series properties of the 
series to be more simple than they actually are. The key message of Marcellino (1999) 
is that greater care should be taken with specifying a temporal frequency for theoretical 
models in order to then compare the predictions of their model to statistical properties 
of the data.
Also, recent papers have argued that the solution to trying to match data collected 
at quarterly, or even annual, frequency is not simply to ask for more frequently col­
lected data; this might be unduly expensive, or introduce excessive measure error which 
may be worse than infrequent data. Instead, Heaton (1993), who focuses on time non­
separabilities, and Aadland (2001), looking a labour market behaviour, calibrate higher 
frequency macroeconomic models and then, following data-sampling methodologies, ag­
21 Without a role for materials and supplies, and work in progress inventories, both of which are 
included in the NIPA estimates of inventory holdings, it is not possible for me to match the exact ratio 
of inventories to sales in the NIPA data. I do, however, use these data to explore the impact of the Great 
Moderation on inventories in Chapter 2.
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gregate the data to quarterly frequency.
Modelling the business cycle at a monthly, rather quarterly, horizon is important in my 
model for two reasons. Firstly, in the baseline calibration, I make use of microeconomic 
evidence that labour supply is more elastic at higher frequency than at lower frequencies. 
This means that, with a high willingness to work longer, the amplification of TFP shocks 
with inventory control is greater. The second reason is that, as I am interested in the 
behaviour of a stock (rather than a flow) concept. Stock measures, unless normalised 
by a flow variable, are invariant to the horizon of the period under consideration. For 
example, the nominal amount of stocks at the end of the year is the stock level at the end 
of December; this is the same as the amount of stocks at the end the second half of the 
year, and simply at the end of December 31st. Therefore, expressing the costs of holding 
these stocks at a higher frequency encourages their use and, since the stock concept at a 
lower frequency does not change, generates a greater role for them in the economy.
1.6.2 C alibration
When choosing the parameters for the monthly model, care needs to be taken to ensure 
that the model does not generate different outcomes as a result of imposing inappropriate 
parameter values. I therefore calibrate the main parameters so that monthly parameters 
are equivalent to their quarterly counterparts. Aadland and Huang (2004) outline a 
method of consistent higher frequency calibration which is designed to ensure that steady- 
state values of temporally aggregated flows are consistent across high and low frequency 
calibrations. I follow their approach in this regard as much as possible.
I begin by calibrating the parameters of the utility function, for which calibration 
is not affected to any great degree by the time aggregation. The additively separable 
isoelastic utility function given by equation (1.13) requires three calibrated parameters: 7  
defines the CRRA parameter (^ = intertemporal elasticity of substitution); b determines 
the relative weight on the marginal utility of leisure and is chosen to ensure that labour 
takes up about one third of total time; 77 is related to the Frisch elasticity of labour 
supply. Usual choices for the CRRA parameter are between 1 and 8 ; following King 
and Rebelo (1999), I begin by choosing 7  =  1 as this makes the model solution slightly 
easier and is a typical value used in the RBC literature. I will also explore the impact 
of greater risk aversion on inventory behaviour. Typical quarterly values of 77 range 
between 1 and 4 (a smaller 77 means there is a bigger the impact of wage shocks on labour 
supply). However, following Aadland and Huang (2004), I choose the monthly value for 
labour supply elasticity (^) such that the agent is more willing to substitute labour from 
month to month than from quarter to quarter. Micro-evidence, from studies such as 
Browning et al. (1999), Macurdy (1983), and Abowd and Card (1989), provide evidence
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to support this choice. In the baseline parameterisation, I choose rj = 0.66 to match 
with the midpoint of Macurdy’s estimated range of labour supply elasticity at a monthly 
frequency, and 6 =  3 determines the steady-state labour supply such that the amount of 
labour supplied in steady-state is 0.25 which corresponds to approximately 40 hours per 
week.
To calibrate the time discount factor, I relate it to the long-term real interest rate22 
such that:
aannual   ^
1 +  f
where f  is the average long-term interest rate (approximately 3%). Hence the annual 
value to use is {3 & 0.970. Thus, calibrating a quarterly or monthly value for /3 is simply:
 — r  »  0.993
(1 + r ) 4
 — r  «  0.998
(1 +  f ) 12
Using data on annual nominal capital stock from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), the average capital to GDP ratio in the US was 2.8 between 1960 and 2007. As 
the numerator in this ratio is a stock variable, it is not going to be affected by the decision 
to use a monthly or a quarterly model. The denominator, however, is affected by this 
choice; the ratio of capital to monthly GDP that I try to match in my model is around 
33. Together with the choice of /?, the depreciation rate is set to match this capital- 
output ratio. Using a depreciation rate of 10% per annum, as in King and Rebelo(1999), 
6 (monthly depreciation rate) is chosen to be 0.008. Following Chari et al, (2000), I 
chose the investment adjustment cost parameter (x) to match the relative volatility of 
investment (to output volatility) found in the US data (3.2 between 1960 and 2007); the 
chosen value of x  is 201. I assume that a, the coefficient on labour in the Cobb-Douglas 
production technology, is set to equal the average labour share in the US between 1960 
and 2007 (a =  0.66).
The standard approach in RBC models to calibrate the parameters of the productivity 
process (p, a) is to assume that the series for quarterly productivity follows an AR(1) in 
logs:
In a^+i =  pQ. In a® +  Et+i
where p® and a® are obtained by estimating this AR(1) using a quarterly series for 
TFP in the economy. Lippi and Reichlin (1991) show that the estimate of persistence
22 Other authors choose (3 to match a steady-state capital-output ratio.
P qu a rterly  _
0m onthly _
48
Table 1.4: Parameters in Baseline Model
Utility and Production functions AR(1) process Cost terms
Parameter (3 7 b rj a Pz Oz X V 8 w
Monthly Value 0.998 1 3 0.66 0.66 0.83 0.0052 201 0.001875 0.008 0.1
of shocks to GDP is changed by temporal aggregation and, importantly, this change is 
not necessarily systematic - it may go either way depending on the underlying data. 
Therefore, in order to calibrate the monthly AR(1) process for TFP in my model, I use 
a quarterly estimate of US TFP and fit an AR(1) but allow for an MA(1) error term 
due to the fact that the quarterly level is (approximately) the average of the monthly 
levels. I then use a Monte-Carlo exercise to find values for the monthly AR(1) that yield 
similar estimates when we aggregate to the quarterly frequency. The monthly parameters 
I use are pM = 0.83 and = 0.0053. These monthly values correspond to quarterly 
parameters of pQ = 0.69 and cr® =  0.00623.
To calibrate the value of u, I follow Khan and Thomas (2007b) who use the estimates 
for the carrying costs of inventories provided by Richardson (1995). In order to include 
only those costs for storage of goods that my model explicitly covers, I concentrate on 
the costs of deterioration Sz pilferage; these are estimated to be in the range of 3% — 6% 
of inventory value for the year. However, since my model only covers about 50% of total 
inventories in the economy, I rescale these values and use the range 1.5% — 3%. Using 
the middle of this range, this corresponds to a monthly cost of 0.1875 as a percentage 
of inventory value (v  =  0.001875). I assume that the cost function for early delivery 
is quadratic, J (l) = w.t2 and I choose w such that the average inventory-sales ratio 
corresponds to approximately 4 weeks as already discussed. This entails using w =  0.1.
The baseline parameter values, presented in Table (1.4), are used to solve my Baseline 
TFP model of inventories. The next section explores the behaviour of inventories in this 
model.
1.7 R esults
In order to examine the role played by active control of inventory-in-motion, as distinct 
from the image of the (assumed) nature of the inventories, I begin by comparing my 
baseline inventories model to a model that has been calibrated with the same parameters, 
but in which inventories cannot be actively adjusted. The two versions correspond to:
23 These quarterly values are derived from an ARM A (1,1) model estimated using a logged US TFP 
series for the period 1961 Q1 to 2006 Q4; the series is detrended using an HP-filter with the smoothness 
parameter set to 1600 as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2001) for quarterly data.
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1. Baseline TFP model
The baseline inventories in motion model, described above, in which TFP shocks 
are the driving process which is calibrated with the parameters given in Table (1.4).
2. Pure Pipeline Model:
This is a standard RBC model driven by TFP shocks. However, all goods are 
subject to the one month delay in delivery. In this model, inventories are a natural 
consequence of the pipeline delay and, therefore, this model differs from the baseline 
model only in that the economic agent does not exercise any control over inventories.
The calibration for all parameters coincides with the Baseline model (Table (1.4)).
Before comparing the two models, I first examine the estimated policy functions for the 
inventory decision variables in the baseline model. Figure 1.1 plots, in the top and bottom 
panels respectively, the optimal choice of ^ and st+i (the control variables affecting active 
inventory management in period t) for combinations of the TFP variable over the interval 
[0.975,1.025] (corresponding to 2.5 standard deviations in either direction from steady- 
state) and capital stock over the interval [41.45,62.176] (which corresponds to ±20% 
on the steady-state level of capital). In each figure, the beginning-of-period stock of 
inventories is assumed to be at its steady-state level. In Figure 1.1 there are two important 
non-linearities which justify the non-linear solution method I use. The first is the kink 
that is to be expected (and was discussed above) where the capital stock is low, and, at 
the same time, so is TFP. In such a case, the agent does not wish to bring forward any 
of the freight and hits the non-negativity constraint. The second is that, for any given 
TFP, the optimal is an inverted-U shape function of capital stock (though higher TFP, 
ceteris paribus, leads to more consumption being brought forward today).
Figure 1.2 repeat the analysis but in each case capital is held constant at its steady- 
state level while start of period inventories are allowed to vary on the interval [0.91,2.12] 
which represents steady-state stocks ±40%; TFP continues to vary on the interval [0.975,1.025]. 
In this case, the policy functions have only the kink from hitting the non-negativity con­
straint. Whenever TFP is at, or below, its steady-state level of 1, and even when it is 
slightly above, the agent will wish to bring forward consumption using early delivery as 
described in section 1.4.1. It is only when TFP is particularly high that the agent might 
consider storing the goods. Otherwise, the effect of different levels of starting inventory 
could be more reasonably be linearly-approximated compared with the effect of different 
levels of capital stock discussed above.
Next, I simulate each model using the same exogenous shock process for 3000 months;
I then aggregate to a quarterly frequency (1000 quarters) as described above and all 
reported results use the quarterly data. Table 1.5 confirms the achieved calibration in
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Figure 1.1: Optimal Choice of Inventory Control Variables For Different Values of Initial 
State Variables: Initial holdings of inventory are assumed to be at their steady-state level
terms of capital and investment to sales ratio. It also shows that the first characteristic 
of inventories is matched in my model; inventory adjustment is, on average, a negligible 
component of GDP growth (rounding to zero) and yet accounts for about 28% of the 
variance of GDP growth in my Baseline Inventories Model. As the effect is also generated 
by the pipeline RBC model, this suggests that this feature of GDP growth decompositions 
does not, necessarily, represent an active inventory motive and may, in fact, simply be 
generated by natural delays between production and consumption. Both models attribute 
too much variation in GDP growth to investment and not enough to consumption - this
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Figure 1.2: Optimal Choice of Inventory Control Variables For Different Values of Initial 
State Variables: Initial capital stock is assumed to be at their steady-state level
is a typical issue with RBC models.
The standard tool for the matching of RBC models to the data is comparing the rela­
tive volatility of the HP-filtered (log) series from the simulated model with the analogous 
statistics from the data. This analysis is presented in Table 1.6. While the models do 
reasonably well, as is often the case with RBC models, I cannot fully match the relative 
volatility of consumption; as mentioned above, both models predict consumption that is
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Table 1.5: Result of Simulations: Key ratios, Shares of GDP, and Contributions to the 
Variance of GDP Growth
Pipeline RB C Baseline Inventories
Capital-GDP ratio 2.7 2.7
Inventory-sales ratio 0.33 0.32
GDP share % o f  Variance GDP share % o f  Variance
o f  GDP growth o f  GDP growth
Consumption 75% 1% 74% 1%
Investment 25% 85% 26% 60%
Inventory Adjustment - 0 .0% 44% - 0 .0% 28%
Covariance -30% 9%
Table 1.6: Volatility of HP-filtered GDP and Components Relative to GDP, by model
Standard Deviation of HP-filtered Series Relative to GDP
Model Pipeline RB C Baseline Inventories data
GDP 1 1 1
consumption 0.15 0.18 0.73
investment 3.6 3.2 3.2
labour hours 0.23 0.72 0.99
too smooth relative to GDP. However, the main benefit of the active control of invento­
ries it that we are able to get much closer to the volatility of labour hours as seen in the 
data; both models have the same assumed labour supply elasticity (which is reasonably 
elastic), this Table shows that the active inventory management, increases the volatility 
of hours relative to output by inducing greater labour effort in times of high TFP than is 
the case where the agent cannot gain from this effort by bringing consumption forward; 
the representative agent works more (less) in times of high (low) productivity.
This labour result suggests that active inventory control may amplify the effect of 
TFP shocks. To establish the extent of this amplification, rather than comparing each of 
the models to the variability of its own GDP series, I now compare the predictions across 
models, using the Pipeline RBC model as the basis for comparisons. The results are 
shown in Table 1.7. As expected, the model with inventory management, when subject 
to precisely the same shocks, has more internal amplification of the shocks; the standard 
deviation of HP-filtered GDP is more than twice as high as the equivalent model in which 
the agent cannot adjust their inventory behaviour. The main difference comes through 
the induced labour effort, which is nearly seven times more volatile relative to its trend 
in the Baseline model. This results in a more volatile inventory-sales ratio.
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Table 1.7: Volatility of HP-filtered GDP and Components, Relative to RBC Model
Standard Deviation of HP-filtered Series Relative to RBC Model
Model Pipeline RBC Baseline Inventories
G D P 1 2.1
consumption 1 2.4
investment 1 1.9
labour hours 1 6.9
Inventory — sales ratio 1 1.6
In order to better understand the source of this amplification of TFP shocks, I com­
pare the dynamic responses of the key model variables in two models. For a positive 
(negative) technology shock that takes place in period t =  1, Figure 1.3 (1.4) plots the 
dynamic responses of TFP, Tastes, GDP, the MPK, hours worked, capital, consumption, 
investment, inventory adjustment, total adjustment costs, inventory levels, the inventory- 
sales ratio and the two inventory control variables.
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Figure 1.3: Dynamic Model Responses (relative to Steady-State (SS)) to a 2 Standard 
Deviation Positive TFP Shock Lasting 1 month
The earlier established results are clear from these impulse responses. The increase 
in TFP, 0.8% in period t, induces a large increase in hours (+1%). The increase in both
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Figure 1.4: Dynamic Model Responses (relative to Steady-State (SS)) to a 2 Standard 
Deviation Negative TFP Shock Lasting 1 month
TFP and hours push the MPK up markedly which amplifies the increase in investment. 
Higher TFP and hours input leads to a 1.7% increase in GDP. This increase in GDP leads, 
via the pipeline inventories effect, to an increase in inventories (and positive inventories 
investment). However, by being able to actively manage inventories means the agent can 
take advantage of the higher productivity today - more goods are brought forward for 
immediate consumption which mitigates the increase in inventories (given the increase in 
output). This generates the less marked increase in the inventory-sales ratio.
The results of a negative shock are similar (1.4). What is noticeable is that storage 
is not used in response to either shock in the baseline model. Nor does it appear to be 
regularly used in the simulations. I discuss this in the next section.
The procyclical response of the inventory-sales ratio in the impulse response functions 
seems to go against the stylised facts listed above. In Figure 1.5, I examine a small sample 
of the quarterly data from the model simulation. In quarters 20-25 of the figure, there is 
an increase in GDP but the inventory-sales ratio falls. The reason for these differential 
responses is that, as shown above, the response of inventories depends not only on TFP, 
but also on the other state variables. Below, I show that, overall, the correlation between
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GDP and the inventory-sales ratio is negative overall in the simulation.
Inventories are lower in the model where the agent can actively manage them; this is 
because in the pipeline RBC model we assume that inventories naturally arise whereas the 
main decision taken in the baseline model is how much to deliver early and, therefore, 
prevent from becoming an inventory. This Figure also shows that capital is higher in 
the Baseline Inventory model; this makes GDP higher than in the Pipeline RBC model. 
Hours, are not any higher on average, but the increased volatility is evident. Higher GDP 
leads to higher average consumption when inventories are actively managed; welfare will 
be higher with active inventory control.
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Figure 1.5: Quarterly Levels of Selected Model Variables Over a 34 Quarter Sample.
To conclude, in Table 1.8, I confirm that the key stylised fact about inventories (that 
sales are less volatile than output) is matched by the Pipeline RBC model and my Baseline 
Inventory model. I also present some additional correlations from my models in this 
Table. As in (Khan and Thomas 2007b), my baseline model generates a counter-cyclical 
inventory-sales ratio. As discussed above, this average correlation is not evident when 
we look at the impulse response functions. The reason for this difference, as mentioned 
above, is that the impulse response functions begin at the steady-state and as Figure 1.1 
makes clear the response of inventories differs when we start away from the steady-state.
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Table 1.8: Correlations between inventories, sales and the I-S ratio
Pipeline RB C Baseline Inventories
Var (Sales)  
V ar (Output) 0.40 0.67
C orr(P ,G D P ) -0.58 -0.36
Corr (AD, M P K ) 0.2 0.24
Lag — Lead Correlation o f GDP and Inventory Adjustment
- 2 - 1 0 +1 + 2
Pipeline R B C -0.09 +0.29 +0.33 -0.62 +0.05
Baseline Inventories - 0.1 +0.24 +0.48 -0.70 + 0.01
To examine the relationship between the real interest rate and inventories, I use the 
marginal product of capital (MPK) as the relevant real interest rate. Within my frame­
work, inventory investment is positively correlated with the real interest rate. Therefore 
in a setting in which many different motives for holding inventories operate, including 
the distributional motive emphasised here, finding a negative effect of interest rates on 
inventory adjustment (predicted by some of the other motives) may be difficult. Hence, 
there may be a theoretical explanation, complementary to the econometric reasoning put 
forward by Maccini, Moore, and Schaller (2004), for why the negative relationship sug­
gested by typical firm-level analyses is difficult to find in the data. Both models perform 
very similarly in terms of the lag and lead correlations between GDP growth and inven­
tory adjustment; though neither actually matches the positive correlation between GDP 
and the 1-period lead of inventories that is found in the data.
1.8 The Storage M otive and A lternative Calibrations
1.8.1 T he Storage M otive
One of the striking facts of the model is that storage is not used in response to shocks 
in the baseline model. There are two reasons for this: (1) storage is less desirable than 
capital investment for carrying excess goods from one period to the next period (because 
capital investment provides both a positive return in terms of more output the next 
period), and (2) in steady-state, some goods are brought forward (l* > 0) and, therefore, 
if the agent wishes to defer consumption using inventories, the first response is to reduce 
l and leave more goods in the pipeline.
I have tried to generate a greater role for the storage motive by: (1) increasing the 
costs of adjusting capital (x Alt = 401); (2) increasing the cost of early delivery (w = 5);
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and (3) reducing the cost of storage (v = 0). Despite these (large) changes, there remains 
no use of storage in the simulations.
One alternative suggestion would be to make investment irreversible. If investment 
cannot be converted back to consumption goods, then it will be less desirable in pro­
viding intertemporal storage. The problem with this is that, in the baseline model, total
investment never goes negative. Thus, the adjustments that are equivalent to “consum­
ing capital” are in fact achieved by simply investing lower (but still positive) amounts 
and letting depreciation run capital down. It does not seem desirable to make gross 
investment irreversible and therefore force firms to replenish depreciating capital stock.
1.8.2 A ltern ative C alibrations
The most striking implication of the inventories is the induced response of labour and 
therefore the greater amplification of TFP shocks. In order to examine the robustness of 
this conclusion, I examine the application in three alternative calibrations of the baseline 
inventory model24:
1. Alternative 1 - less elastic labour supply rj = 1.5;
2. Alternative 2 - higher risk aversion 7 ;
3. Alternative 3 - both together.
The results in terms of the amplification effect are shown in Table 1.9 which, in the first 
2 columns, repeats the analysis of 1.7. Our three alternative models are then subjected 
to the same series of TFP and the HP-filtered volatilities are compared to the baseline 
model. As can be seen, although lower labour elasticity (obviously) reduces the volatility 
of labour hours and therefore mitigates the response of GDP, the amplification effect 
remains substantial. Risk aversion also lowers the labour supply volatility and, therefore, 
both together produce the smallest amplification effect from the variants I consider here. 
Nonetheless, the HP-filtered volatility of GDP is 1.8 times larger when inventory control 
is possible. Moreover, the close fit of other aspects of the model is not adversely affected 
by these alternative calibrations.
1.9 Conclusions
In this paper, I focus on the concept of inventories-in-motion - that is, where a firm 
tries to optimally control inventories that arise naturally between the production and
24I do not consider the changes in the cost of inventories here as I explore these in greater detail in 
Chapter 2.
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Table 1.9: Volatility of HP-filtered GDP and Components, Relative to RBC Model under Alternative Calibrations
Standard Deviation of HP-filtered Series Relative to RBC Model
Model Pipeline RBC Baseline Inventories Low Labour Elasticity Higher R isk Aversion Both
GDP 1 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.8
consumption 1 2.4 2.3 0.8 0.8
investment 1 1.9 1.7 2.0 1.8
labour hours 1 6.9 5.1 6.2 4.6
Inventory — sales ratio 1 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.4
the consumption of the goods. The first contribution is to solve a model of distribution 
inventories using a version of the PEA numerical solution technique which ensures that 
I am able to examine the behaviour of the model despite its inherent non-linearities. I 
then calibrate and simulate a monthly version of this model, and I aggregate the model 
outcomes following national accounts standards to generate quarterly model predictions.
The second, and main, contribution of the paper that my model, although highly 
stylised, is able to successfully match (at least qualitatively) a number of key facts about 
the behaviour of inventories at the macroeconomic level. These include:
• Inventory adjustment is a small component of GDP growth, but it contributes a 
great deal to its volatility;
• Sales are less volatile than production;
• Production and inventory investment are procyclical;
• The inventory-sales ratio is counter-cyclical;
• No clear negative relationship should exist between inventories and the real interest 
rate.
Perhaps more importantly, I find that my inventory channel also generates a substan­
tial amount of internal propagation of TFP shocks. The lack of internal propagation is 
often cited as a major failure of the RBC modelling approach. In my model, the same 
volatility of GDP could be generated with volatility of the driving TFP process.
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l .A  M odel and Solution D etails
0 5
Full M odel E quations - T F P  Shocks
The optimisation problem in period t is then given by:
max U =  E*
{ f c r + l i C r i ^ r }
Y f - U  (°r’ 1 ~  nr )
. r = t
s.t. yT = aT (nT)“ .k\~a
/ / w * . „ h  f  kT+i — (1 — 8)kT
cT +  sT+i +  kT+1 — (1 — 6)kT =  (lt  — J  (iT))-2/r +  (1 — v).sT +  f T — — ( ---------—
f T+1 =  (1 -  iT).aT (nT)a .k]ra
ST+1 >  0
lt > 0
which we can treat as a Kuhn-Tucker problem in period t:
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Et [ f r - t .U'c (cT) \ = E t [ \T] Vr
E, [ 0 ^ . K  (1 -  nr)] = E( [AT(tT -  j  (tr))aar («r)a_1 - K ^ }  + Ej [At+1(1 -  iT)aaT (tv )0"1 .k ]ra] Vr
a AT+1. ( ( tT+1 -  J  (tT+1)). (1 -  a) aT+1 (nT+1)“ +  (1 -  6) + ^  )
x  ( kT+1 — (1 — 5)kT
+Et [Ar+2-(l — tT+l)- (1 _  &) ttr+l ( n T +  l)a -K + l \  — Et 
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Ar ( 1 + kT kT Vr
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Therefore the equations defining the equilibrium are (using r  = t):
U'c (c) ( l  +  g  ( fct+1 ~ f c ) ~ 5)fc‘) )  -  Et [p.U'c (c(+2) .(1 -  i(+1). (1 -  a) at+1 (nm )“ .*£*]
= Et pU'c (ct+1) ( W t  -  7 (k+1)) (1 -  a) at+i (n,+1)“ +  (1 -  S) + ( ^ j  ( fct+2 ~  <5)fc(+1) )
AC (1 -  nt) =  t/ ' (c,) . ( 6 , - 7  (t.JJaa, (n()a_1 +  E, [/?.£/' (c*+1) .(1 -  n)aa,
U ^ c t ) . ( l - J ’ (Lt))yt = Et\P.U'c (ct+i)-Vt]-Kt 
U'c ( c t ) - n t  = Et[!3.U'c {ct+l) . ( l - v ] \
Q + *t+i +  h+i — (1 — &)kt =  (it — 7 (k))-Vt +  (1 — v)-St +  ft — 7T ^  1+1  ^ ^2 V h
In at+i =  plnaj +  et 
«< > 0 , ^ > 0 
fa > 0, st+1 >  0
N um erical Solution
In each period, the model can be solved using the approximations of the expectation 
terms (given by equations (1.33)-(1.34)) as follows:
1. Assume that the agent does not wish to store any goods but rather wishes to bring 
forward consumption; st+1 =  0 ,/z* > 0 , Kt = 0 , and it > 0 :
(a) The intratemporal Euler equation for labour allocation (equation (1.15)) uses 
1 approximation and is given by:
(1 -  nt) = U'c (ct) \ i t - J  {h))aat (nt)a_1 .kl~a+ (l-L t)aat (n*)"-1 (at , kt, Dt\ip)
(b) The intertemporal Euler equation for investment (equation (1.14)) uses 2 
approximations to yield:
U° (q) • f1 + f  ( h+1 = ^ {at’ h ’ D t ’ ^ +f}2-Q (°t’ D t> V
(c) Using Kt = 0, and (1.16), and the approximating function for expected marginal 
utility, we get the relevant Euler equation as
[ / '  ( c , ) . (1 -  J ’ M )  =  p . *  ( a t , k t ,  D t ,  VO
(d) In this case, the budget constraint (equation (1.18)) can be written as:
Ct +  k t +1 -  (1 -  S ) k t  +  |  ( fc,+1 ~  ^  ~  S ) k t }  =  ( t t  -  J (k))-yt +  D t
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(e) The 4 equations in (a)-(d) solve the 4 choice variables (c^ n*, kt+i, h) an(l-
yt =  at (nt)a .kl~a 
Dt+i = ft+i — (1 — h)'Vt
(f) Calculate nt from (1.16); if < 0 , skip to step 4; else, move to step 2.
2. If Kt > 0 then set ct =  0 ( => f t+1 =  yt)', and check whether the agent wishes to 
store any extra goods:
(a) The intratemporal Euler equation for labour allocation uses 1 approximation 
and is given by:
N'n (1 -  nt) = aat (nf)a_1 .k]~a (at, kt, Dt; ip)
(b) The intertemporal Euler equation for investment again uses 2 approximations 
to yield:
U'c (ct) . ( l  +  ^  (<k, kt, Duu,)+/32. e  (at,kt,  D t; 0)
(c) Using it = 0, //t — 0 and (1.17), and the approximating function for expected 
marginal utility, we get the relevant Euler equation as
UXct) =  p . ( l - v ) * ( a t ,kt ,Ds,1>)
(d) In this case, the budget constraint (equation (1.18)) can be written as:
Ct +  St+1 +  fct+1 - ( 1 - ^  +  f  (^ +1 ~ ^  ~ 5 ) h )  = D t
(e) The 4 equations in (a)-(d) solve the 4 choice variables (c*, rif, kt+\, St+i) and:
yt = at {nt)a .k]~a 
Dt+i = yt +  st+i
(f) Calculate fit from (1.17); if fit < 0, skip to step 4; else, move to step 3.
3. Set it = st+1 = 0;
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(a) The intratemporal Euler equation for labour allocation uses 1 approximation 
and is given by:
N'n (l - n t) = aat (nt)a .kt (at , kt, Dt\
(b) The intertemporal Euler equation for investment again uses 2 approximations 
to yield:
u ’c (c)• (i + ^  W D*’“)+(?&K  h , D t ; e )
(c) In this case, the budget constraint (equation (1.18)) can be written as:
, i ft  ;m  , H ( h +1 -  {I -  8 ) k t \ 2 _  n  ct +  kt+1 — (1  — 5)kt +  — I  —------------- 1 — Dt
(d) The 3 equations in (a)-(c) solve the 3 choice variables (Q,nt ,fct+i) and:
yt = at (nt)a .k]~a
A + i  =  Vt
4. The model is solved for period t; repeat for process for next period.
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Chapter 2 
The Great M oderation and 
Inventories
2.1 Introduction
The Great Moderation (or Great Stability as it is called in the UK) is the term used 
to describe the decline in the volatility of business cycles that has occurred since at 
least the 1980s (see for example, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Stock and Watson 
(2002), and Blanchard and Simon (2001)). Benati (2004) documents a similar decline in 
macroeconomic volatility in the UK. Figure 2.1 displays quarterly real GDP growth for 
the US since 1960; the decline in volatility can be seen clearly. Nonetheless, Figure 2.2 
plots the 10-year rolling variance of GDP growth in the US between 1960 and 2007.
While there is generally agreement that there has been a substantial decline in the 
standard deviation of output growth, there is some disagreement about whether this 
change took the form of a trend decline or a step change. Both McConnell and Perez- 
Quiros (2000) and Stock and Watson (2002) argue that there was a structural break in 
the variance of the GDP growth series which occurred in the early 1980s (around 1983). 
Blanchard and Simon (2001) on the other hand suggest that rather than just being a 
phenomenon since the 1980s, this decline in volatility is a steady one since the 1950s, but 
was interrupted in the 1970s and early 1980s.
There are many competing explanations for what caused this increased stability. The 
main three are “good policy” , “good luck” , and better inventory management1. The 
“good policy” argument emphasises the role of either less volatile fiscal policy (Blanchard
1 Others, not discussed here, include the idea that it is driven by a shift from highly-volatile production 
to less-volatile service sectors. However, many papers, including McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) 
and Stock and Watson (2002), have examined this and found no evidence that compositional shifts play 
an important role. Also, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) argue that reduced 
macroeconomic volatility is driven by improvements in the institutional framework.
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Figure 2.1: US Quarterly Real GDP Growth, 1960-2007
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Figure 2.2: 10-year Rolling Variance of Quarterly US Real GDP Growth, 1960-2007
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and Simon 2001), or more, often more activist monetary policy. The attractiveness of 
the monetary policy argument as an explanation for the Great Moderation in the US is 
the relatively close timing between the identified break in the volatility (around 1983), 
and the change in monetary policy in the US associated with the end of the Volcker 
disinflation (Taylor 2000). However, the timing does not work so well for other countries 
where the timing of the reduced volatility is similar, and this explanation is not consistent 
with the idea of a trend decline. In terms of fiscal policy, fiscal deficits have gone through 
a number of growing and shrinking phases since 1980, and the evidence suggests that 
automatic stabilisers have, if anything, weakened (Taylor 2000).
The “good luck” hypothesis argues that the greater stability is due simply to the 
absence of large shocks (such as the 1970s oil shocks) in the period since 1983. Justini- 
ano and Primiceri (2006) and Stock and Watson (2002) tend to favour the “good luck” 
hypothesis; Stock and Watson attribute 20%- 30% of the volatility decline to improved 
monetary policy, and the rest to good luck.
Improved inventory management is the main explanation put forward by McConnell 
and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Kahn et al (2002). Their argument is that, with better 
inventory management, there is lower volatility of production for a given level of volatility 
of sales. Nonetheless, in the last 10 years, there has been an increase in research on the 
macroeconomic impact of inventories, partly to try to explain the Great Moderation. In 
particular, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), argue that improvements in inventory 
management techniques, made possible by advances in information and communications 
technology, are the source of this lower volatility.
There is evidence, which I discuss in Section 2.2 of this paper, that supports the view 
that improved inventory management has played a role in the decline in the volatility 
of GDP, and the idea that improved inventory management has contributed to lower 
GDP volatility is pertinent amongst policy-makers2. However, in order to explore the 
implications of inventory management techniques on macroeconomic volatility, we need 
a model of the inventory behaviour that captures those motives for inventories that we 
believe have changed.
My contribution in this paper is to examine the role played by improved inventory 
management in explaining the Great Moderation using the model developed in Chapter
2For example, Charles Bean of the Bank of England said in a 2003 speech: “There are at least three 
possible explanations for this greater stability...Second, structural changes in the economy, possibly asso­
ciated with the IT revolution and the advent of just-in-time production processes that have attenuated 
the amplification and propagation induced by the inventory cycle.” While Bernanke (2004) reflects the 
Fed research on the topic, saying “Some economists have argued, for example, that improved manage­
ment of business inventories, made possible by advances in computation and communication, has reduced 
the amplitude of fluctuations in inventory stocks, which in earlier decades played an important role in 
cyclical fluctuations.”
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1. There are many IT developments and management techniques which are likely to 
have led to improved inventory management; I examine them in Section 2.3. I then map 
the most salient features of these inventory management improvements into the baseline 
inventory model developed in Chapter 1. The aim of this experiment is to determine 
what variations in delivery and storage costs are required to capture the magnitude of 
the decline in output volatility in the United States since the mid-1980s. As the behaviour 
of inventories within my model is endogenously related to the volatility of shocks, I then 
perform a second exercise; I reduce the volatility of the supply shocks and see whether 
lower shock volatility (the “good luck” hypothesis) generates model predictions that fit 
the actual changes that have occurred in the last 23 years3
My main finding is that although there is little evidence to support the idea that 
inventory management techniques were a driving force in reducing aggregate volatility, 
these improvements appear to have played an important role in matching other changes in 
the aggregate data, such as a lower level and reduced procyclicality of the inventory-sales 
ratio. These other changes are not generated by the “good luck” explanation. I therefore 
conclude that the recent macroeconomic data are best explained by a combination of 
“good luck”, which contributes to the lower volatility of GDP growth, and inventory 
management techniques, which help to match the behaviour of the inventory-sales ratio.
2.2 The Great M oderation
As mentioned above, the paper by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) was one of the 
earliest papers to identify the Great Moderation.4 They argued that the cause of the lower 
volatility was improved inventory management techniques. They identified the change 
as a step change occurring in the early 1980’s (1983), and they traced this decline to a 
fall in the volatility of goods output which was driven by the reduced use of inventories 
in that sector. Thus, they conclude that it is changes in the use of goods inventories 
that has driven the lower volatility5. In this section I review some of the “smoking-gun” 
evidence that led them to conclude that the main explanation for the Great Moderation 
is inventory management techniques.
3Without any role for monetary policy in the model used in this paper, there is no scope to use it to 
explore the “good policy” hypothesis.
4Of course, there were much earlier analyses of the changing behaviour of GDP growth, such as 
DeLong and Summers (1986), but these did not identify the marked change in volatility around the early 
1980s (the Great Moderation).
5Their argument that goods sales are unaffected is contested by Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004) 
who find it was a decline in both sales and production volatility. Moreover, their analysis concludes that 
the main component of the goods inventories decline is durable goods. On the other hand, my analysis 
using the BEA’s contributions data points to a clear role for non-durable goods inventories in explaining 
the decline of the variance of GDP growth.
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Figure 2.3 shows the 10-year rolling variance of GDP growth in the US between 1960 
and 2007, as well as the contributions to the variance from the goods output (further split 
into sales and inventories), services output [ystermces^  and structures output (yftructuresy  
This graph uses the decomposition:
GDPt = sa le4da + ^ inventories?*  +  2/ f ruclur“
This graph supports the conclusions of McConnell and Perez-Quiros as the largest 
contributor to the appears to be goods inventories.
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Figure 2.3: Ten-year rolling-variance of quarterly U.S. GDP growth and the contributions 
by types of product.
Figure 2.4 shows a similar disaggregation but now adds together all non-goods com­
ponents together in order to focus on the goods sector, with goods output split further 
into the contribution from durable goods (D_goods) and non-durable goods (ND_goods). 
The decomposition used is:
GDPt = sales?-900ds +  A i n v ^ 900ds +  sales?D-9°°ds +  A inv?D-goods +  others.
Again this graph shows that there have been declines in both durable, and partic­
ularly, in non-durable goods inventories. However, the other main contributors to the 
decline are the lower covariance between durable and non-durable sectors, and the lower
Ten-year R ollin g  Variance o f  GDP G rowth
r / /  o/w Goods Inventories 
o/w Services Out put
o/w Goods Sales 
o/w Structure Output 
Var (GDP growth)
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Figure 2.4: Ten-year rolling-variance of quarterly U.S. GDP growth and the contributions 
by types of product.
covariance between goods sectors and other sectors (which is a part of the “all other 
items” contribution).
Table 2.1 repeats the analysis of Table 1.1 but splits the 48 years between 1960 and 
2007 into the two periods identified by McConnell and Perez-Quiros; a more volatile 
period from 1960-1983 and the Great Moderation era from 1984-2007. The variance of 
GDP growth during the Great Moderation is almost one-fifth of the variance from the 
earlier period (last column of the table showing the relative variance between periods). 
Moreover, there have been large declines in the main components of GDP between the 
two periods, albeit the declines are not as large as those in GDP volatility. This table 
also captures a key role for a decline in the covariance of the components of GDP which 
has swung from amplifying fluctuations in the components of GDP, to reducing them. 
Table 2.2 shows that a similar conclusion is reached if we disaggregate GDP according 
to the definition used in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
The procyclicality of the inventory-sales ratio has changed as well in the post-1983 
period. The correlation between the HP-filtered log I-S ratio and HP-filtered log GDP 
is -0.46 in the period including the 1970s, and increases to -0.15 in the period of the 
Great Moderation. There is, over the period of greater stability, also a coincident decline 
in both GDP volatility and the inventory-sales ratio. Figure 2.5 displays the real and 
nominal ratio of non-farm inventories to sales of goods and structures. Since the early
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1980s, the ratio has declined by about 10% (from 2.53 in 1983 to 2.27 in 2007). However, 
if we look at the entirety of both periods, there is no change in the average I-S ratio 
between 1960 and 1983 when compared to the Great Moderation period. This a first 
indication that declining stock-sales ratios have not necessarily been a key element of the 
Great Moderation. The capital-output ratio, which is not shown in the figures, has, on 
average, not changed between the two periods.
^ ^ “ NominaJ Non-farm  inventories to  final sales o f  goods and structures (LHS) 
^ ^ “ Real Non-farm  inventories to  final sales o f  goods and structures (RHS)
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Figure 2.5: US Inventory-Sales Ratios: Real and Nominal.
2.3 Inventory M anagem ent
I now explore, using my model, the possibility that improvements in inventory manage­
ment may have driven the decline in volatility of GDR According to an industry website 
(www.inventorymanagement.com), inventory management refers to “the active control 
program which allows the management of sales, purchases and payments.” The manage­
ment of inventory encapsulates not only the monitoring and control of existing inventories 
but includes controlling their optimal level through the ordering of new stock at optimal 
times and the analysis of sales data as well. It is considered an important area in which 
companies can generate significant cost savings.
In recent years, particularly since the mid-1980s, inventory management has under-
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Table 2.1: Contributions, by expenditure components, to changes in the volatility of US GDP growth, 1960-2007, S.A.A.R.
1960-1983 1984-2007 Relative Variance
Nominal GDP Variance of % Nominal GDP Variance of % Var(1984+)V ar(1960-1983)
Share (%) GDP growth of total Share (%) GDP growth of total
GDP growth 100 19.9 100% 100 4.5 100% 0.22
of which
Consumption 62 4.4 22% 67 1.6 36% 0.36
Investment 16 3.1 15% 16 1.1 25% 0.36
A Inventories 1 7.9 40% 0 2.6 58% 0.33
Government 21 1.8 9% 19 0.9 20% 0.49
A Net Trade 0 1.1 6% -3 0.4 10% 0.40
Covariance 1.6 8% -2.1 -48% -1.31
Table 2.2: Contributions, by type of product, to changes in the volatility of US GDP growth, 1960-2007, S.A.A.R.
1960-1983 1984-2007 Relative Variance
Nominal GDP Variance of % Nominal GDP Variance of % Var{  1984+) Var (1960—1983)
Share (%) GDP growth of total Share (%) GDP growth of total
GDP growth 100 19.9 100% 100 4.5 100% 0.22
of which
Goods Sales 43 5.3 27% 35 2.4 53% 0.45
A Inventories 1 7.9 40% 0 2.6 58% 0.33
Services 45 1.1 5% 55 0.5 11% 0.46
Structures 11 1.8 9% 10 0.4 9% 0.22
Covariance 3.9 20% -1.3 -30% -0.34
gone major changes due primarily to the technological improvements6. The development 
of better IT (both hardware and software) have made it easier for firms to improve the 
management of demand and inventory (McCarthy and Zakrajsek (2007)). Such technolo­
gies include:
• Barcoding and scanners.
• Radio Frequency Identification Tags (RFID).
• Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and 
Replenishment (CPFR).
Barcodes and scanners, as well as Radio Frequency Identification Tags (RFID) have 
resulted in the improved the storage and control of inventories within and between ware­
houses. These inventions facilitate control and monitoring of inventory flows into and 
out of warehouses, without the need to investigate the contents of each box separately. 
With RFID tags it is possible to simply move past a shipment for a hand-held device to 
receive important information regarding the shipment (and to pass this information into 
a central database). These innovations reduce the marginal cost of storing and holding 
inventories both through time spent stock-keeping as well as reducing the loss through 
theft and obsolescence.
CPFR systems that have developed as a result of greater EDI technologies, provide 
a comprehensive system for the real-time analysis of sales and production data. This 
allows firms to distribute their goods more quickly and accurately to the outlets which 
require them, and it enables the firms to respond to changes in demand without the need 
to use inventories as a buffer. Overall, the combined effect of these improved technologies 
is that inventory managers have developed flexible distribution systems which actively 
manage inventories while still in the distribution chain.
These developments have led to three main changes in inventories; firstly, better 
analysis of sales data makes demand easier to monitor and therefore to forecast; secondly, 
the better control and monitoring of inventories; and finally, the active management of 
inventories in transit has reduced the overall costs of immediate delivery of produce to the 
final consumer. In the absence of demand shocks, I am unable to examine the implications 
of the first development. However, the latter two can be mapped into my framework as 
a reduction in costs of immediate delivery (w ).
6 Another problem with the improved inventory management story is that it would most likely have 
taken place gradually, rather than as a jump change in 1983 as McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) argue 
(Taylor 2000).
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2.4 The Experim ents
In order to explore how well the improved inventory management and “good luck” hy­
potheses perform as two possible explanations, I carry out a simulation analysis using the 
model of inventories that I developed in Chapter 1. I carry out three experiments. The 
calibration of the experiments is described in some greater detail below, but the basic 
idea of the experiments is:
1. Experiment 1 - “Improved Inventory Management”
I model better inventory management techniques as lower costs of distribution, and 
then examine whether the model generates lower macroeconomic volatility that is 
comparable to the decline experienced during the “Great Moderation”.
2. Experiment 2 - “Good Luck”
I calibrate the decline in macroeconomic volatility using the changes in US TFP. 
While it is more directly going to generate lower volatility of GDP, the interesting 
test of this experiment is whether the inventory series change in accordance with 
the observed data is the result of “good luck”.
3. Experiment 3 - “Both together”
I run a combined experiment using the calibrations of both Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2.
2.4.1 D etails o f  the C alibration
As I use the Baseline Inventories model developed in Chapter 1, unless otherwise stated, 
all the calibration parameters come from Table 1.4. The alternative parameter values 
that are used in each experiment are displayed, at their monthly rate, in Table 2.4.
The first simulation, Experiment 1, maps the salient features of improved inventory 
management techniques into the models parameters as discussed above. Particularly, I 
reduce the cost of delivery such that the change in the steady-state inventory to sales ratio 
matches the actual decline from 1983 to 2007 (10%). To achieve this, the cost parameter 
associated with actively managing inventories (w) falls from 0.1 in the baseline model, to 
0.0019 in Experiment 1.
The second simulation, Experiment 2, explores the “good luck” hypothesis and is 
designed to match the decline in volatility. In the Baseline model, I choose the AR(1) 
parameters to match the quarterly estimates of the following ARMA(1,1) equation:
In a®+1 = pz In a® + et + K£t-i
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where the dependent variable, In aT+l , is the logged quarterly estimate of US TFP between 
1961Q1 and 2006Q4. The data are detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with the 
smoothing parameter set to 1600. These data are presented in Figure 2.6.
H P-Filtered TFP Growth 0.03
1960-1 1965-1 1970-1 1975-1 1980-1 1985-1 1990-1 1995-1 2000-1 2005-1
Figure 2.6: HP-filter Detrended US TFP.
The estimates from these equations are presented in Table 2.3. The first column 
corresponds to the estimates for the whole sample and corresponds to the values used 
in Chapter 1. Column 2 presents the estimates for the early period, while Column 3 
presents the estimates for the Great Moderation period. The Pre-Moderation period 
had the same AR(1) coefficient as the overall sample, but higher volatility of the shocks, 
while the Great Moderation is characterised by lower volatility and higher persistence. 
As I need to calibrate a monthly estimate for the TFP process, I use the Monte Carlo 
approach discussed in Section 1.6 (Chapter 1) to derive the parameters for the Pre- 
Moderation Model and for Experiment 2. The values are presented in Table 2.4. As this 
will, by design, match the decline in aggregate volatility well, the test for Experiment 
2 is whether it can match other features of the data that we associate with the Great 
Moderation such as the changing inventory-sales ratios and the reduced procyclicality of 
this ratio.
Experiment 3 combines the two explanations and explores the outcomes if both the 
“good luck” and better inventory management techniques play a role.
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Table 2.3: Estimates of TFP process (ARMA(1,1)) Across Different Samples
Full Sample Pre-Moderation Great Moderation
1960 -  2006 1960 -  2006 1960 -  2006
Pz 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.76***
(0 .068) (0 .087) (0 .160)
K 0.097 0.127 -0.038
(0 .078) (0 .098) (0 .110)
Constant -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0 .002) (0 .003) (0 .002)
g z 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.004***
(0 .000) (0 .001) (0 .000)
Observations 184 88 96
Table 2.4: Parameters That Differ Across the Experiments
Cost terms AR(1 process
Parameter w Pz Gz
Pre-Moderation Model 0.1 0.83 0.0069
Experiment 1 - Inventory improvement 0.019 0.83 0.0069
Experiment 2 - “Good Luck” 0.1 0.87 0.0034
Experiment 3 - Both together 0.019 0.87 0.0034
2.5 R esults
The results in column 2 of Table 2.5 indicate that it is unlikely that declining costs of 
active inventory control could have generated the Great Moderation within my model. 
Lower costs of distribution actually increase the volatility of GDP growth. As was argued 
in Chapter 1, this is driven by the behaviour of labour hours; labour input is more volatile 
as the representative agent is more willing to take advantage of high (low) productivity 
by working hard (less) and using inventories to smooth consumption. Moreover, this 
adjustment comes at the cost of increasing the covariance between the main elements of 
GDP - when consumption and investment are falling, we run down inventories to smooth 
the negative growth period.
On the other hand, the “good luck” experiment matches the relative decline in GDP 
variance. This is unsurprising given that it was calibrated to achieve this result. But 
it cannot match other changes in the data. While the cheaper distribution experiment 
successfully lowers the inventory-sales ratio and reduces the counter-cyclicality of this 
ratio (slightly), neither of these are possible when we examine the “good luck” story 
alone. In fact, the reduced volatility of shocks makes the inventory-sales ratio more
79
countercyclical.
Thus, it is not surprising that my final experiment, a combination of the two, is more 
successful at matching most of the relevant data. I would, therefore, conclude that the 
both stories are required to explain the recent behaviour of inventories and GDP volatility, 
although the “good luck” hypothesis contributes to the reduced variance of GDP growth.
2.6 Dem and shocks
My results so far only allow for productivity shocks as a source of business cycle variation; 
Gali (1999), however, argues that demand shocks are a more likely source of business 
cycle variation. The main challenge posed by trying to take account of additional shocks 
is that adding another state variable increases the computational burden of the model 
considerably. Nonetheless, I make a small beginning here by examining a version of the 
model from Chapter 1 in which there are only taste shocks. I do this as it will give me an 
idea of whether the predictions of the analysis will be different under taste or preference 
shocks.
The model is solved using the PEA algorithm adapted for taste shocks. The main 
problem with the model using taste shocks is that it does not generate much volatility 
in terms of GDP. Using the same AR(1) parameters from the TFP process, but on an 
AR(1) for the taste variable (\ngT+i =  p\ngT + et), yields volatility of HP-filtered GDP 
that is 12 times lower for the taste model compared with the TFP model.
However, the taste model does generate a large, negative covariance between com­
ponents of GDP. The analysis has, therefore, convinced me that the observed falling 
covariance may be consistent with the a shift from supply to demand shocks after the 
end of the 1970s. This is suggested by Barnichon (2007). Therefore, in a model which 
includes both types of shock, the interaction of inventories, GDP and improved inventory 
management techniques may be greater. Developing this model further, therefore, is a 
priority area for research.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper, I examine the impact on business cycle volatility of changes in the technol­
ogy used to manage distribution inventories. In particular, I explore whether, according 
to my model, these technology changes can explain the decline in macroeconomic volatil­
ity in the last 30 years. Mapping the salient features of the improvements in inventory 
management into the parameters of my model, I find that although the inventory man­
agement changes are useful to match aspects of the changes in inventory behaviour over
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Table 2.5: Great Moderation Experiments: Key ratios, Shares of GDP, and Contributions to the Variance of GDP Growth
Pre-Moderation Model Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Level Rel. to Level Rel. to Level Rel. to Level Rel. to
Pre-Mod Pre-Mod Pre-Mod Pre-Mod
Var(GDP growth) 2.54 1 2.60 1.02 0.62 0.24 0.64 0.25
Capital-GDP ratio 2.7 1 2.7 1 2.7 1 2.7 1
Inventory-sales ratio 0.3238 1 0.29 0.9 0.32 1 0.29 0.9
Corr GDP) -0.25 1 -0.23 0.92 -0.59 2.4 -0.55 2.2
Table 2.6: Great Moderation Ex
00
to
jeriments: Key ratios, Shares of GDP, and Contributions to the Variance of GDP Growth
Pre-Moderation Model Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
% of  Var of % o f  Var of % of  Var of % of  Var of
GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth
Consumption 1 1 1 1
Investment 61 49 60 50
A Inventory 28 15 26 13
Covariance 9 35 13 36
the period, they play no role in the reduction of the variance of GDP growth. In my 
model, the “good luck” hypothesis is a more likely explanation for the Great Moderation 
decline in volatility of GDP growth. However, the “good luck” hypothesis alone fails to 
match other developments in the aggregate data. These other developments are more 
closely matched by the inventory-management explanation. I therefore conclude that the 
two explanations have played a role in the behaviour of GDP since the mid-1980s.
My result is similar to the result in Khan and Thomas (2007b), and also in McCarthy 
and Zakrajsek (2007). In Kahn and Thomas’ (s, S) model, to the extent that inventory 
improvements lowered the fixed costs of making an order, there would be little impact of 
such technology on macroeconomic volatility as sales become more volatile as inventory 
use is reduced. McCarthy and Zakrajsek (2007) conclude that inventory management 
has played only a reinforcing role in the Great Moderation.
However, even allowing for both improved inventory management techniques and 
“good luck”, we miss a large part of the Great Moderation story. The combined experi­
ment cannot match the decline in the covariance between components of demand, sectors 
of the economy, or types of product in the economy.
Nonetheless, the contribution of this paper remains. It has shown that the improved 
management of inventories has had, at best, a secondary role in the period of the Great 
Moderation. Instead, I conclude that the “good luck” hypothesis is a more likely expla­
nation for the Great Moderation, though it is not the sole explanation.
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Chapter 3
A ssessing the Effectiveness of M ixed  
Com m ittees: Evidence from the  
Bank of England M PC
3.1 Introduction
A dramatic change has occurred in how central banks around the globe determine mon­
etary policy: responsibility for setting interest rates has shifted from individuals to com­
mittees. In fact, Pollard (2004) reports that ninety percent of eighty-eight surveyed 
central banks use committees to decide interest rates, underscoring their growing ubiq­
uity. Although the trend is heavily in favour of collective decision making, some fun­
damental issues regarding the optimal structure of committees remain unclear. One of 
these is whether committee members should come from heterogeneous or homogeneous 
backgrounds. Some central banks, like the European Central Bank and US Federal Re­
serve, have committees composed solely of internal members (experts employed within 
the bank). Others, like the Bank of England and Reserve Bank of Australia, have com­
mittees that consist of internal as well as external members (experts who are not part of 
central bank staff).
The goal of this paper is two-fold. The first is to provide theoretical arguments in 
favour of mixed committees and the second is to examine whether the voting record of 
the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is consistent with these ar-. 
guments. We build a model that allows a committee designer to select different kinds 
of experts to decide monetary policy. The model identifies two primary tasks for com­
mittee members. First, they communicate private information about economic shocks to 
each other prior to voting. We assume that members’ private information is verifiable, 
which allows us to apply an unraveling argument to show that communication fully ag-
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gregates information. If different members have different dimensions of expertise, then 
mixing them together can lead to higher utility for the designer if members are sufficiently 
specialized.
The second task for members is to use the collective information set to select an appro­
priate interest rate. We allow members to differ in their beliefs about the correct interest 
rate given a history of economic shocks, and for the committee designer to consider all 
beliefs equally likely to be correct. Thus, when two experts disagree, the designer assigns 
the probability one-half that each member is correct. Nevertheless, if members’ beliefs 
are public information, then the designer’s preferred committee structure takes the form 
of an advisory board: all members provide information to the member with the most 
moderate belief. Hence, with publicly observed beliefs, there is no justification for giving 
members with different beliefs a vote on the committee.
If the designer cannot observe beliefs, then drawing members from two different distri­
butions can improve the designer’s utility if the means of each distribution lie at opposite 
extremes. In this case, mixing types from the two distributions can lead to a more mod­
erate median voter than if the designer drew from just one distribution. Therefore, the 
justification for giving external members a voting role in addition to an advisory role 
must arise through their moderating influence on internal members.
We next turn to examining the voting record of the MPC. We begin by establishing 
cross-sectional differences between external and internal members, namely, that externals 
are: (1) more likely to deviate from the committee decision and from internal members; 
(2) vote for, on average, lower interest rates; and (3) have higher within-group voting dis­
persion. In themselves, these results are not surprising, and in fact have been documented 
by other authors as we discuss below.
The clearest prediction of our model concerns how voting behaviour changes over 
time. We obtain more original and interesting results when we examine voting dynamics. 
We find that the probability that external and internal members vote for different rates 
increases with time, and that the entire difference in voting behaviour between external 
and internal members arises from members who have been on the committee longer 
than twelve months. It is only at this point that external members begin voting for 
systematically lower rates. These results are important because they are inconsistent 
with the rationale for giving both externals and internals voting rights since they fail to 
moderate each other’s views initially.
We then delve deeper into the sources of external behaviour and find an intriguing 
result: the entire drop in externals’ voting levels arises from academics. We argue that 
this provides evidence of career concerns which influence the voting behaviour of non­
academics as they face more future career uncertainty than academics, all of whom joined
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the MPC from tenured positions. To push the results further, we examine how externals’ 
voting behavior changed in response to an exogenous change in the probability of reap­
pointment. External members who served during periods in which reappointment was 
unlikely all began voting for lower rates after twelve months. This evidence is consistent 
with a story in which external members with career concerns mimic internal members 
through their tenure on the committee in order to increase their chances of reappointment.
Another possible cause of the voting differences, and one that is often discussed in 
the monetary literature, is that external members may have asymmetric preferences over 
inflation and output. In particular, external members may be more recession-averse 
meaning that they cut rates by more than internal members during downturns. We 
examine the evidence for this and find that although tests in isolation appear to provide 
evidence in favour of such preferences, we conclude that it is more likely that career 
concerns are the driving force.
We next set out a brief description of previous research on MPC voting behaviour 
before we explore our model more fully in Section 3.4. We then turn our attention to the 
data and the empirical analysis in the remaining sections. We conclude that the inclusion 
of external, together with internal, members on the MPC would create an unambiguous 
welfare gain if each group has specialized knowledge that it shares with the other, and 
that allowing external members to vote can also improve welfare under certain conditions. 
However, the evidence suggests that career concerns and the resulting failure of external 
members to moderate opinion, mean that these gains may be limited, or even negative. 
Our paper, therefore, highlights the need for a more complete model of reputation, taking 
account of its effect on the optimal design of mixed committees.
3.2 Previous Research on M PC Voting
There has been a great deal of research interest in committee behaviour. Blinder (2007) 
provides an excellent coverage of the issues relating to monetary policy committees. In 
the analysis below, we take for granted that there is transparency of voting behaviour 
of MPC members and that MPC meeting minutes are published; without such a design 
structure, the nature of our empirical work would be impossible. As a result our paper is 
not contributing to general discussion of whether having a committee influences monetary 
policy outcomes (interested readers are pointed toward Sibert (2006), Sibert (2003) and 
the references therein), or on the debate about optimal degree of transparency (see, for 
example, Geraats (2006) and Sibert (2002)).
Using an experimental set-up, Blinder and Morgan (2005) and Lombardelli, Proud- 
man, and Talbot (2005) both conclude that committee decision making improves on the
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behaviour of individuals; although neither paper explicitly examines the behaviour of 
external members. Gerlach-Kristen (2006) constructs a model of monetary policy com­
mittee voting to formalize the idea that groups can outperform individuals, but does not 
explore strategic voting or communication. Li, Rosen, and Suen (2001) have studied the 
two-person committee voting problem in which members can report their non-verifiable 
private information strategically. They show that when members disagree about the 
correct decision, there is less than full reporting of private information. In this paper, 
committees fully aggregate information due to the verifiability of private information, 
which allows us to apply unraveling results (Grossman 1981, Milgrom 1981).
Numerous recent papers examine empirical differences in voting behaviour among 
MPC members. Gerlach-Kristen (2003), Spencer (2006), Harris and Spencer (2008), 
and Gerlach-Kristen (2009) all document the tendency of external members to dissent 
more often and to favour lower interest rates than internal members. Bhattacharjee and 
Holly (2005) and Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008) consider member heterogeneity more 
broadly, and find that there are systematic voting differences across members. None of 
these papers uncovers the growth of conflict on the MPC,1 nor do they explore the nor­
mative implications of including internal and external members on the same committee. 
By and large, these papers assume member preferences derive from a weighted sum of 
inflation and output, with different members having different weights. However, such 
preferences alone are unable to explain our empirical results.
Unlike Spencer (2006) and Harris and Spencer (2008), we do find evidence of career 
concerns on the MPC. Our paper is also complementary to Meade and Stasavage (2008), 
who have found evidence of career concerns on the Federal Open Market Committee in 
the US.
3.3 M PC Background
Until 1997 the Chancellor of the Exchequer (the government official in charge of the Trea­
sury) had sole responsibility for setting interest rates in the UK. One of Gordon Brown’s 
first actions on becoming Chancellor in the government of Tony Blair was to set up an 
independent committee for setting interest rates in order to make monetary policy less 
arbitrary and susceptible to election cycles. The MPC first convened on 6 June 1997, and 
has met every month since. Majority vote determines the rate of interest. Its remit, as 
defined in the Bank of England Act (1998) (h ttp : / / www.bankofengland. co .uk /about/ 
le g is la tio n /1 9 9 8 ac t .pdf) is to “maintain price stability, and subject to that, to sup­
1However, Gerlach-Kristen (2003) does mention a delay in a member’s first dissent: on average, it 
occurs after nine months.
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port the economic policy of Her Majesty’s government, including its objectives for growth 
and employment.” In practice, the committee seeks to achieve a target inflation rate of 
2%2, based on the Consumer Price Index. If inflation is greater than 3% or less than 
1%, the Governor of the Bank of England must write an open letter to the Chancellor 
explaining why. The inflation target is symmetric; missing the target in either direction 
is treated with equal concern.
The MPC has nine members; five of these come from within the Bank of England: 
the Governor, two Deputy Governors, the Chief Economist, and the Executive Direc­
tor for Market Operations. The Chancellor also appoints four members (subject to 
approval from the Treasury Select Committee) from outside the Bank. There are no 
restrictions on who can serve as an external member. According to the Bank of England 
(http://w w w .bankofengland.co.uk/m onetarypolicy/overview.htm ), the purpose of 
external appointments is to “ensure that the MPC benefits from thinking and expertise 
in addition to that gained inside the Bank of England.” Bar the governors, all members 
serve three year terms; the governors serve five year terms. When members’ terms end, 
they can either be replaced or re-appointed. Through June 2008, 25 different members 
have served on the MPC -  11 internal members and 14 external members. Each member 
is independent in the sense that they do not represent any interest group or faction. The 
Bank encourages members to simply determine the rate of interest that they feel is most 
likely to achieve the inflation target.3
The MPC meets on the first Wednesday and Thursday of each month. In the month 
between meetings, members receive numerous briefings from Bank staff and regular up­
dates of economic indicators. On the Friday before MPC meetings, members gather for 
a half-day meeting in which they are given the latest analysis of economic and business 
trends. On the Wednesday of the meeting, members discuss their views on several is­
sues. The discussion continues on Thursday morning; each member is given some time 
to summarize his or her views to the rest of the MPC, and suggest what vote they favour 
(although they can, if they wish, wait to hear the others views before committing to 
a vote (Lambert 2006)). This process begins with the Deputy Governor for monetary
2This target changed from the RPIX to the CPI measure of inflation in January 2004, with a reduction 
in the inflation target from 2.5% to 2%.
3According to the Bank of England website (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/ 
overview.htm)
Each member of the MPC has expertise in the field of economics and monetary policy. 
Members do not represent individual groups or areas. They are independent. Each member 
of the Committee has a vote to set interest rates at the level they believe is consistent with 
meeting the inflation target. The MPC’s decision is made on the basis of one-person, one 
vote. It is not based on a consensus of opinion. It reflects the votes of each individual 
member of the Committee.
policy, concludes with the Governor, and other members are selected in random order 
in between. To formally conclude the meeting, the Governor suggests an interest rate 
that he believes will command a majority. Each member then chooses whether to agree 
with the Governor’s decision, or dissent and state an alternative interest rate. The MPC 
decision is announced at 12 noon. Two weeks after each meeting, members’ votes are 
published, along with minutes of the meeting with full, but unattributed comments.
We now set out a model that captures the essential institutional details of the MPC.
3.4 C om m ittee Voting M odel
3.4.1 A ssum ptions and set-up
The model has an infinite number of periods t £ {1,2,...}. The period t forecast for 
inflation at the horizon4 is given by 7rt ~  N  (cn* +  6 — /3rt , a2) where at is a period t 
state variable that captures the history of shocks to hit the economy, 6 N  (0, <%) is 
a parameter related to the non-inflationary level of output and independent of at (for 
example, 6 could capture the effect of long-run supply),5 and (3 is a simplified monetary 
policy transmission mechanism.
We assume that at is persistent and is subject to two independent shocks, st ~  
N(0, a2s) and dt ~  -/V(0,o^); in particular, at = pcx-t- i +  st +  dt where p is the AR(1) 
persistence coefficient. The key issue is that economic conditions are not unidimensional, 
however, for the sake of the discussion, we shall refer to d and s as temporary demand 
and supply shocks.6 This means we can write economic conditions as
t
(sr +  dT).
T = 1
There is a group of experts, each with period t preferences given by
- B  [(*, -  tt*)2] , (3.1)
4To reduce notation, we define this period t  forecast inflation of inflation as 7rt rather than irt + h. 
We shall also refer to this forecast as “current inflation”.
5In the absence of transitory shocks, and assuming a constant interest rate r, inflation will equal
6 — pf .  Thus, to meet their target, the central bank must ensure E[d] — fir =  7t* holds. This equation 
defines the equilibrium real interest rate.
6Given our specification of how shocks impact expected future inflation, a positive supply shock would 
result in a negative s*, while a positive demand shock would result in a positive d t . Moreover, as the 
MPC members are only concerned with those shocks to which monetary policy reacts, we can think of 
St as the second round effects of supply shocks. Therefore, a positive St is the second round inflationary 
impact of the a negative supply shock (such as an oil price spike). An alternative could be to consider st 
as consumption (saving) shocks and dt as investment (depreciation) shocks which both affect the level 
of demand and inflation.
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where 7T* is an exogenous inflation target. Thus, experts share the same preferences. 
However, they disagree in the sense that each believes that 6 ~  N  (0», oj). Thus, experts 
do not necessarily agree on the distribution of inflation conditional on an interest rate. 
We assume that the prior beliefs on 6 are common knowledge. In contrast, we assume that 
experts know g up to a constant, which can be absorbed into uncertainty about 6. While 
this assumption may seem strong, insider accounts from the MPC suggest that most 
disagreements are about economic conditions rather than the transmission mechanism.7
In every period, each expert receives verifiable private signals about the current shocks 
equal to s'u = st + £* and dit = dt +  ef, where e* ~  N  (0, ofs) and ef ~  N  (0, ofd). The 
paper will refer to the ratios 7? =  1 /a fs £ (0 , 00) and 7f  =  l/o fd £ (0 , 00) as the skill of 
member i in identifying s and d shocks, respectively. For example, as 7? —► 0, member i 
has no useful private information about the supply shocks, and as 7? —► 00 he has near 
perfect knowledge of them.
The verifiability assumption on the private signals is key in the model. The motivation 
is that monetary policy experts arrive at their private views about the latest economic 
shocks through analyzing and interpreting economic data, reports and forecasts. This 
in turn means that when communicating their views to others, they can produce hard 
information to back it up. Thus, verifiability is a natural assumption given the model’s 
application.
A committee designer (who one can think of as the government) with preferences
00
- £ « * £ [ ( * - 0 * 1  (3.2)
t=1
can appoint two experts to a committee that decides interest rates in a manner specified 
below. The designer receives no private information about the shocks. It also has higher- 
order uncertainty about the distribution of 0: it believes 0 ~  N  (0, (Jq) and that 6 ~  
U [—a, a]. So, whereas the experts have a clear prior belief about 9, the designer does 
not. For consistency, we assume that for all members, —a <  0i <  a, so that the committee 
designer believes each member’s view is correct with equal probability. The designer’s 
incentives to appoint experts depend on what they can do once they join the committee, 
so to complete the model we describe this.
Once on the committee, and after receiving their private signals, experts (whom we 
call members hereafter) have the opportunity to communicate with each other prior to 
voting. For both dit and sh, members simultaneously choose whether to disclose their
7For example, see Barker (2007). In addition, Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005) find heterogeneity in 
estimated individual policy reaction functions for MPC members, and argue that differences in the way 
individual members assimilate information supplied to them generate such differences.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Unique Votes Across Meetings
Unique Votes Frequency Percentage
1 47 35.3
2 81 60.9
3 5 3.8
Total 133 100
private information or not. One can characterize member i ’s strategy space with two sets 
Oft and 0 J, with the interpretation that member i withholds his period t signals whenever 
dit £ Oft and s'a E Sft. These sets are choice variables for each player i in each period 
t, and we solve below for their equilibrium structure. Because private information is 
verifiable, credible communication is not an issue.8 Allowing communication is important 
in light of the extensive discussions that MPC members have with each other in the days 
leading up to the final vote. We assume that the committee designer does not observe 
what members communicate to each other, only the final decision that they take.
After sharing information with each other, the members simultaneously select an 
interest rate rit £ where without loss of generality rt < r t. Table 3.1 provides
a motivation for this assumption. In 96.2 per cent of meetings, members all vote for 
one or two interest rates, even though there are no restrictions (legal or otherwise) in 
place that prevent them from selecting other rates. We assume that if r\t =  r2t = Lt, 
then rt = r*; that if r\t =  r2t = rt , then rt = ft', and that if r\t =  Lt and r2t = rt , or 
ITt = f t  and r2t =  Lt, then member l ’s preferred rate is chosen with probability p. This 
assumption simply says that the committee has a way of breaking ties, and that there 
is some non-zero probability that the tie could go either way. This is similar to the fact 
that the Governor of the Bank of England is charged with breaking any ties that remain 
after all other members have cast their votes.
After setting the interest rate rt , all members observe the random variable = 7rt + ut 
where ut ~  N  (0, crj) is again a white noise term. In other words, members receive 
information about the success they had in period t in achieving the inflation target 
before they vote in period t  + 1. This information could, for example, come from national 
accounts and other data releases, as well as Inflation Report projection updates which 
are regularly done within quarters to help interpret new data.
To summarize, the timing of the game is the following:
1. Members receive signals dit and sh
2. Members simultaneously choose whether or not to disclose their signals to each
8One could allow members to send arbitrary messages to each other in the case where they do not 
provide verifiable information without altering the intuitions that underpin the solution of the model.
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other
3. Members simultaneously vote for r* or rt
4. rt is implemented
5. Members observe 7r*
3.4.2 M em ber Behaviour
This section solves the committee voting model laid out in the previous section by back­
ward induction. It begins by deriving the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the voting stage 
given an arbitrary outcome of the communication stage, and then solves for the Bayesian 
Nash Equilibrium of the communication stage given equilibrium behavior in the voting 
stage.
Voting
There are two relevant parameters that a member needs to consider when selecting his 
vote in period t. The first is his estimate of current economic conditions at. We denote 
this estimate as ait = E [a | Iit], where Iit the information set of member i at time t. 
The second is his current belief about 6. We denote this by da = E  [9 \ I it ].
With strategic voting, agents have to take into account not only their private estimates 
of payoff-relevant parameters when selecting an optimal action, but also the strategies 
of the other players. A strategic effect potentially arises because when agents condition 
on their vote being pivotal, they might obtain information about other agents’ private 
information. In this model, a strategic effect does not arise because each agent can 
independently influence the interest rate. For example, if member 1 votes for rt , then 
by also voting for rt, member 2 guarantees that rt is the outcome. On the other hand, 
if member 2 instead votes for rt , then rt is the outcome with probability p. Therefore, 
it is a dominant strategy for each member to maximize (3.1) conditional on his private 
information only.
P roposition  3.1 Member i votes fo r r t if and only i f a it > a*t where a*t is
strictly decreasing.
To understand this result, it is first important to examine what interest rate member 
i would choose if he were not constrained to choose between rt and rt . The proof of 
proposition 3.1 shows that the ideal interest rate r*t satisfies
P r i t  + a i t  +  O i t  = 7T*. (3-3)
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That is, if he could choose any interest rate, member z would choose the one that set the 
expected mean of the inflation distribution equal to the inflation target ir*. Moreover, 
one can easily show that preferences are single peaked in the sense that (3.1) is strictly 
declining as rt moves away from r*t . To see the implications for voting behaviour, one 
can examine Figure 3.1, which plots out expected utility for member z given an and Qiu 
as well as examples of and rt. Member z will choose the interest rate that maximizes 
his expected utility. In terms of the figure, this entails choosing rt over f t.
Figure 3.1: Member Preferences
We now turn  to analyzing how voting depends on an and 6it- The top half of Figure 
3.2 depicts the same preferences as in Figure 3.1, when the ideal interest rate for member 
z is r*t. We first consider what happens when a it increases. In this case, member z believes 
more inflationary pressures have accumulated in the economy in period t, and his ideal 
interest rate increases. When an  increases by enough, member z votes for rt over rt , as 
demonstrated in the bottom half of the figure. One can therefore characterize member z’s 
voting rule with a single parameter a*t: whenever an <  a*t, he votes for r t , and whenever 
an > a*t , he votes for r t .9
We next consider what happens when 9it increases. Now, for fixed beliefs about the 
temporary shocks, the ideal rate increases since member z believes long-term inflationary 
pressures are higher. The effect on preferences is the same as when a it increases: the 
ideal rate increases. So, the preferences in the top half of Figure 3.2 shift to the right. 
This in turn decreases a*t since member z needs less evidence of temporary inflationary 
shocks to prefer the higher rate.
9Here, we have resolved indifference in favour of rt, an unessential assumption.
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Figure 3.2: Member Preferences
Com m unication
Before discussing the equilibrium of the communication game, it is important to first 
discuss exactly how each member uses information in his decision-making. To begin, 
we focus on just the first period, and suppose that member 1 has a lower prior belief 
on 6 than member 2 (9y < 62). This means that member 1 requires evidence of higher 
temporary shocks to vote for the higher interest compared to member 2. Furthermore, 
instead of each member’s signals being private information, we suppose that they are 
public information. By Proposition 3.1, member i votes for f i  if and only if c^i >  ajj, 
where a j j  ><*21-
M ember 2 \  
decision rule
Conflict
.R egion
M ember 1 
decision rule
Figure 3.3: Decision Rules for Members 1 and 2 Given du  and Sn
Figure 3.3 graphically illustrates the decision rules of each member for fixed values of 
du  and sin- Since both members’ signals are mixtures of normal random variables, an  is 
linearly increasing in each signal. This means that we can represent member 1 ’s decision 
rule (for a fixed du  and sn ) as a negatively sloped line in (d^i, S21) space that represent
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the combinations of member 2’s signals at which a n =  ajj. All combinations of d21 and 
S21 that lie on or above this line lead member 1 to accept f \ , and all combinations that fall 
below lead him to accept rv  Member 2’s decision rule is simply member l ’s shifted down 
by 02 — 0\ , the amount by which their beliefs on expected inflation for any realization of
the signals differs.
There are three distinct regions that emerge from Figure 3.3. The first is realizations 
of ^ 2 i,S 2 i) that lie below the line a2\ =  aJi- In this region, both members agree that 
rj is the correct interest rate. The second lies above the line a n  = a jj. Here, both 
members agree that 7q is the correct rate. The third region lies between c*2 i = CH21 and 
c*n = QfJi- In this area, there is disagreement between the members: person 1 believes 
rx is the correct rate, and person 2 believes that f \  is. This is the “conflict region” in 
which disagreement between the members arises. Its size is key to understanding the 
equilibrium.
One can now turn to analyzing the effects of communication when members privately 
observe their signals. For expositional purposes, we consider an equilibrium in which 
member 1 withholds some realizations of his demand shock, and always discloses his 
signal on the supply shock. When member 1 observes some du 6 ©f1; he anticipates 
that person 2 will vote for rq whenever
one furthest to the southwest. On the other hand, member 1 believes that the correct 
decision rule is to vote rq whenever ) lies above aqi =
Figure 3.4: The Effect of Member 1 Disclosure on Member 2 Decision Rule 
For an equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that member 1 actually wishes to
<*21 =  E Qq | d\\ £ ©1 1 , Sn, d2\ , S21 > aqi-
Figure 3.4 plots the line a2i =  above which member 2 votes for 7q. This line is the
decision ru le  
w h en  M e m b e r 1 
\d isd o se s
M em b er 1 
decision ru le
M em b er 2 \  
decision r u l e \ .  
w h en  M em b er l \ .  
d o es  n o t d isclose \
M e m b e r 2 5 2 1
\
withhold information whenever du 6 ©f. The inherent conflict between the two commit-
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tee members is over the threshold at which the higher interest rate becomes appropriate. 
Member 1 would like to convince member 2 that the shocks are as small as possible in 
order to get him to vote for the high interest rate less often. Consider the incentives of 
member 1 when he observes some du  — inf > e for e near 0. If member 1 shares this 
information with member 2 then
du  € 0 f , s n  € ©i , d2i , s2i 
d u , 5 n  £  © i > d 2 i , < s 2 i
In other words, when member 1 discloses some du  that is one of the smallest elements in 
0 f, member 2 forms a lower belief on a  than when member 2 withholds such a du- This 
happens because without disclosure, member 2 forms his belief on cti knowing only that 
du £ 0 i ,  so he takes the average over this set. With disclosure, member 2 infers d\ to be 
lower, and so also adjusts his belief on a down. This in turn shifts member 2’s decision 
rule to the northeast, as illustrated in Figure 3.4. For all ^ 21, $21)  in the shaded region, 
member 2 now votes for rx instead of r\. Thus, from member l ’s perspective, information 
disclosure reduces the probability that member 2 will take the wrong action, and strictly 
improves expected utility. In this way, any equilibrium without full information disclosure 
“unravels” since there is always some type that strictly prefers disclosing to withholding.
P roposition  3.2 In the unique equilibrium of the communication game, Qft = 0 andQft = 
0 Vi,t.
This result that communication on committees can indeed lead information aggre­
gation, even when members have conflicting ideas about how to interpret each others’ 
information.10 It also echoes results in Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981), who demon­
strate similar results in exchange economies with adverse selection.
Learning
We have concluded that behaviour consists of full sharing of private information followed 
by all members’ voting for their preferred interest rate in every period. One might then 
wonder what a dynamic structure adds to the model. The answer lies in the release of 
the inflation signal 7rt . While members enter the committee with heterogeneous priors on 
6, they are able to adjust their views when they obtain information on how the interest
10The verifiability of private information is crucial for establishing this result. Okuno-Fujiwara, Postle- 
waite, and Suzumura (1990) show that full information revelation need not occur if even some private 
information is not verifiable.
CX 21 — E a  1
E a 1
a21-
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rate chosen by the committee maps into actual inflation. Since the demand and supply 
shocks are not correlated with 0, the communication of private signals does not allow for 
learning.
3.4 .3  M ixed  com m ittees and welfare
So far, we have discussed two dimensions of member behavior: communication and voting. 
We now show how each dimension provides a margin on which mixed committees can 
affect welfare.
Information aggregation and welfare
The first result of our model formalizes the idea that mixed committees can add value to 
society due their ability to draw on members’ diverse expertise.
Proposition 3.3 For small enough a, there exist numbers 0 < d < d and 0 < s < s 
such that a committee composed of solely of members with 7f  < d and 7? > s or solely 
of members with 7f  > d and 7? < s will yield the committee designer a lower expected 
utility than a committee composed of a mixture of these types.
To understand the intuition of this result, suppose there are only two types of experts, 
both of whom agree with the committee designer that 0 ~  jV (O, ^ ) : 11 d-types perceive 
d perfectly (7f  —► 00) but have no private information about s (7? = 0); s-types perceive 
s perfectly ( 7 ■ —► 00) but have no private information about d ( 7 f  = 0). Once on the 
committee, either type will share his information with the other. When they make interest 
rate decisions, a committee with just d-types will therefore know d but know nothing 
about s, and a committee with just s-types will know s but know nothing about d. On 
the other hand, a mixed committee will know both d and s. Since both types agree with 
the committee designer about the appropriate interest rate, a mixed committee yields 
the designer strictly higher utility, since it has more information on which to base its 
decision.
This result is important because it shows that a committee composed of members 
with different kinds of policy-making expertise can produce a better outcome for society, 
even if the members do not agree perfectly about the right course of action. The key 
to the argument is information aggregation, since members have access to each other’s 
expertise when they vote.
11 The relationship between member information and designer utility is not clear when there is the 
possibility for members to be very far from the correct belief about 6.
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Belief d iversity  and  welfare
We have said nothing so far about voting per se. The previous result shows that infor­
mation aggregation can lead to better outcomes for some level of belief diversity, but now 
we ask another question: whether there is a value to having a diversity of beliefs among 
committee members for its own sake. To isolate this issue, we assume for the moment 
that members’ identities do not affect the amount of information to which committee 
members have access.
P roposition  3.4 Suppose that members observe public information about the d and s 
shocks prior to voting, and have no private information. Furthermore, suppose that 6\ =
62 = 0 . The committee designer’s welfare is strictly decreasing in
While the committee designer believes that all prior beliefs about 6 between —a and a 
are equally likely, the designer is not indifferent among members with these different be­
liefs. The more moderate the beliefs of the committee members—in the sense of distance 
from 0—the better off the designer is. To see the intuition for the result, an example is 
helpful. Suppose that a = 1 and the designer can appoint members for whom 0* =  0.5 or 
for whom 0* =  0.75. Then, whenever 6 < 0.5, the former types take the correct decision 
more often. But, since 6 < 0.5 is more likely than not given the distributional assumption 
on 0, the expected utility from the more moderate belief is higher. This has an immediate 
and important implication for committee design.
Corollary 3.1 Suppose member beliefs are public information and 6\ ^02-  Then the 
committee designer’s welfare is highest either as p —► 0 or p —*■ 1 .
p is the parameter that measures the probability that member l ’s preferred rate 
is chosen when he conflicts with member 2. Moreover, its value does not affect the 
communication behavior of any member because as long as there is some probability 
of everyone’s vote mattering, each member would like to influence the other through 
information disclosure. The designer can thus choose p without altering the amount 
of information that each member has when selecting rates. Therefore, if the designer 
can observe member’s prior beliefs about 0 , it should give full decision authority to 
the member with the more moderate belief. In other words, it can appoint members 
as advisors to the decision maker, without giving them any responsibility for decision 
making.
Corollary 3.1 has the important implication that a committee with heterogeneous 
beliefs can only benefit the designer if it does not observe members’ priors. If this is the 
case, appointing members with different (expected) beliefs can moderate the outcome.
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In order to see this, one must move beyond a two-person committee and consider the 
possibility of larger groups. Suppose that the designer can draw members from one of two 
groups. The first group has members with beliefs distributed U [—a, |]  and the second 
has members with beliefs distributed U [— §,a]. By appointing half the members from 
the first group and half the members from the second, the designer ensures moderation 
for a large enough committee size, since the median voter’s belief converges to 0* =  0 
as the committee size becomes large. If it only appointed members from one of the two 
groups, the median voter’s belief converges to |0;| =  J, resulting in a utility loss relative 
to the mixed committee.
In terms of our application to the MPC, there would be a justification for including 
externals as voting (as opposed to advisory) members if the UK government felt that 
they balanced the views of internal members to yield a more moderate outcome. One 
might suspect that when we look at the data we will find differences in voting behavior 
between members—and indeed we do. The question is whether the differences we observe 
are consistent with moderation. Our final theoretical result provides a useful test.
P roposition  3.5 Pr [ru ^  r2t] 0.
Different beliefs about 6 lead to a positive probability of members’ selecting different 
interest rates; however, after each period, members have the opportunity to adjust their 
beliefs, and results from statistical theory (Blackwell and Dubins 1962, Savage 1972) show 
that members’ beliefs about 6 converge when they are exposed to a sufficient amount of 
information about the relationship between interest rates and inflation. Therefore, the 
probability of members’ voting for different interest rates becomes negligible after they 
have sat for long enough together on the committee. In an iV-person committee, one can 
simply apply this result to each pair of members to generate the same result.
3.5 D ata
In order to test Proposition 3.5 we use the MPC voting records between July 1997 and 
June 2008 (data available from http://w w w .bankofengland.co.uk/m onetarypolicy/ 
decisions.htm ). The data contain a record of every decision (decisiont) taken by the 
MPC, as well as each member’s vote in each meeting (voteit = Arit) } 2 Before June 
1998 there is information about whether members preferred higher or lower interest rates 
compared with the decision, but not about their actual preferred rate. In these cases, we 
treat a member’s vote as either 25 basis points higher or lower than the decision, in the
12We express members’ votes in terms of their preferred change in interest rates rather than their 
preferred level. This makes no difference to the results.
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direction of disagreement. The Bank website also provides information on which members 
were external appointments and which were internal. For every member we gathered 
biographical information, including previous occupation, educational background, and 
age from press releases associated with their appointment and from information provided 
to the Treasury Select Committee ahead of their confirmation.
We drop the emergency meeting held after September 11th 2001 from our dataset 
for the programming convenience of having only one meeting per month. This does not 
affect our results: in the meeting after 9/11, voting was unanimously in favour of lowering 
interest rates, so it would not be used for econometric identification given our use of time 
fixed effects. Howard Davies served on the MPC for the first two meetings and is the only 
member who voted exclusively on unanimous committees and thus his inclusion/exclusion 
is unimportant for econometric identification; although we include him in our baseline 
regressions. Lord George, the Governor for most of our sample, always voted with the 
majority regardless of his starting position; as a result we think that these voting records 
do not represent his own views in all cases. Even under the governorship of Mervyn 
King, the Governor has only deviated twice since taking office in July 2003. Nonetheless, 
we include the observations for the Governor in the regression results presented below, 
though all of the results stand if we exclude the data on the Governor at each meeting.
In Table 3.2 we provide summary statistics of the individual members on the MPC. 
Of the 25 MPC members that we consider in our sample, 14 are external and 11 are 
internal as indicated by the variable13
T [ 0 if member i is an external member IN Ti = <
I 1 if member i is an internal member
The average vote shows the mean of all votes cast by the member during their time on 
the MPC within our sample; this is driven largely by when a member served on the com­
mittee. The variance column reports the analogous second-moment for the voting data. 
Table 3.2 also shows that the educational background of both groups is heterogenous and 
that both groups contain members who worked as academics prior to their appointment 
(acadi = 1).
In our model, the committee has two members each of whom can choose two interest 
rates, so the probability of their not agreeing on the correct rate is the only natural 
measure of disagreement. On the actual MPC there is not just one internal member and 
one external member, but many of each. Therefore, determining the correct measure 
of disagreement is not as straightforward. We therefore explore several possibilities for
13No member has so far served as both an external member and an internal member, though there is 
nothing that prohibits this from happening in the future
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Table 3.2: Sample Statistics by Member
M em ber IN T , A verage
V ote
V ariance 
o f V ote
E d u cation A cadi M eetin gs
A. Sentance 0 0.07 0.026 Prof/PhD 0 21
C. Goodhart 0 0.01 0.050 Prof/PhD 1 36
C. Allsopp 0 -0.13 0.020 Masters /  Accountancy 1 36
D. Blanchflower 0 -0.11 0.032 Prof/PhD 1 25
D. Walton 0 0.00 0.023 Masters /  Accountancy 0 12
D. Julius 0 -0.12 0.036 Prof/PhD 0 45
K. Barker 0 -0.01 0.020 Undergraduate 0 85
M. Bell 0 -0.01 0.018 Masters /  Accountancy 0 36
R. Lambert 0 0.02 0.013 Undergraduate 0 34
A. Budd 0 -0.06 0.070 Prof/PhD 0 18
S. Nickell 0 -0.05 0.028 Prof/PhD 1 72
S.Wadhwani 0 -0.11 0.041 Prof/PhD 0 36
T. Besley 0 0.07 0.025 Prof/PhD 1 22
W. Buiter 0 0.00 0.105 Prof/PhD 1 36
C. Bean 1 -0.02 0.017 Prof/PhD 1 93
D. Clementi 1 -0.04 0.034 Masters/Accountancy 0 60
I. Plenderleith 1 -0.03 0.034 Masters /  Accountancy 0 60
J. Vickers 1 0.00 0.060 Prof/PhD 1 28
M. King 1 0.02 0.027 Prof/PhD 0 133
P. Tucker 1 0.03 0.014 U ndergraduate 0 73
R. Lomax 1 0.02 0.010 Masters/ Accountancy 0 60
A. Large 1 0.07 0.016 Masters/Accountancy 0 40
E. George 1 -0.03 0.029 Undergraduate 0 73
J. Gieve 1 0.01 0.024 Undergraduate 0 29
H. Davies 1 0.25 0.000 Masters /  Accountancy 0 2
measuring conflict.
The first measure (and the one most common in the literature) is whether a member 
deviates from the majority of members on the committee. We therefore define the variable
^  ^   ^__ I 0 if Arit =  decisiorit
D (D ev.M PC)if = <
 ^ 1 if Arit 7^  decisiorit
However, a measure of disagreement that is closer in spirit to our model would explic­
itly measure conflict between externals and internals, not compare each member against 
the majority. We therefore construct a second dummy variable that measures when in­
ternal (external) members deviate from the modal vote of the external (internal) group. 
This variable more closely captures disagreements between internals and externals on 
the committee. Defining the modal vote of the subset of internal (external) members in 
period t as decision]NT=1 (decision]NT=Q), we can define:
0 if Arn = decision]NT=1 h IN T i =  0
0 if Arit =  decision]NT=0&INTi =  1
1 if Arit 7^  decision]NT=1h IN T i — 0 
1 if Arit t  ^dedsion]NT=Qh IN T i =  1
One issue that arises with this approach is that the modal vote among externals is not 
always uniquely defined; in 20 of the 133 meetings in our sample the external vote distri­
bution is bimodal. Therefore, we need to decide between these two modes. One of the two 
external modes always corresponds to the mode of the internal members (which is always 
unique). In the construction of D (Dev.group)it we set decision]NT=0 = decision].NT=1 
whenever decision]NT=0 is multi-valued. This reduces the number of group deviations in 
the sample and so may bias us toward finding support for our model. However, we also de­
fine an alternative dummy variable called D(Dev-group-dlt)it, which is defined similarly 
to D (Dev .group) iv except with decision]NT=0 ^  decision]NT=1 whenever decision]NT=0 
is multivalued.
Table 3.3 compares how frequently members deviate according to each of our measures. 
While the internal and external groups each contain members who deviate more and less 
often in all three senses, the tendency is clearly for external members to deviate from the 
committee decision more often than internal members. Indeed, differences along these 
lines have already been pointed out by Gerlach-Kristen (2003). The table also highlights 
that, according to the D(Devgroup)-it measure, externals deviate more frequently with 
internals than vice versa. This is perhaps unsurprising given the greater within-group 
dispersion among externals combined with the fact that D(Devgroup)-it equates the
D (Dev-group)it = <
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modal votes of internals and externals when the external votes is bimodal. Once we use 
the alternative group mode for external members, internal and external members have 
much more similar patterns of deviation from the other group.
Disagreement is in general quite common. For instance, in 14% of the observations 
of D (D ev-M PC)it = 1. While this number might seem quite low, we find that 65% of 
the 133 meetings in our sample have at least one deviation from the committee majority. 
Figure 3.5 shows the level of interest rate chosen by the MPC, where the markers indicate 
the votes of individual members; deviations from the majority are those that are off the 
MPC decision line. These deviations occur regularly and not just around turning points 
in the interest rate cycle (marked with shading on the figure).
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Figure 3.5: Votes and Decisions of the Monetary Policy Committee
The fact that there are numerous disagreements within the MPC is not surprising. 
W hat is unclear is what generates these differences. This paper argues that there are two 
likely candidates. The first is divergent beliefs. Even though members share the same 
access to data as each other, and communicate their views extensively with each other, 
they can still have fundamentally different beliefs about the inflationary pressures facing 
the economy. The second is preferences. Members can have fundamental differences in 
what they hope to achieve when selecting interest rates. As our model shows, these 
two stories are empirically distinguishable. If members differ because of beliefs, then
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Table 3.3: Total and Percentage Deviations using 3 Different Approaches, by Member
M em ber
IN Ti M eetings
D(Dev_M PC)it 
Total % Deviations
D (Dev_group)it 
Total % D eviations
D (Dev .group -alt )it 
Total % D eviations
A. Sentance 0 21 5 23.8 6 28.6 6 28.6
C. Goodhart 0 36 3 8.3 3 8.3 3 8.3
C. Allsopp 0 36 10 27.8 13 36.1 13 36.1
D. Blanchflower 0 25 13 52.0 12 48.0 12 48.0
D. Walton 0 12 3 25.0 4 33.3 4 33.3
D. Julius 0 45 13 28.9 15 33.3 15 33.3
K. Barker 0 85 5 5.9 8 9.4 8 9.4
M. Bell 0 36 5 13.9 5 13.9 5 13.9
R. Lambert 0 34 0 0.0 1 2.9 1 2.9
A. Budd 0 18 4 22.2 4 22.2 4 22.2
S. Nickell 0 72 17 23.6 17 23.6 17 23.6
S.Wadhwani 0 36 12 33.3 15 41.7 15 41.7
T. Besley 0 22 5 22.7 6 27.3 6 27.3
W. Buiter 0 36 16 44.4 16 44.4 16 44.4
C. Bean 1 93 5 5.4 7 7.5 23 24.7
D. Clementi 1 60 4 6.7 8 13.3 15 25.0
I. Plenderleith 1 60 5 8.3 9 15.0 14 23.3
J. Vickers 1 28 5 17.9 5 17.9 8 28.6
M. King 1 133 14 10.5 19 14.3 35 26.3
P. Tucker 1 73 7 9.6 12 16.4 21 28.8
R. Lomax 1 60 5 8.3 7 11.7 14 23.3
A. Large 1 40 9 22.5 13 32.5 16 40.0
E. George 1 73 0 0.0 7 9.6 20 27.4
J. Gieve 1 29 3 10.3 4 13.8 8 27.6
H.Davies 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
differences between members should become less pronounced.
3.6 Econom etric M odelling and R esults
The primary goal of this section is to examine the time path of individual voting be­
haviour on the MPC in order to shed light on the source of conflict within the MPC. 
It first analyzes how the probability of deviating evolves, and then turns to looking at 
the actual votes that members cast. The main result is that on a variety of measures, 
conflict increases with time, leading us to conclude that members are likely to have dif­
ferences arising from their preferences; we will explore the main two potential preference 
differences.
3.6.1 P robability  o f D eviating
The measures of deviation we introduced in the previous section are all dummy variables, 
so ordinary least squares (OLS) will produce inconsistent estimates. Instead, we adopt 
the regression model:
logit (D-devn) =  a +  A • Zi +  ipi • IN T { +  ^2 • expit +  ^3 • (INTiexpit)
+ ^ ^ T t  • Timet  -b ^  ' Q t "I- ^  ■ COMj  -I- Ea (3.4)
* T j
where:
• D.deva is the deviation outcome variable of interest;
• INTi is the internal dummy variable defined earlier;
• expn is a dummy variable indicating that a member has experience on the committee 
(defined below in more detail);
• Zi are time-invariant individual characteristics;
• Timet are monthly dummy variables (month fixed effects);
• Qt are quarterly dummies (quarter fixed effects);
•  COMj  is a committee fixed effect
The two sets of time fixed effects control for the variation in voting behaviour that 
is common to each period of time, such as variations in the business cycle. We include,
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in addition to month fixed effects, quarter fixed effects to capture the fact that some key 
information is quarter specific (national accounts data, as well as the Bank’s own forecast). 
An alternative was to include data on inflation and GDP, as well as the information that 
comes from Bank of England quarterly forecast meetings as controls; this approach does 
not alter the conclusions of our work.
As a further control, we also include committee fixed effects. In the regressions we run, 
there is a separate dummy variable for each unique combination of committee members 
in our sample. This is potentially important if a member’s vote (and the extent to 
which it conflicts with other members’) is affected by the identity of the other committee 
members. These committee fixed effects require inclusion of a separate dummy variable 
for every different committee composition that has met. Therefore, if a member leaves the 
committee and is replaced by a new member, this represents a new committee composition 
and so a new dummy variable. Also, if a member is absent and so only 8 members meet 
in a particular month, then this committee composition is also different and so controlled 
for separately.
In order to ensure that INTi  is not capturing the effects of other variables that are 
correlated with being an internal member, we include a set of controls for individual 
characteristics. The regressions control for age as well as dummy variables for whether a 
member worked in the private sector immediately before joining the committee, whether 
a member was an academic immediately before joining the committee, and whether a 
member holds a Master’s or PhD degree.14
We allow the errors to be clustered by MPC member since it is unlikely that members’ 
errors are independent across time periods, especially if there is some systemic hetero­
geneity in member voting. Clustering corrects the standard errors of the estimates for 
this correlation, making it less likely that we wrongly fail to reject a null hypothesis of 
coefficient significance. However, our results are unchanged without clustering the errors 
by member.
The key variable of interest in our regressions is expit, the variable that distinguishes 
new MPC members from those with experience. This variable is:
{ 0 if member i in time t  has been on the committee 12 months or less 
1 if member i in time t  has been on the committee more than 12 months
The 12 month cutoff represents one-third of the term for non-Governor MPC members, 
and half the average number of meetings attended by an external member in our sample. 
Since this threshold may seem arbitrary, we shall carry out robustness tests to ensure
14The effect of the two kinds of degrees was similar in the regressions, so we combine them. Also, most 
of the professors in our sample without a PhD hold a Master’s degree.
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that results are qualitatively unchanged if we consider alternative cutoff values to define 
experience. In particular, we consider 9-month and 18-month cutoffs.
The regression output in the tables below reports the estimated odds-ratios associated 
with each variable. Interpreting the output therefore requires some care. If we define the 
odds of deviating as
,,  , , . x P r(deviate)oddsiaeviate) = ——------   -Pr (not deviate)
then the odds-ratio for the INTi variable is given by:
odds — ratio(internals) = ( odds (deviate) | INTi =  1) 
( odds (deviate) \ INTi  =  0)
/  Pr (deviat e) 11 N T j=1  
yPr(no£ deviate)\INTi-
( \I i l \
‘ ' ^=1J
f  Pr(deviate)\I N T i=0  \  
yPr(no£ deviate)\INTi=0 J
Therefore the odds-ratio, as reported in the tables below, will always be greater than zero. 
If it is greater (less) than 1, this means that, holding all other variables constant, the 
odds of deviating for internals is higher (lower) than for external members. Finally, the 
interpretation of the coefficient ipz — the coefficient on the interaction term IN Ti • expit 
— is that of the ratio of the odds-ratios. It will tell us if the odds-ratio for experience is 
different between internals and externals.
Table 3.4 reports the results from estimating equation (3.4) without the expit vari­
ables. The results confirm what was expected from the earlier examination of Table 3.3. 
Namely, for the first two measures of deviation (D(Dev-M PC)u and D(Dev-group)it), 
internals are less likely to deviate than externals. For the third approach to measuring 
deviations (D(Dev.group.alt)it), there is no statistically significant difference between 
internals and externals. These results are robust to the inclusion of the other covari- 
ates, and all regressions include the month, quarter and committee fixed effects discussed 
above.
Table 3.5 introduces the expit variables; for each deviation variable, we estimate (3.4) 
both excluding and including the interaction term. These regression results provide a 
clear test of our model. If conflict on the committee arises because people have different 
beliefs about the correct monetary policy, then over time there should be fewer deviations 
since members’ beliefs should converge after observing enough data. In fact, the opposite 
is true. In all cases, the expit odds-ratio is larger than 1 and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. This means that, holding all other variables constant, the likelihood of 
deviating increases when an MPC member has been on the committee for more than 
12 months. In terms of magnitude, 12 months on the committee makes a member over 
twice as likely to deviate in nearly all cases. In columns (2) and (4), the interaction term
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Table 3.4: Logit Model - Basic Regression Results
(i)
D(Dev.
(2)
-MPC)it
(3)
D{Dev.
(4)
-group)it
(5) (6)
D {Dev .group-alt) a
IN T { 0.287*** 0.193*** 0.340*** 0.271*** 1.338 1.150
(0.103) (0.078) (0.137) (0.114) (0.587) (0.499)
D(high education) 5.089*** 3.987*** 2.845**
(2.323) (2.046) (1.211)
D (private sector) 0.396** 0.536 0.532
(0.164) (0.249) (0.245)
Age when start 0.9359** 0.9511 0.9637
(0.0301) (0.0340) (0.0249)
Month FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Committee FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Residuals? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.215 3.046 16.216* 6.731 6.861 434.538***
(0.231) (6.111) (26.416) (14.950) (9.966) (939.464)
Observations 763 763 754 754 754 754
Odds-ratios reported rather than coefficient estimates 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
is insignificantly different from 1, indicating that there is no difference in the odds-ratio 
for experienced internals and experienced externals. In column (6), where we use the 
alternative measure, internals that become experienced have a smaller increase in their 
probability of deviating than externals who become experienced.
The results in Table 3.6 replicate the results in columns (2), (4), and (6) in Table 
3.5 using the alternative cut-off values for experience discussed above. The variable exp% 
measures experience as beginning after 9 months on the MPC, while the exp\f uses a 
value of 18 months. The results are qualitatively unchanged, and in fact the estimated 
magnitudes on the experience variable are almost always higher. Thus, there is robust 
evidence that members do not vote more in line with each other as they gain experience.
3.6.2 V oting Levels and D ispersion
So far, we have looked at members’ deviation probabilities in order to stay true to our 
model. We now turn to members’ actual votes. There are several reasons for doing 
so. First, the change in the average vote level between internals and externals provides 
another test of convergence. Second, the voting data allows us to examine the direction of 
conflict, not merely its existence. Third, we can use voting data to construct measures of 
within-group voting dispersion for internals and externals to see how it behaves through 
time.
There are three possible measures for voting dispersion:
1. the squared deviation from the average vote in each time period (Ariyt — A rt)2;
2. the squared deviation from the committee’s decision (Ari>t — Arfec)2;
3. the squared deviation from the average external or internal vote (Ari)f — Artgrp)2.
Each of these variables measures the dispersion of member i from the group, thereby 
capturing the underlying variance of their voting behaviour. In practice, these three 
measures are highly correlated (with correlation coefficients above 0.9), so we shall report 
only a selection of the regressions focusing on the first measure.
Following equation (3.4), we now estimate the following regression model using ordi­
nary least squares:15
yit = a  +  A .Zi +  ipi.INTi + rp2-expit +  f t. (INTi.expit)
Yjrt .Timet +  ]T) 5t . Q t  +  £ Kj.COMj +  eit (3.5)
t  T  j
15Although our data is categorical (in 25bp devisions) we proceed using OLS. Use of multinomial logit 
estimation is not feasible with seven distinct groupings in our sample (and theoretically more groupings).
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Table 3.5: Logit Model - Experience Regression Results
0 )  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(Dev.MPC)it D {Dev .group) a D {Dev .group-alt) it
INTi
D(high education)
D(private sector) 
Age when start 
expu
INT^ expu
Month FE?
Quarter FE? 
Committee FE? 
Clustered Residuals?
Constant
Observations
0.171*** 0.126***
(0.073) (0.076)
5.606*** 5.460***
(2.907) (2.798)
0.405** 0.405**
(0.163) (0.164)
0.9324** 0.9323*
(0.0329) (0.0334)
2.141** 1.927*
(0.673) (0.677)
1.460
(1.072)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
1.807 2.024
(5.837) (6.501)
763 763
0.230*** 0.309
(0.108) (0.236)
4.413*** 4.512***
(2.504) (2.583)
0.541 0.540
(0.246) (0.246)
0.9469 0.9471
(0.0370) (0.0367)
2.574** 2.889**
(1.102) (1.451)
0.690
(0.491)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
0.702 0.616
(2.334) (2.037)
754 754
1.009 2.476
(0.475) (1.587)
3.048** 3.318***
(1.355) (1.535)
0.509 0.500
(0.235) (0.232)
0.9598 0.9607
(0.0273) (0.0271)
2.410** 4.122**
(1.003) (2.346)
0.301*
(0.189)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
0.247 0.141
(0.681) (0.385)
754 754
Odds-ratios reported rather than coefficient estimates 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: Logit Model - Robustness to Different Experience Variables
(i)
D(Dev
(2)
-M PC)it
(3)
D(Dev.
(4)
.group) a
(5) (6)
D(Dev-group-alt)it
INTi 0.179*** 0.219** 0.641 0.402 5.402*** 1.824
(0.101) (0.145) (0.507) (0.289) (3.489) (1.082)
D(high education) 5.455*** 6.197*** 4.512*** 4.920*** 3.199** 3.278**
(2.661) (3.372) (2.484) (2.971) (1.463) (1.566)
D(private sector) 0.418** 0.397** 0.563 0.529 0.538 0.492
(0.169) (0.162) (0.254) (0.245) (0.246) (0.227)
Age when start 0.9349** 0.9318* 0.9486 0.9482 0.9629 0.9616
(0.0320) (0.0339) (0.0352) (0.0368) (0.0258) (0.0271)
exp-, 2.134* 3.396** 4.147**
(0.873) (2.092) (2.515)
INTi*exp% 0.998 0.324 0.144***
(0.716) (0.260) (0.103)
exp]f 3.173** 3.509** 3.696**
(1.458) (1.721) (1.907)
INTi*exp\t 0.581 0.395 0.354*
(0.371) (0.231) (0.197)
All regressions contain the usual month, quarter and committee FE, and residuals are clustered by member.
Constant 1.807 2.024 0.702 0.616 0.247 0.141
(5.837) (6.501) (2.334) (2.037) (0.681) (0.385)
Observations 763 763 754 754 754 754
Odds-ratios reported rather than coefficient estimates 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
where yit is the outcome variable of interest, and the other variables are as in (3.4). Here, 
the interpretation of the coefficients is more straightforward. The three coefficients of 
interest are ipi, the marginal effect of being an internal member; ip2, the marginal effect 
of having at least one year of MPC experience; and (3\ , the marginal effect of being an 
experienced, internal member. Another advantage of the OLS model is that estimation 
with member fixed effects (i.e., modelling the error terms as Ea = Vi +  77^ , where Vi is 
a member-specific intercept that captures any unobserved heterogeneity at the member 
level) becomes computationally feasible. We will estimate (3.5) both with and without 
member fixed effects, since their inclusion forces us to drop all time-invariant individual 
characteristics.
The results of estimating (3.5) are reported in Table 3.7. Columns (1) - (3) report 
the coefficient estimates when yit = Ari>t. In Column (1), only time and committee fixed 
effects, the usual covariates, and the INTi variable are included. It is clear that internal 
members vote, on average, for higher interest rates. The three basis point difference 
between internals and externals is economically significant. Consider the conterfactual 
switching an external member to an internal member. Since members conventionally 
vote in 25 basis point increments, this would mean that such a member would vote for 
higher interest rates in 12% more meetings ( ^  ~  0.12). What is rather suprising is 
that this effect arises even while controlling for individual characteristics. Internals and 
externals appear to vote for different interest rates not because of different educational or 
occupational backgrounds, but simply because one group has managerial responsibilities 
within the Bank and the other does not.
In Column (2) we include the expit variable as well as the interaction term. This es­
sentially allows us to use a differences-in-differences approach for estimating convergence 
of opinions. The results are striking. The effect of being an internal is no longer sig­
nificant, but the effect of being experienced is highly significant and large in magnitude 
(—5.3 bps lower on average). Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction term is also 
highly significant and large (+5.5 bps higher on average). Thus, the effect of experience 
is different for internals and externals. Experience by itself leads people to vote for lower 
rates, but this is driven entirely by the external members; it is not possible to reject the 
hypothesis that internal members do not change their vote once they become experienced. 
Therefore, neither inexperienced nor experienced internals vote for different rates on av­
erage. This implies that although inexperienced externals do not behave any differently 
from inexperienced internals, experienced externals vote for systematically lower interest 
rates on average. This finding is qualitatively robust to the inclusion of member fixed ef­
fects (Column (3)). These regressions provide yet more evidence of growing disagreement 
between externals and internals on the MPC.
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Table 3.7: Level and Vote Variability Regression Results
( i )
voteit
(2)
voteit
(3)
voteit
(4)
( A ritt -  A rt)2
(5)
(ArM -  A rt)2
(6)
( A r <it -  A rt9rp)2
I N T i 0.030** -0.007 - -0.006** - -0.006**
(0.014) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002)
D(high education) -0.010 -0.013 - 0.004** - 0.002***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.001)
D (private sector) -0.010 -0.010 - -0.002 - -0.002
(0.016) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002)
Age when start 0.000 0.000 - -0 .000 - -0 .000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
expu -0.053*** -0.034*** 0.002 0.002 -0.001
(0.016) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
I N T f  expit 0.0547*** 0.0454*** -0.0006 0.0004 0.0012
(0.0158) (0.0117) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0030)
Month FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Committee FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Residuals? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Member FE? Yes Yes
Constant 0.235*** 0.257*** 0.247*** 0.007 -0 .000 0.006*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.035) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Observations 1163 1163 1163 1163 1163 1163
R2 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.22 0.20 0.24
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Columns (4) and (5) repeat the regressions in columns (2) and (3) using yit =
/   v 2(A r t^ — A rt) . The main finding is that externals as a group display more volatility 
in their voting behaviour, and that volatility does not decline with time for either inter­
nals or externals. Thus, not only do internals and externals not reach consensus with 
each other through time, but they also do not seem to reach a consensus with each other. 
Moreover, the greater volatility of external members clearly reduces the expected utility 
of a committee designer with preferences given by (3.2), so the only rationale for including 
them at all must come from some other margin. Column (6) shows the robustness of the 
findings to an alternative definition of group dispersion ((A r^  — A r /rp) 2).
To summarize, the main empirical findings are that:
•  There are systematic differences in the voting behaviour of internals and externals;
•  On numerous measures, internal and externals members display increasing conflict 
through time;
•  Through their greater volatility, external members reduce the welfare of a committee 
designer with a quadratic loss function.
Our second finding is the most important. We believe that it rules out a model 
in which all members share the same preferences over interest rates. We have shown 
that such a model generates declining disagreement, but in fact the opposite is true in 
the data. Therefore, the source of conflict between members must arise for reasons other 
than conflicting beliefs, and the most likely candidate is conflicting preferences. However, 
if internals and externals have different preferences, then at least one group maximizes 
an objective function other than the committee designer’s. Thus, we also believe that 
we have identified an agency problem on the MPC. In other words, the MPC appears to 
not work as effectively as its designers might have hoped. In the next section, we explore 
what preferences underlie internals’ and externals’ behaviour.
3.7 A lternative M odels
Exposure to increasing amounts of information should not drive Bayesian agents apart, 
and yet our econometric results show that this is the case on the MPC. The data also 
show that external members separate from internal members and vote for systematically 
lower interest rates. Therefore, although our regressions offer no support for the model 
of ideal mixed-committee voting presented above, we are not given an insight into why 
the model fails.
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We believe that any reasonable model with Bayesian learning and ideal behaviour 
assumptions could not explain the patterns in the data. This finding is important because 
it indicates the presence of an agency problem resulting from the presence of internal 
and external members on the MPC. If we are going to reject the model of ideal voting 
behaviour, however, a natural question to ask is what model we need to use in its place. 
Also, the policy and committee design implications depend on the underlying reasons for 
the failure of our ideal behaviour model.
To begin with, we shall take as given the initial period of agreement and examine 
what causes the votes to change, and in particular why the votes of externals appear 
to become systematically lower. In this section we explore a number of the leading 
candidate explanations; we examine the presence of career concerns, and the possibility 
of asymmetric preferences.
3.7.1 Career C oncerns
One possibility is that members not only want to maximize equation (3.1), but also want 
to signal their competence or preferences through their voting record. In other words, 
committee members may have career concerns. There are many reasonable career concern 
stories. For example, internals may want to signal to the government and to the central 
banking community that they are tough inflation fighters. Externals, who face more 
uncertainty about their future prospects after their terms end, may want to signal that 
they are competent economists. These concerns may lead MPC members to vote for 
interest rates that differ from those predicted by our ideal voting model.
We shall examine a particular form of career concern that is consistent with the 
idea that MPC members reputation shall be assessed, largely, by the central banking 
community and by the government. Gordon Brown was not only the Chancellor who 
set-up the MPC structure, but he was the key person in approving the members who 
got appointed to the MPC over the majority of our sample. In setting up the MPC 
with a narrowly-defined inflation target, he made clear his belief that the correct focus of 
monetary policy is fighting inflation. He was clearly aware that attempts to try to exploit 
short-run output gains from monetary policy would quickly lead to inflation. While 
it is often assumed that internal members would worry about their inflation-fighting 
credibility, it also seems clear that in order to either build a reputation, or in terms of 
getting reappointed, external members would need to be considered inflation-averse.
Our experience effect may, therefore, already be capturing a career concern; upon 
joining, new members may wish to build a reputation for fighting inflation and so start 
by voting with the other members. Our results are consistent with this being the case 
particularly in the first year, and applying, on average, to both internal and external
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members.
However, after the initial reputation building period, career concerns may play a dif­
ferential role with different members. If career concerns explain the behaviour of MPC 
members after one year, then we would expect to see the change in behaviour only for 
those groups for whom career concerns do not play a major role. To test this hypothe­
sis, we divide internals and externals into groups for which reputational considerations
should play varying roles and examine whether these different groups display the same 
divergence as they gain experience16. If they do, then signalling is not a convincing factor 
in explaining our experience results, while if they don’t, it cannot be ruled out.
We split the members according to whether, or not, they are an academic when they 
join the committee. There are substantial numbers of academics and non-academics in 
both the internal and external group. Because of the tenure system, one could argue that 
academics should have less of a need to signal since they have a stronger outside option 
should they fail to build a good reputation. In order to test whether non-academics and 
academics differ in voting behaviour, we run the following regression with member fixed 
effects17:
yit = a A A .Zi 4- V>i .INTi +  ^ 2-expu +  ^3 -Acadi
+/3i. (INTi.expit) 4- /?2- (INTi.Acadi) 4- /?3. (expit.Acadi)
+/ii. (INTi.expit.Acadi)
4-^  \ t .Timet 4- ^   ^6t -Qt +  ^  j Zj.COMj  4 - 1/* 4- rja (3-6)
t T j
where Acadi is the dummy variable indicating that a member is an academic, and all 
other variables are as defined above.
With two different distinguishing dummy variables (Acadi and INTi), there are four 
different “types” of MPC member. For each type, the last dummy variable (expit ) 
allows us to calculate the effect of experience on each group. Rather than discuss the 
values of the coefficients themselves, it is easier to discuss the sums of coefficients that 
represent this experience effect for each particular set of characteristics. For example, 
the experience effect of being an internal, non-academic is fa  +  Pi18 and the experience 
effect of being an external academic is fa  4- fa- The results are listed in Table 3.8; the 
experience effect is listed along with the P-value associated with the null hypothesis that
16We have also carried out the same analysis for the variance of voting behaviour; these results are 
not included as the variance results are less puzzling than the level results, but are available on request.
17Estimating without member-fixed effects leads to qualitatively unchanged results.
18The effect of being an experienced, internal, non-academic is -01 4- V>2 4- /?i while the effect of being 
a new, internal, non-academic is . The experience effect for this group is the difference of these two.
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Table 3.8: Estimates of “Experience-Effect” by Member Type: Career Concerns
Members Experience P-Value 95% Confidence
Effect Interval
(1) External Non-academic -0.01 0.57 -0.03 0.02
(2) External Academic -0.07 0.00 -0.10 -0.05
(3) Internal Non-academic 0.01 0.57 -0.02 0.03
(4) Internal Academic 0.01 0.50 -0.03 0.05
the effect is zero, and the 95% confidence intervals.
The results clearly lend support to the career concerns hypothesis. Controlling for 
whether members are academic or not can seemingly explain the entire experience result. 
Experience drives the voting of academic externals down by 7bps. Hypothesis tests 
confirm that the experience effect for academic externals is different from zero, and from 
the experience effect of other types of member (all of whom have no experience effect). 
This is surprising as the regression controls for not only the time and committee fixed 
effects, but also for member fixed effects.
Thus, our results seem consistent with the idea that career concerns, the building of 
an anti-inflation reputation, remain important for some external members beyond the 
initial period on the committee.
3.7.2 A sym m etric Preferences
Although the UK Treasury officially sets the inflation target and instructs MPC mem­
bers that the target is symmetric, it may be that individual members, consciously or 
subconsciously, view phases of the business/inflation cycle differently. We have assumed 
symmetric preferences in our model of voting behaviour, but the results in Table 3.8 may 
be consistent with asymmetric preferences; this is our second potential explanation.
The idea of asymmetric preferences is not new in monetary economics (see Surico
(2007)). Gerlach-Kristen (2009) simulates an asymmetric preferences voting model and 
concludes that it would lead to similar patterns of voting to that of the MPC. External 
members, in her model, are assumed to be recession-averse in that they dislike negative 
output gaps more than positive output gaps. To be consistent with our findings, this 
hypothesis states that, after initially behaving as the government expected them to, 
some members reveal themselves to be less willing to fight inflation at the expense of a 
recession.
We split the interest rate cycle into a tightening phase (when interest rates are, or
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have been most recently, increasing) and a loosening phase (when interest rates have most 
recently been declining) so that we can examine the evidence for recession aversion. We 
use the variable Looserii - a dummy variable indicating that period t is in a loosening 
phase - to distinguish the two phases. These are displayed in Figure 3.6; grey shading 
denotes the tightening cycle, and other periods are therefore considered the loosening 
cycle.
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Figure 3.6: Interest Rate Cycles in the UK
In order to test whether the behaviour of MPC members differs over the phases
of the interest rate cycle, we run a regression similar to equation (3.6) but instead of
distinguishing between academics and non-academics, we use the variable loosent to 
distinguish between the phases of the interest rate cycle. Thus, we estimate:
yit =  a + A .Zi + ipi.INTi + fa-expu + ip4.loosent
+fa. (INTi.expn) -I- fa. (INTi.loosent) + fa. (expit.loosent)
+p,2- {INTi.expu.looserit)
\ t.Timet +  ^   ^8t .Qt +  ^  j xj.COMj -T v% +  Tju (3-7)
t T  j
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Table 3.9: Estimates of “Experience-Effect” by Member Type:
Members Experience P-Value 95% Confidence
Effect Interval
( i ) External Tighten -0.02 0.20 -0.04 0.01
(2) External Loosen -0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.01
(3) Internal Tighten 0.02 0.18 -0.01 0.05
(4) Internal Loosen 0.01 0.44 -0.02 0.04
The results for the estimated experience effect, analogous to the results in Table 3.8, 
are displayed in Table 3.9. The evidence is not conclusively for or against the asymmetric 
preferences story. While the experience effect is only significantly different from zero for 
external MPC members in a loosening phase, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
experience effect is the same in tightening and loosening cycles for externals. Therefore, 
while it is likely that the effect is larger in the loosening cycle, and we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that there is a different experience effect for internals and externals, 
the fact that there is an experience effect in tightening cycles, weakens the evidence for 
recession-aversion as driving our experience result.
3.7.3 T esting both  together
One concern may be that the two explanatory variables may not be orthogonal. The 
results for the cycle could be driven by the academics; most inexperienced academics in 
our sample (who would be building a reputation under our story), cast their votes in 
tightening cycles.
Also, it is not clear that career concerns would be symmetric over the cycle. A 
member who is trying to build a reputation for being tough on inflation in order to get 
reappointed may require more evidence of falling inflationary pressures to cut rates, than 
an optimally-behaving member would require to increase rates.
Therefore, as we could not conclusively eliminate one story, we test for both the 
stories together in a combined regression given by equation (3.9), where the variables are 
as defined before. If we find that the importance of either the academics, or the loosening 
cycle, disappears, then it may be the smoking-gun that we are looking for in determining 
which of our stories is most likely to explain the behaviour.
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Table 3.10: Estimates of “Experience-Effect” by Member Type: Combined Career Con­
cerns and Asymmetric Preferences Regression
Members Experience P-Value 95% Confidence
Effect Interval
(1) External Tighten Non-academic -0.01 0.67 -0.03 0.02
(2) External Tighten Academic -0.02 0.27 -0.05 0.01
(3) External Loosen Non-academic 0.00 0.88 -0.02 0.03
(4) External Loosen Academic -0.12 0.00 -0.17 -0.08
(1) Internal Tighten Non-academic 0.02 0.30 -0.01 0.04
(2) Internal Tighten Academic 0.03 0.37 -0.02 0.08
(3) Internal Loosen Non-academic 0.01 0.62 -0.02 0.04
(4) Internal Loosen Academic 0.01 0.58 -0.03 0.05
yit = a  +  A .Zi + ipi.INTi +  ^ 2-expit -I- i/j3. Acadi +  ^ 4-loosent 
+ P i .  {INTi.expu) -I- P2• {INTi.Acadi) +  Pz- (expit.Acadi)
+ / ? 4 . {INTi.loosent) +  P$. {expit.loosent) +  Pq. {Acadi.loosent)
{INTi.expu-Acadi) +  Hz- {INTi.expit.loosent) + {INTi.Acadi.loosent) 
+ / i 4 . {expu.Acadi.loosent)
+<f>\. ( /NTi.expa.Acadi.loosent)
\ t -Timet +  ^   ^St -Qt +  ^  KKj.COMj  -I- ^  +  t]u (3-^)
t  T  j
The results in Table 3.10 for the estimated experience effect, are reported as before. It 
is now the case that the experience effect can be attributed solely to external, academic 
members during the loosening phase of the business cycle. Thus, we are no closer to 
eliminating either explanation as both are consistent with this result; either the academics 
have recession averse preferences, or the other members are affected by a career concern 
that keeps them voting for higher interest rates.
3.8 A  N atural Experim ent
Ideally we would have an exogenous variation in the extent of career concerns which would 
help us to disentangle these two effects and determine which is driving the behaviour. 
Fortunately, we have one such natural experiment. The Act that created the MPC
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allows for the reappointment of all members, internal and external. When the first group 
of externals and internals served on the MPC, they thus operated under the assumption 
that reappointment to the committee was possible, although uncertainty still existed 
about how the reappointment system would function. Then, on 18 January 2000, Willem 
Buiter wrote an open letter to then Chancellor Gordon Brown that laid down forceful 
arguments for not reappointing external members (Buiter 2000). To quote from this 
letter:
With the end of my term approaching, I have given considerable thought 
to whether I should be a candidate for re-appointment. I have come to the 
conclusion that both the appearance and the substance of independence of the 
external members of the MPC are best served by restricting their membership 
to a single term - three years as envisaged in the Bank of England Act 1998.
It seems that this letter swayed Brown’s decision; he did not reappoint a single external 
member from the original group, even though some were still among the most prominent 
monetary policy experts in the UK. A clear precedent was set: external members would 
find reappointment difficult, most likely extremely so. All external members served for 
only one term until February 2003 (almost 6 years since the first MPC meeting), when 
Brown unexpectedly reappointed Stephen Nickell to the MPC (HM Treasury 2003). Since 
then, Kate Barker has also been reappointed twice.
If career concerns play a role, one would expect different voting patterns between 
external members serving from February 2000 to February 2003 and those serving at other 
times, since the rewards to reputation presumably changed when reappointment was and 
was not possible. There are 322 votes cast during this period in which reappointment of 
external members was not possible. Of course, there is no reason to expect that this lack 
of reappointment opportunities for external member to affect internal member voting; 
during this period many external members were reappointed to the committee. To this 
end, we define a dummy variable reappointit which equals 1 before February 2000 and 
after February 2003. We then estimate the following career concerns regression:
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Table 3.11: Estimates of “Experience-Effect” by External Type: Career Concerns Re­
gression from Natural Experiment
Members Experience P-Value 95% Confidence
Effect Interval
(1) External reappointu = 0 Non-academic -0.05 0.04 -0.09 0.00
(2) External reappointu = 0 Academic -0.06 0.01 -0.11 -0.02
(3) External reappointu = 1 Non-academic 0.01 0.55 -0.02 0.04
(4) External reappointu = 1 Academic -0.07 0.00 -0.10 -0.03
(5) Internal reappointu = 0 Non-academic -0.01 0.69 -0.06 0.04
(6) Internal reappointu = 0 Academic 0.03 0.31 -0.03 0.09
(7) Internal reappointu =  1 Non-academic 0.01 0.36 -0.01 0.04
(8) Internal reappointu = 1 Academic 0.00 0.98 -0.06 0.06
yit = a A  A .Zi -I- fa .INTi  -I- fa.expit A fa. Acadi +  fa.reappointt 
A fa. (INTi.expu) A  fa. (INTi.Acadi) +  fa- (expit.Acadi)
A fa. (I NTi.reappointt) 4- fa. (expit.reappointt) +  fa. (Acadi.reappointt)
Ap\. (INTi.expu.Acadi) A p$. (INTi.expit.reappointt) +  p&. (INTi.Acadi.reappointt) 
Aps- (expit.Acadi.reappointt)
A fa  • (INTi • expit. Acadi. reappointt)
+ y \ t.Timet + ^  &t -Qt A y \ j .C O M j  + 1/» +  r)it (3.9)
t T j
The results in Table 3.11 lend support to the idea that this exogenous variation has 
led external members to behave differently, while internal members have been unaffected. 
Rows (1) and (2) shows that, when reappointment was not possible, the experience effect 
was the same across types of external member; there is no longer a differential effect 
between external academics and non-academics. The effect uncovered earlier in Table 3.8 
is driven by the differential behaviour when reappointment was possible.
We now attempt to distinguish between the preferences and career concerns story 
using our natural experiment and the combined effects equation given by (3.9). How­
ever, we now augment this equation with differential effects for when reappointment was 
possible; the resulting (large) equation is:
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yit = a  +  A .Zf +  ipi-INTi + ip2.expit +  ip3. Acadi +  04-loosent +  05-reappointt 
+/?i. (INTi.expa) +  /32. (INTi.Acadi) +  /33. (expit.Acadi)
+/?4. (INTi.loosent) +  Ps• (expit.loosent) + P§. (Acadi.loosent)
+(3j. ( /NTi.reappointt) +  /?8- (expit.reappointt) +  /?g. (Acadi.reappointt)
+/3io- (looserit.reappointt)
+//i. ( /NTi.expa.Acadi) +  p2. ( /NTi.expit.loosent) +  ^ 3. (INTi.Acadi.loosent)
+/x4. (expit.Acadi.loosent) +  Ms- {INTi.expit .reappointt) +  p§. (INTi.Acadi.reappointt) 
+ /i7. ( /NTi.loosent .reappointt) +  /^ s- {expit.Acadi.reappointt)
+/ig. (expit .loosent.reappointt) +  //io- (Acadi.loosent.reappointt)
+0i. (INTi.expn.Acadi.loosent) +  <f)2. (INTi.expit.Acadi.reappointt)
+ 0 3. (INTi.expit.loosent.reappointt) +  04. (INTi.Acadi.loosent .reappointt)
+05. (expu.Acadi.loosent .reappointt)
+t\. (INTi.expa.Acadi.loosent.reappointt)
+ ^  \ t.Timet +  ^   ^St -Qt +  ^  j ^j.COMj +  i/j +  rja (3.10)
t r  j
When we estimate the effect, two of the interaction terms are automatically dropped 
because of dependency among the independent variables; the dropped variables are fully 
explained by other variables in the regression. Given the number of interaction terms, this 
is perhaps not surprising. The variables dropped by Stata (the econometrics package we 
use) are (INTi.expit.Acadi.reappointt) and (INTi.Acadi) meaning that fi2 and <p2 will not 
be separately identified. This means that we are unable to accurately identify the separate 
effects of experience on different types of internal members. However, as we would expect 
from our natural experiment, and as suggested by the results in Table 3.11 above, the 
reappointment period only affects external member behaviour. We, therefore, use the 
estimates of this equation to examine their behaviour only and present the “experience 
effect” results in Table 3.12.
The results when reappointment is possible mirror those of the estimations reported 
in Table 3.10 and Table 3.11 above. We reject the hypothesis that the experience effect 
is the same across different types of external members when reappointment is possible 
(F(3,983) =  0.38,Prob > F = 0.7638). However, the results change markedly when 
we look at the behaviour when reappointment was not possible (Columns (3) and (4)).
In particular, the behaviour of all externals is much more similar; we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that all external types experience the same experience effect (F(3,983) =
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Table 3.12: Estimates of “Experience-Effect” by External Type: Combined Career Con­
cerns and Asymmetric Preferences Regression from Natural Experiment
reappointit= 1 reappointit= 0
Members Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
External Tighten Non-academic 0.00 0.84 -0.05 0.29
External Tighten Academic -0.02 0.41 -0.03 0.47
External Loosen Non-academic 0.03 0.27 -0.04 0.10
External Loosen Academic -0.18 0.00 -0.08 0.01
3.58, Prob > F  = 0.0136).
These results suggest that it is only in the presence of career concerns that the interest 
rate cycle plays a role. In terms of distinguishing between the two potential explanations, 
it seems that career concerns play a larger role. In fact, it may be that the extent of career 
concerns is influenced by the cycle; it is easier to appear anti-inflation by keeping interest 
rates higher in a downturn. However, to examine the reasons for such interactions we 
would need to develop a model that explicitly considers career concerns and the economic 
cycle.
3.9 Conclusion
MPC members communicate their views (signals) about the state of the world, and 
they also have different views about the economic structure. Our model provides two 
justifications for appointing different types of committee members. First, if different 
members have different dimensions of expertise, then mixing them together can improve 
the outcome for the committee designer. Second, where the designer cannot observe 
member beliefs about the economic structure, drawing members from two distributions 
which are likely to lie at extremes of the distribution of possible views of the economy 
is more likely to generate a moderate median voter. The first benefit can be attained 
through a simple advisory role, whereas the second relies on external members having a 
vote.
We find that internals and externals only vote for different interest rates after a 
period of time on the committee. This is an important finding; if members are failing 
to moderate each other’s views initially, then it fails to justify appointing externals in a 
voting capacity. We explore what might drive this behaviour; we find evidence of career 
concerns as some external members vote differently in an attempt to be reappointed. 
Career concerns not only reduce the benefits of appointing members with different views
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about the economic structure, but, if there is less learning about the economic shocks, 
then the information sharing may be impeded also.
The systematic difference between internals and externals should be particularly sur­
prising given the fact that internals are often appointed from very similar backgrounds 
to externals and, therefore, the two groups differ only in the sense that the internals 
are appointed to the staff of the Bank of England, taking on management roles in the 
day-to-day running of the Bank.
Our results suggest that career concerns may play a role in MPC voting (though they 
obviously cannot prove the existence of career concerns). This finding is of independent 
interest because papers such as Levy (2007) and Sibert (2003) have stressed the theo­
retical consequences of career concerns in committee voting, and Meade and Stasavage
(2008) have uncovered patterns in the voting record of the FOMC that they interpret 
as identifying career concerns. These papers largely focus on voting differences when 
deliberation and voting is either transparent or secretive. These dimensions do not vary 
with regard to the MPC and yet we find evidence supporting career concerns.
Our results on the effect of experience are important in the wider literature. We 
show that herding does not arise in this environment. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), 
Banerjee (1992), and Ottaviani and Sorenson (2000) have shown that when experts have 
private signals about the state of the world and take decisions one after the other, then in 
equilibrium experts can “herd” , or ignore their private information and follow those that 
voted before them, either because of reputational or optimal decision making preferences. 
If anything, our results show the opposite. MPC members begin with no disagreement 
whatsoever, and then after several rounds of voting begin to disagree.
As our model shows, the voting behaviour of the Bank of England’s MPC indicates 
that the gains to a mixed committee may be reduced or even made negative. The finding 
is particularly striking as the MPC is, otherwise, close to our ideal committee in terms 
of set-up; if optimal behaviour fails on this committee, it is more likely to fail on other 
committees where differences in preferences are more acceptable. Exploring the benefits 
of a mixed committee in the context of career concerns is required in order to better 
understand the decision to appoint external experts to a committee. Nonetheless, the 
conclusion of this paper is that mixed committees are not a panacea to ensuring optimal 
monetary policy decisions.
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3.A  Proofs
3.A .1 P roof o f  P roposition  3.1
Proof. The optimal strategy for each member i is to maximize (3.1) conditional on I it, 
the information set of member i at time t. In the proof, we suppress In for notational 
simplicity; the expectations should be understood to be taken with respect to Iit. We 
decompose (3.1) in the following manner:
E  [K  ~ 7T*)2] =  E  [ttt2] -  2tt*E [trt] +  (n*)2
= v  M  +  E  [7rt]2 -  2tt*E [7rt] +  (71-*)2 
= v  M  + (E  [7rt] -  7r*)2 ,
where
E  M  =g{r)  + an +  0it
and
V [7rt\ = E [V [7rt \ at ,0]] + V [E [Trt \ at ,0]\ = cr2 + V  [at + 0\ •
The interest rate only affects E  [71^ ], not V  [71*]. Clearly, utility is highest when rt = r*t ,
where r*t satisfies
9 (r*t) + ait +  9it = tt"
Also, since g is strictly increasing, utility is strictly increasing when rt < r*t and strictly 
decreasing when rt > r*t. So, expected utility is continuous and single peaked.
Member i is indifferent between a given rt and rt when an =  a*t, where
a*t +  0 i t - 9  (rt) =  9 (rt) -  a*t -  6it,
which implies
. . .  _  9(n) - g ( u)  n ,of , \
a i t  ~  2 i t ' ( 3 ' H )
Since preferences are single-peaked with the bliss point depending positively on a it, 
member i votes for rt for all ait < a*t and for f t for all ait > a*t. From (3.11) one can 
see that a*t is decreasing in 6it. ■
3.A .2 P ro o f o f P roposition  3.2
Proof. Suppose the game is in period 1, and that there is an equilibrium in which 
and Ofj are non-empty. Moreover, without loss of generality, suppose that 6\ < 02- For 
this equilibrium to exist, it must be that case that member l ’s expected utility is higher
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from withholding than disclosing Vdn G ©f1? S n  G © n -
Using standard results in Bayesian decision theory (Greene 2003, p.871-2), one can 
construct two separate beliefs for member 2:
a2\ — E I dn, fin, 2^1,S21 
=  A i d n  +  A 2 S 1 1  +  A3C/21 +  A 4 S 2 1 ;
and
a 21 =  E a  1 | d n  £  ©11,511 G ©11,^21,521
=  Ai  E dll | d l l  £ © 1 1 , ^21 + X2E  [ s n  I S 1 1  G 0 Jl5 521 ]
+A3CZ21 +  A4521.
In these equations, the A terms are linear weights that depend on the variance terms 
of the underlying signals. ol21 is member 2’s belief on a  when he observes member l ’s 
signals, and a2i is his belief when he does not, in which case he knows that they lie in 
the sets ©fx and ©fj.
Define ©ff =  |  d n  | d n  G ©n, ^dn — inf ©n^ > £ }, and define ©ff analogously. For 
the rest of the proof, we suppose that e is small enough so that
E
E
dn I dn £ ©11, d2i >  d n  Vd2i , V d n  G ©n , and
[ 5 1 1  | S n  G @ n ,5 2 i ]  >  S n  V s2 i ,V s i i  G 0 “
Now, fix some d n  G ©ff and 5n G ©n- One can define the following sets:
Ri =  { (d2i,52i^ | a21 < a211
i?2 =  ^  ^ 2 1 ,5 2 1 ^  | Oi2i >  <^21)^21 ^  ^21 ^
i?3 =  ^  ^ 2 1 ,5 2 1 ^  | &2i >  <^21^21 a \ \  ^
i?4 =  |  ^d 2i , 5 2i^  | a 21 ^  a ll }
These sets are all non-empty since a.'2l < a2l whenever dn G ©ff and Sn G ©n- 
For some fixed dn £ © n  and 5n G ©n, let
Ul 1^1 d^2i,s2i^  ,r2i d^2i,s2i^
be the expected utility of member 1 when member 2 has drawn (d2i, 52i  ^, member 1
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votes for rn , and member 2 votes for r2i. The payoff for member 1 from withholding his 
information from member 2 in the proposed equilibrium is
E  1 1 /1 jrn (d2i, S21)  5 Hi j I ^21j52i^ G * i } P r  ^ d 2i , s 2i^ 6 RiJ 
4
+  y ]  E  |  /71 jVn ^d2i, s2i^ , rij | ^d2i, S21)  G R* |  Pr j^d2i, s2i^ G Ri
i = 2
while his payoff from disclosing information is 
2
y  E  |  C/1 ^ 1 1  ^c?2i, S2 1 )  ,H ij | ^ d 2i ,  s 2i^  G i ^ } P r  ^ d 2i ,  S2 1 )  G R*j
1=1
4
+  ^ e { [ / 1 rn  (d21,s 2i )  ,ri] | ^ i , s 2i )  e  R* }  Pr [ (d  21js2i^
i= 3
which is strictly larger his payoff from withholding si
e -Ri
nce
R-1 rn  (d2i,52i)  ,zij. > U1 rn (d21,s21^  ,r i
whenever ^d21, G i?2- Thus, there cannot exist an equilibrium in the first period in 
which member 1 withholds information. Similar arguments show that there also cannot 
exist an equilibrium in which member 2 withholds information in the first period. Thus, 
the equilibrium of the communication game in the first period features full disclosure.
Now consider the communication game in period 2. Since all information in period 
1 continues to be public information, the game is isomorphic to the game in period 1. 
Therefore, the equilibrium of the period 2 communication game is also full disclosure. 
Repeating this argument ad infinitum gives the result. ■
3.A .3  P ro o f o f Proposition  3.3
Proof. In the proof, all expectations taken at time t are understood to depend on {7rt }*=1 
as well as the variables explicitly noted. Suppose that 0* = Oj for all possible appointees. 
Let
P _ / r j  -» t  I E  [ ( i r t  —  t t  )  | { d T , s r } T = i  ]  >  1
M t= i1  E [ ( n t - n * f \ { d T,sTyT=1,rt ] }
" d  _  \  tfj I E  [(7Tt -  f t * )  | { d T , s T } r = i  ,rt ] >  1
t i t  — \  t “ r j  STfr=i  | r , *\2 I r j  i t  1 f '[ E[(irt -ir*)  | K , s T}T=1,7^J J
Now, the expected utility of the committee designer at time t computed in the first
and
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period is equal to
E  [ ( tt* -  tt* ) 2] =
E[(jrt -  tt* ) 2 | {dT, sT}* =1 £ R t ,Lt] x 
Pr [rt = rt | {dT, sT}*=1 G ^ ]  + 
E[{7rt -  7r*)2 | {dT, sTyr=1 e R t ,rt ] x  
 ^ Pr [rt = rt | {dT,sTYT=1 G R^]
E  [ (7Tt -  7T*)2 | {dT, ST} l=l E Rt,Lt) X 
Pr [rf = rt \ {dT, s TYT=i € Rt ]  +
E[{7rt -  7r*)2 | {dT,sT}t=i € R t , r t ] x 
Pr [rt =  f t | {dT,sT}t=i £ Rt]
>Pr [ {dT,STYr=l ^  Rt]  +
► Pr [{dT,Sr}t=l € # i]
Expected utility reaches a maximum when there is at least one member for whom 7f  —*■ 00 
and one member for whom 7? —► 00 because in this case Pr [rt = f t \ { d T, st Yt= i  ^R t  ]
0 and Pr [rt =  rt | { d T, Sr}t=i G Rt] —► 0. This follows from the fact that members share 
their private information with each other prior to voting. The result follows from the 
continuity of E  [(77 — 7r*)2] in 9i} j f ,  and 7 *. ■
3.A .4  P ro o f o f P roposition  3.5
Proof. Let at be the members’ shared belief about at at time t. By (3.11)
Pr [rlt ±  r2t] = Pr 9 (n) ~ 9 f a )  ^   ^ 9 (rt) -  9 f a )  , ------«------  < Oit < ------   h 9\t — @21
Since at has a continuous distribution for allt, a sufficient condition for the result to hold
is dit — 621 0.
By standard results in Bayesian decision theory, the conditional distributions of 6 \ 
{ d T, Sr,Ttr-\YT=\ f°r both members are normal with means On and 02t. Let f }  (6) and 
f t  (6) be the associated probability density functions.
Now, since both members’ prior distributions on 6 assign positive probability to all 
subsets of R, they are absolutely continuous with respect to each other; so, one can apply 
Proposition 1 in Kalai and Lehrer (1994), which implies
f l
l - e >  J- E >  1 + e 
" f t  ~
for large enough t for all e > 0. Since / J (9) are unimodal, (3.12) implies that
(3.12)
— 9int ~ u2t <
6 for all 6 > 0 for large enough t. So, 9\t — @21 0 , establishing the result.
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Chapter 4
Policy U ncertainty and 
Precautionary Savings
4.1 Introduction
This paper uses German micro data and a quasi-natural experiment to provide new 
evidence on the empirical importance of precautionary savings, defined as “the additional 
saving that results from the knowledge that the future is uncertain” (Carroll and Kimball, 
2007). The use of a quasi-natural experiment allows us to overcome the identification 
problem that often affects estimates of precautionary savings based on aggregate data. 
Micro data allow us to control for individual characteristics and thus for heterogeneity 
across individuals.
Our quasi-natural experiment draws on a sharp increase in the number of people who 
respond that they are “uncertain about the general economic situation” when asked a 
specific question in the German Gfk consumer survey which covers a sample of some 2,000 
individuals. The increase in uncertainty - which occurs despite households expecting (on 
average) an improvement in the general economic situation and a fall in unemployment - 
was observed in the run-up to the general election held in September 1998. This election 
was one of the closest in postwar Germany (James, 2000) and ultimately marked the 
end of the Kohl era. We therefore view the increase in uncertainty as being driven by 
the election, its difficulty to call, and particularly the differential policies that might be 
pursued depending on the outcome.
We estimate the effect of the increase in uncertainty on household saving using a diff- 
in-diff estimator and household data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), 
an annual longitudinal study which now covers some 10,000 German households and 
provides information on numerous aspects of their life, including household composition, 
family biographies, employment, social security, earnings and health. Using data from
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repeated yearly surveys we build a panel which extends over a 6-year period (1995 to 
2000) and contains 2,854 households yielding a total of about 17,000 observations. We 
use fixed effects to control for unobservable characteristics, such as differences across 
heads of households in their degree of risk aversion. We use civil servants as the control 
group in our diff-in-diff estimator because civil servants, with jobs for life and a separate 
(and protected) pension system, were unaffected by the two reasons that are the best 
candidates to explain the increase in uncertainty that we observe: concern about the 
effect of the election outcome on unemployment and on pension rules.
We find that household saving increases significantly following the increase in uncer­
tainty about the future path of income: this suggests a significant precautionary saving 
motive. A household can increase its savings either by consuming less or by working 
more: departing from previous studies on precautionary saving we also analyze house­
holds’ response in terms of their labour market choices, hours worked in the primary and 
(possibly) in secondary jobs by all working-age household members. We find evidence 
of a labour supply response by workers who can use the margin offered by part-time 
employment.
There is an existing literature that examines the effects of uncertainty on the economy. 
Bloom (2007, 2009) shows that uncertainty increases markedly in response to major eco­
nomic and, most relevant for this paper, political shocks. His work shows that increased 
uncertainty reduces firm investment and hiring (2009), as well as R&D (2007). He does 
not consider the effect on households.
Gourinchas and Parker (2001) have investigated the role of precautionary saving using 
structural estimates of a dynamic stochastic model of households expenditure over the 
life cycle with uninsurable labour income uncertainty. They show that the precautionary 
saving motive is especially important at young ages while it becomes negligible for older 
households who, on average, hold large amounts of liquid wealth. Our data allow us 
to test whether the precautionary saving induced by the increase in uncertainty affects 
individuals differently depending on their age.
Fuchs-Schundeln (2008), examining the differential saving behaviour of East and West 
German households over the 1990s, finds that “the precautionary saving motive is essen­
tial” in order for her life-cycle model to be able to match this behaviour. Thus, there 
is already strong evidence that precautionary saving plays a role in German household 
behaviour.
Carroll and Kimball (2007) conclude their excellent survey of the empirical research 
on precautionary saving with these words: “The qualitative and quantitative aspects of 
the theory of precautionary behavior are now well established. Less agreement exists about 
the strength of the precautionary saving motive. [...] Structural models that match broad
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features of consumption and saving behavior [such as Gourinchas and Parker (2002), 
Cagetti (2003)] tend to produce estimates of the degree of prudence that are less than 
those obtained from theoretical models in combination with risk aversion estimates from 
survey evidence. Direct estimates of precautionary wealth seem to be sensitive to the exact 
empirical procedures used, and are subject to problems of unobserved heterogeneity [...] A 
problem that plagues all these efforts is identifying exogenous variations in uncertainty 
across households. ” Our experiment is immune from these problems.
We are not the first to follow this route: Lusardi (1998) splits households into groups 
distinguished by their self-assessed risk of job loss, and uses the groups with low or zero 
risk to estimate the importance of precautionary saving. Closer to our approach, Fuchs- 
Schiindeln and Schiindeln (2005), using data drawn from the same German survey, employ 
German civil servants as a control for group with low precautionary saving motives. Our 
paper differs from theirs in focus and timing; the focus of their paper is on the role of 
self-selection by risk-averse agents into safer careers which biases typical estimates of 
precautionary saving down, and they focus on the natural experiment of reunification as 
an exogenous shock to labour market risk for East Germans 1.
Our results are independent of the reasons why uncertainty jumped in the run-up to 
the 1998 election. It is nonetheless interesting to ask what could have produced such 
an increase in uncertainty. The 1998 election, which, as we mentioned, was one of the 
closest elections in postwar German history (even professional polling institutes failed to 
predict the swing in voting preference in the final election run, see James, 2000), was 
fought on two major themes beyond the obvious political themes of the personalities of 
the two candidates, Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schroder, and the make-up of the govern­
ment coalition after the election (Pulzer, 1999). The two themes were the high level of 
unemployment, particularly in the new Eastern Lander, and the incumbent government’s 
“reform of the century” , the 1997 pension reform which Schroder was pledging to revoke.2 
The possibility that Kohl’s reform might be revoked was particularly prominent in the 
campaign because in order to justify the adoption of new pension rules Chancellor Kohl 
had explained to the German public that the existing system was unsustainable. The 
argument seemed convincing because under the existing rules by 2050 payroll contribu­
tion rates would need to reach 25%, from 18% in the mid-1990s (Borsh-Supan, 2003). 
The reform adopted by Kohl addressed these issues restricting the accrual of pension 
rights not based on contributions and gradually reducing the replacement rate from 70% 
to 67%. Over time the new law would have stabilized the payroll contribution rate at
1Also, as we discuss below, the papers use different measures of saving.
2This fact allows us, as we said, to use civil servants as the control group in our diff-in-diff estima­
tor: German civil servants have lifetime jobs and Kohl’s pension reform had left the generous pension 
entitlements of civil servants intact specifically excluding them from any change in pension rules.
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around 21% (Schulze and Jochem, 2007). The possibility that Schroder might win the 
election and the pension system returned to an unsustainable path is thus a candidate 
explanation for the observed increase in uncertainty. Such an explanation appears con­
sistent with the observation that while uncertainty about future economic conditions was 
increasing, German people were expecting (on average) an improvement in the general 
economic situation and a fall in unemployment.
Reform reversals, i.e. the adoption by one government of a new set of rules and their 
revocation by a subsequent government, are not infrequent. Underlying these experiences 
is often a ‘war of attrition’ among various groups in society, each trying to protect them­
selves and to shift the burden of the reform on someone else. Reforms of pay-as-you-go 
pension systems in countries where population growth is decelerating are a frequent ex­
ample. There is rarely a disagreement on the fact that the rules will eventually have to 
be changed but, as one reform plan after the other is considered, decisions often keep 
being been postponed because political parties are unable to agree on how the burden 
should be shared between various groups in society and in particular between the young 
and the old 3
Thus a political economy interpretation of our experiment is that such “wars of attri­
tion” can have significant economic effects. People do not simply sit and wait. When a 
reform is motivated with the argument that the system in place is unsustainable, delays 
in adopting new rules, or the possibility that they might be revoked once adopted, do 
not simply perpetuate the status quo. They raise uncertainty and induce households to 
save more: consumption may fall and the economy might slow down for no other reason 
than the inability to agree on a reform.
Our results support the view that the revocation of Kohl’s reform lowered private 
consumption contributing to the slowdown of the German economy at the start of this 
millennium. (The household saving rate, as a share of disposable income, increased in 
Germany precisely at the time of the debate surrounding pension reform: from below 
10% of disposable income in the mid 1990’s to 11% at the start of the millennium; 
something similar also happened in Japan). We find that German PAYG workers, the 
large majority in the population, saved more. For instance, a household that previously 
was holding savings constant at 9.8% of disposable income (the average saving rate in 
our balanced sample in 1998) would, ceteris paribus, have a saving rate of about 15.8% 
by the year 2000. Households whose pension status was affected by the Kohl reform 
and by its subsequent revocation also worked more, exploiting the margin provided by
3Boeri, Borsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001), using survey data, analyze the opinions of European 
citizens regarding pension reform trying to understand why a political consensus is so difficult to achieve. 
They find that conflicts of interests over welfare reform are generally aligned along three main dimensions: 
age, income, and the insider/outsider status in the labour market.
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part-time employment. For instance, a head of household working only part-time, who 
previously worked 10 hours per week (the 10th percentile of part-time hours per week in 
our balanced sample in 1998), would increase her hours to around 19 hours per week (up 
to the 25th percentile).
4.2 The Quasi-Natural Experim ent
In order to measure time-varying consumer uncertainty, we use the Gfk consumer survey 
which is the German component of the European Commission Consumer Survey. Con­
ducted monthly, the survey asks about 2,000 German households to answer a number of 
both backward-looking and forward-looking questions; we focus on the forward looking 
component. The respondents choose from a menu of multiple choice answers for each 
question. The answers are all qualitative, and accord to a five-option ordinal scale: “+ 
+ ” (most positive answer), “+ ” (positive answer), “= ” (neutral answer), (negative 
answer), and “- -” (most negative answer); “Don’t know” is an alternative answer. Using 
the responses to individual questions over the period 1994 - 2002, we calculate a measure 
of the mean answer (to measure the average response)4, and also examine the “Don’t 
know” answers separately as a measure of uncertainty.
Here, we focus on two specific questions taken from this survey. Figure 4.1 provides the 
mean and uncertainty measure to the question “How do you expect the general economic 
situation in this country to develop over the next 12 months?”. Despite the improved 
outlook on average (top panel), there is a marked increase in uncertainty in the months 
that lead up to the September 1998 election (bottom panel), and this uncertainty seems 
to only fall back gradually over the following 3 years. Figure 4.2 shows that answers to 
the question “How do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country to 
change over the next 12 months?” follow a similar pattern; although unemployment is 
expected to decline (consistent with falling unemployment over the period), uncertainty 
increases around the election5.
4.2.1 T im ing
To study how households’ saving and labour supply decisions respond to this increase in 
uncertainty we need to define both the period when uncertainty jumped, and, in order 
to employ the diff-in-diff approach, a treatment and a control group. We do this by
4We use the following mapping from qualitative answers in order to derive a quantitative measure 
of the average response: “+ + ”=  2, 1 “= ”= 0, —1, “— ”=  —2. Hence, a higher mean
indicates a more positive response.
5The figure shows that a similar increase in uncertainty occurred earlier in the 1990s, but this increase 
was associated with a deteriorating labour market.
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Figure 4.1: Gfk Consumer Survey: Expectations about the economics situation over the 
next 12 months.
defining an uncertainty dummy which corresponds to the period of increased uncertainty 
indicated in Figure 4.1. Thus, we define:
{ 1 between August 1998 and December 1999 
0 otherwise
Although the election, which took place in September 1998, is the focal point of the 
uncertainty (the figures indicate that it is where the uncertainty peaks), we do not define 
the increase in uncertainty as occurring only then. Instead we allow for some anticipation 
of the close election. As shown in Figure 4.1 and 4.2, uncertainty begins to increase in the 
months leading up to the election; we use August 1998 as the start date of the uncertainty 
period. The end date, December 1999 is selected to coincide with the month in which 
general economic uncertainty first returns to the level in June 1998. In the econometric 
analysis below, we perform robustness tests allowing for less anticipation (a later start 
date for the uncertainty) and a slower return to the lower uncertainty state (a later end 
date).
Since we observe the month in which the interview is conducted, we can precisely 
identify those who answered in the uncertainty period. For instance, during the course
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Figure 4.2: Gfk Consumer Survey: Expectations about unemployment over the next 12 
months.
of 1998, we know which households were interviewed before July, and those which were 
interviewed after this date. Our sample includes the years from 1995 (three years before 
the election) to 2000 (2 years after the election) inclusive.
4.2 .2  T reatm ent and C ontrol Group
We identify the effect on household saving of the increase in uncertainty using a diff-in-diff 
estimator. The “treated group” includes those households who are likely to have been 
affected by the increase in uncertainty. Our “control group” consists of households whose 
head is a civil servant.
As discussed above, there were two main concerns in the run-up to the 1998 election 
that are the best candidates to explain the increase in uncertainty: concern about unem­
ployment and concern about possible changes in the pension system. Unemployment had 
been a major economic issue in Germany since reunification. Figure 4.3 shows that in the 
run up to the 1998 election unemployment was falling. Nonetheless, there were concerns 
that unemployment was still persistently high in the New Lander. Moreover, following 
the end of government subsidies to construction, unemployment in this particular sector
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was rising. Policies affecting unemployment were, therefore, a major issue of the election.
German Unemployment Rate
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Figure 4.3: German Unemployment Rate
The other big election issue was pensions. Since the early 1990’s Germany had gone 
through a long debate that increased the public’s awareness about the unsustainability 
of the existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system. In August 1997 Chancellor Kohl 
announced a major reform explaining that the existing rules were no longer sustainable: 
the reform was adopted in December 1997 and was due to come into effect in 1999 (des 
Rentenreformgesetzes 1999, December 16, 1997). The main provision of the new law 
was the indexation of pension benefits to future gains in life-expectancy: over time this 
provision would have reduced the replacement rate from 70% to 67%. During the 1998 
election campaign Gerhard Schroder made the revocation of this law one of his main 
campaign promises: when he won, one of the first decisions of the new Chancellor was 
to revoke Kohl’s pension reform (Rentenkorrekturgesetz, November 20, 1998). Nothing 
happened on pension reform for almost three years, until the adoption (in 2001) of the 
Riester reform which, along with a gradual reduction of benefits, mostly encouraged 
enrolment in private pension plans. Though outside of our sample, the anticipation of 
this reform could have contributed to the decline in uncertainty that we observe in 2000.
The pension rights of civil servants had been insulated from the effect of the Kohl 
reform. This had happened through the adoption—at the end of January 1997 and thus 
before the Kohl reform—of a new set of rules for public sector employees. The main 
purpose of the new rules, (Gesetz zur Reform des offentlichen Dienstrechts) which had 
come into force on July 1, 1997 was to create a more market-driven system for career 
civil servants, to introduce flexibility in work practices and performance-related pay, and 
to increase mobility across jobs. Among the many provisions of this law was a measure 
which marginally modified the rules of civil service pensions,6 but de-facto safeguarded
6 The reform involved civil servants contributing to the financing of their pensions through a fixed
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the generosity of the system going forward, and more importantly insulated civil servants 
from the effects of reforms of the PAYG system that might be introduced in the future -
With unemployment and pension reform being the most likely explanations for the 
observed increase in uncertainty, we are presented with a natural control/treatment dis­
tinction for our diff-in-diff estimator:
Civil Servants: Households headed by a civil servant constitute our “control” group. 
First, civil servants, with a job for life, face no labour income risk. Second, German 
civil service pensions are run separately from the PAYG system and, as we discussed, 
civil servants knew that their pensions rights would be insulated from the effects of 
the Kohl reform, whatever direction such reform might take.
Indiv iduals who are  n o t Civil Servants (Non-CS): The majority of the individu­
als in the GSOEP survey (about 64% in 1998) are members of the PAYG public 
pension system 7 and constitute our “treated group”: people in this group face un­
certainty with regard to both the future of their pension rights and unemployment.8
We thus define
The diff-in-diff estimator that we shall use relies on the assumption that prior to the 
treatment, households in the treated and in the control group are indistinguishable, i.e.
reduction of 0.2% in the annual pay every year between 2001 and 2016.
7Membership in the PAYG pension system is mandatory for almost all German workers. To be eligible 
for a pension a worker’s earnings must be above a certain threshold.
8We drop from our sample other groups which may or may not have been affected by the reform. 
Firstly foreign nationals, a group which is over-represented in the GSOEP survey, may have very different 
saving motives to German citizens. What is more, some may only be in Germany temporarily, or expect 
to leave Germany before retirement. If a person who has contributed to the public pension system leaves 
Germany before they can claim their pension, there are rules in place to treat their accrued pension 
wealth fairly. (These rules can be quite complicated and differ depending on where the person moves 
to. If they move to another EU country, then the years of pension contribution in Germany could count 
toward a public pension at home. If instead the person moves to outside the EU they can generally claim 
their contributions back. In either case, such a worker is likely to be less affected (if at all) by changes 
to the German public pension system.). As such, we eliminate all foreigners from our sample group.
Two other broad classifications of workers that we exclude are the self-employed and professionals. 
Self-employed workers can choose whether or not they wish to join the public pension system; this group 
will thus contain some members who are affected by the reform and others who are not. This group is also 
more difficult to link to the worries about unemployment. Professionals, such as lawyers, accountants, 
vets, doctors, etc., are required to join private pension plans and are thus unaffected by a reform of the 
public pension system. They are also less at risk (though not immune) from unemployment. In our 
analysis we exclude both groups.
Finally, we eliminate pensioners from the control and treatment groups. Most proposed reforms of the 
pension system protect the benefits of those already in retirement and pensioners are no longer part of 
the labour market. Pensioners should thus be unaffected by both types of uncertainty.
and indeed the subsequent Kohl reform did not apply to civil servants.
treated^
0 if civil servant 
1 otherwise (non-CS)
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that the treatment is random. In other words, that households headed by a civil servant 
are similar to all other households except for the fact that they are headed by a civil 
servant. We have checked this assumption looking at “propensity scores” . These are 
reported in Figure 4.4.
The horizontal axis in Figure 4.4 shows the estimated probability of being treated 
measured from a panel logit regression of “being treated”- that is being headed by a 
non-CS individual - on various controls including a household fixed effect. The vertical 
axis shows the percent of households in each group. We find controls and treated groups 
close to both extremes of the estimated probabilities of treatment. In the left panel, for 
instance, we find households headed by a civil servant that have a high probability of being 
treated, that is whose characteristics closely match those of the treated group, namely 
non-CS individuals. Symmetrically, the right panel of the figure shows that there are 
households headed by a non-CS individual who, considering their characteristics, might 
have been civil servants. This reassures us that the two groups are not too different from 
each other - that is that the assumption that the treatment is random, conditional on 
fixed effects, is not too extreme.
Propensity Score
Civil Servants Non-Civil Servantso .
“ i-------------1------------ 1------------1------------ 1------------ r
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
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The horizontal axis shows the estimated probability of being treated measured from a panel logit regression 
of being treated - being affected by the uncertainty (a non-CS individual) - on various controls 
including a household fixed effect. The vertical axis shows the percent of households in each group.
Figure 4.4: Propensity Scores - Probability of Being Treated
Our diff-in-diff estimator also relies on there being some evidence that non-CS workers 
became more worried over the period 1998-2000, compared with civil servants. Unfortu-
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nately, we cannot decompose the responses used in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 into civil servants 
and others. Therefore, we instead use the answers to a GSOEP question which asks 
“Does your own financial situation worry you?”. The mean, 25th percentile and 75th 
percentile of the distribution of answers in each year is shown in Figure 4.5. This figure 
shows that non-CS workers had an increase in worries (3 indicates the highest level of 
worry, 1 the least worry) around 1998 (the 25th percentile shifted up) that is unmatched 
by what happened to civil servants. Even though the question is not a perfect measure 
of the type of uncertainty depicted in the bottom panels of Figures 4.1 and 4.2, this is 
further comfort for us in the use of civil servants as the control group.
Figure 4.6, subject to the same caveats as the previous Figure, finds no major changes 
in the level of worries about job security. Notice that the absolute level of worry remains 
consistently lower, on average, for civil servants. Below, we shall make use of this self­
assessed worry variable in order to control for time-varying individual concerns about job 
security, and how these might affect saving behaviour.
—  75th Parcentito 
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Baseline sample using GSOEP data: uses only households where the same respondent answers each year.
Figure 4.5: Worries about personal finances.
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Baseline sample using GSOEP data: uses only households where the same respondent answers each year.
Figure 4.6: Worries about job security. We exclude the unemployment for whom the 
question does not apply.
4.3 D ata
Our data are from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). This survey, first con­
ducted in 1984, is an annual longitudinal study which now covers some 10,000 German 
households providing information on numerous aspects of their life, including household 
composition, family biographies, employment, social security, earnings and health. The 
number of households surveyed rises over time since subsequent waves have increased the 
coverage of the sample, and attrition rates are low. Balanced samples over a sufficiently 
long number of years are relatively small: when we restrict our analysis to households who 
report their savings, the size of a balanced panel covering the 6-year period 1995-2000 
contains 2,854 households yielding a total of about 17,000 observations.
Two main surveys are conducted each year. The first is an individual questionnaire in 
which all adult household members answer questions regarding their own situation. The 
second is a household questionnaire in which the head of the household is asked questions 
regarding the entire household. We combine the information from the two question­
naires.9 From the first we obtain information about each member of the household: age,
9We also make use of the variables contained in the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF). These
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education and employment status, which defines the future pension status, hours worked, 
etc. for each individual. Prom the second, we obtain information relating to the entire 
household: income, household taxes paid (including a separate measure of social security 
contributions), pension income received from both public and private sources, as well as 
demographic information such as marital status, number of children, area of residence, 
etc. The concept of saving we use thus refers to the entire household. The head of 
household is defined in the GSOEP as “the person who knows best about the general 
conditions under which the household acts” . In most cases, this coincides with the main 
earner in the household although this not always the case. In order to establish the main 
public pension status of household, and whether or not it is affected by the reforms, we 
use the information on the main earner (in terms of gross income per annum) rather than 
on the GSOEP-defined head of the household; when we repeated our analysis using the 
GSOEP head of household data our results were qualitatively the same.
The GSOEP survey is generally conducted early in the year, although some respon­
dents are interviewed as late as October and November. Using an “interview month” 
identifier, we can tell whether the interview happened during the period characterized by 
the increase in uncertainty.
We construct a balanced sample using six waves of the GSOEP survey: those from 
1995 (three years before the election) to 2000 (the year before the Riester Law). Table 
4.1 describes the characteristics of the 1,718 households included in the balanced panel 
(Table 4.1 considers their responses in 1998). The household proportions in terms of the 
key variables in the balanced sample are similar to those in the unbalanced data (not 
reported).
4.3.1 H ousehold saving
The GSOEP survey asks about household savings posing the following question: “Do 
you usually have an amount of money left over at the end of the month that you can save 
for larger purchases, emergency expenses or to acquire wealth?” Households that answer 
”Yes” then provide the average amount of money left over in euro. The amount given 
as the answer to this question is our main household saving variable 10, which we then
data are also based on the GSOEP responses, but are constructed ex-post in order to provide variables 
that are comparable with the British Household Panel and Panel Study on Income and Dynamics (PSID) 
- see Burkhauser et al. (2001) for details. The variable we use to measure social security contributions 
comes from this dataset.
10Our measure of household saving differs from that used by Fuchs-Schiindeln and Schiindeln (2005) 
who use wealth levels as their dependent variable. To construct this variable these authors assume that 
each household receives an average return from the assets it holds. Such a definition however is subject
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Table 4.1: Sample Size and Basic Household Characteristics: Balanced Sample
Balanced Panel (1995-2000)
1998 data
Total Civil Servants Non-Civil Servants
Total who report income 1,924 167 1757
by household saving
o/w positive saving 1,275 136 1139
o/w saving unreported 649 31 618
by labour force participation
o/w full-time 1,655 161 1,494
o/w part-time 113 6 107
o/w unemployed 110 0 110
o/w out of the labour force 46 0 46
express as a percentage of household disposable income or, alternatively, of household 
consumption.
One problem with our survey data concerns those households who do not save (House­
holds that answer ”No”). The GSOEP survey reports saving only for those households 
that declare positive saving: if a household has zero or negative saving, the amount of sav­
ing is left unanswered or a zero is entered. Income is instead reported for all households. 
The number of households for which there is no information about saving is significant: 
for instance 619 out of 1,718 households in the balanced sample in 1998, or about 35% 
(see Table 4.1). Among the main earners of the household who do not report saving, 20% 
(in the balanced sample in 1998) are unemployed. The percentage of non-savers is rea­
sonably constant along the age distribution. We treat those with non-reported savings as 
zero savers; in section 4.4 we discuss the truncation problem this choice might induce.11.
A second problem with our definition of saving arises from the PAYG pension system.
to measurement error. The same stock of total assets will in general yield different returns depending on 
the particular asset composition: if this happened, households with identical stocks of assets would end 
up being attributed different stocks of wealth. The measure of saving reported in the GSOEP survey is 
immune from this problem since the question is directly about additions to the stock of wealth. Moreover, 
since our focus is on the reaction of household saving to a sudden increase in uncertainty; it is unlikely 
that household wealth (a stock) will immediately be affected by the sudden change in the saving rate 
(the flow). We therefore choose to examine the reported saving of households. In a more recent paper, 
Fuch-Schiindeln (2008) measures flows into financial wealth using the same measure of saving as we do 
in this paper.uses the same measure of saving as we do to measure flows into financial wealth.
11 In an appendix to Giavazzi and McMahon (2008), we follow Browning and Leth-Petersen (2003), 
amongst others, and impute saving rates for those for whom no saving is reported. The results are little 
changed when we use the sample which also includes estimated negative saving by households who do 
not report saving.
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The answers to the question about saving miss two portions of actual household saving. 
First, social security contributions by workers and by firms 12, which are not reported as 
savings although they are a form of saving (which increases with income). Thus reported 
savings increase over a person’s working life by less than “true”saving. Second, the 
pension payments an individual receives are misreported as income, rather than being 
considered negative savings. Thus reported savings remain positive even after retirement 
when actual savings are likely to be negative 13. A similar problem arises for private 
pension plans. In the GSOEP survey, individual contributions to such plans are correctly 
reported as saving 14, but money withdrawn from a private plan is incorrectly reported 
as income. The bottom line is that the savings reported in the GSOEP answers represent 
a fraction of actual household saving.
This problem is discussed in Poterba (1994) and its implications are shown in Figure 
4.7. Poterba shows that the age profile of the German saving rate (defined as the ratio of 
reported saving to disposable income in 1998) is at odds with the life cycle hypothesis: 
the difference is particularly sharp when compared with the US profile obtained from the 
PSID survey and reported in Poterba, 1994. Rather than hump-shaped, as implied by 
the life-cycle hypothesis, the saving rate of German households seems to be unaffected by 
an individual’s age 15. Figure 4.7 shows the saving rate once we correct it, as discussed 
above, by including contributions to social security and excluding pension benefits from 
the measure of disposable income. (This correction and the variables used to compute 
it are discussed in detail in the Appendix posted on our websites). The ‘corrected’ 
age-saving profile resembles more closely that predicted by the life-cycle hypothesis. As 
expected, correcting saving rates boosts the saving rate of those in employment, and 
causes positive reported saving to become negative for retirees. But since we exclude 
pensioners from our main sample, we shall proceed using the reported saving rate as this 
is the margin of total saving which is likely to be affected by any precautionary motives 
and can be adjusted more directly by household behaviour16.
Table 4.2 (top panel) shows sample statistics on the reported saving rates (as a per­
centage of disposable income) by pension status of the head of household. Reported saving
12 We do not observe social security contributions paid by firms. Consistent with the rules of the 
German social security system we assume that firms pay a contribution on behalf of their workers equal 
to that paid by the workers themselves.
13To be precise, the mis-reporting does not concern the total pension payments received, since part 
of these are an implicit return on pension wealth, and therefore are indeed income. We have overlooked 
this fact. For a discussion of this correction see Jappelli and Modigliani (2005).
14We do not observe contributions to private pension plans possibly made by firms and we thus overlook 
them.
15This fact is well known from the work of Borsch-Supan et al. (1991, 2001) and Borsch-Supan (2003). 
Poterba (1994) makes the same observation for Japan.
16Also, in Giavazzi and McMahon (2008) we show that our estimates are robust to the use of corrected 
saving rates, rather than reported saving rates, as the dependent variable.
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rates are generally similar across groups, and all groups display a wide within-group vari­
ation. The overall mean reported saving rate, as a percent of disposable income, is 9%: 
this is slightly higher for civil servants (10%). Though some respondents claim to save 
almost 90% of their disposable income, the reported saving rate for high savers (90th 
percentile) is 22%.
52 -I
—  Reported SR (Mean)
Corrected SR (Mean)
60 8020 40
Head of Household Age
Figure 4.7: Reported and Corrected Saving Rates in Germany in 1998 by age of the head 
of the household. (Source: authors calculations using all 1998 GSOEP data)
Households differ not only in the level of their savings but also in their trend. Figure 
4.8 shows the mean, median and key percentiles of the saving rate by public pension 
status. Two points are important; first, the average non-CS household has reduced the 
level of saving over the period in question, while civil servants have (on average) increased 
their saving slightly. Second, there are numerous non-CS households that have been 
increasing their saving rate, but also many that have been lowering it; the same is true 
for households headed by a civil servant. Because fixed effects on levels cannot capture 
these trend differences we use the first difference of the saving rate as our dependent 
variable; once we include a fixed effect in such a regression, any trend differences will be 
eliminated, allowing us to focus on how households have changed their behaviour around 
their trend.
4.3 .2  H ours W orked
The GSOEP survey reports the hours worked by the head and other members of the 
household each week in their main job and, possibly, in other, secondary, jobs. The 
question asked is: ''How many hours do your actual working-hours consist of, including
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics by treatedit in 1998: Balanced sample, 1995-2000
Variable Statistics
N mean sd min max plO p25 p50 p75 p90
Reported Saving Rate All 1924 9 10 0 87 0 0 6 13 23
(% of disp. income) Non-CS 1757 9 10 0 87 0 0 6 13 23
Civil Servant 167 10 10 0 59 0 4 8 14 23
All 1924 38 15 0 80 0 38 40 45 50
Hours Non-CS 1757 38 15 0 80 0 38 40 45 50
Civil Servant 167 40 10 0 78 30 39 40 45 50
AH 1924 1 1 0 6 1 1 1 2 2
Workers Non-CS 1757 1 1 0 6 1 1 1 2 2
Civil Servant 167 2 1 1 4 1 1 2 2 2
P-time Hours All 113 21 10 0 70 8 15 21 29 34
(given P-time) Non-CS 107 21 10 0 70 8 14 21 29 35
Civil Servant 6 24 5 18 31 20 20 22 29 30
Weekly 2nd-Job Horns All 1924 0.1 0.3 0 .0 7 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0.3
(given employed) Non-CS 1757 0.1 0.3 0 .0 7 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0.4
Civil Servant 167 0.1 0 .2 0 .0 3 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .2
Household Saving Rate (% of Disposable Income)
—  75th Percentile 
Mean
—  25th Percentile
75th Percentile 
Mean
25th Percentile
Baseline sample using GSOEP data.
Figure 4.8: Distribution of Household Saving Rate (SR)
possible over time?\ We are able to identify whether a person works, in her main job, full­
time, regular part-time or occasionally, from the answer to the question ‘Are you currently 
engaged in paid employment? Which of the following applies best to your status?\ Finally 
a related question asks respondents to ignore their main job, and consider additional 
employment {‘It is possible to work in addition to regular employment, household work, 
education and also as pensioner. How many days a month do you engage in this additional 
employment? How many hours on average on these days?’); the answer to this question 
allows us to construct a measure of hours worked in secondary employment.
Table 4.2 also reports descriptive statistics on the number of weekly hours worked 
by the head of household (3rd panel), the number of household members who work (4th 
panel), the average weekly hours of those household heads who works part time in their 
primary employment (about 10% of all those in employment, displayed in panel 5), and, 
in the final panel, the average number of hours worked in a 2nd job (by those who also 
have a main job). About 70% of households contain only a single worker (usually the head 
of household), and most heads of household work on average 30-40 hours per week. The 
main earner in a non-CS household is more likely to work part-time, while civil servants 
are more likely to work in a 2 (or more) workers household. Though some of the non-CS 
workers are employed for up to 4.5 hours per week in a second job, second jobs are very
Civil Servants
o <o
co
o
1995 1997 1998 19991996
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Non-Civil Servants
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rare and even the 90th percentile of the distribution works an average of 0.3 hours per 
week in such employment. In fact only 32 of the 1197 employed non-CS workers in the 
balanced sample in 1998 engage in 1 hour or more of secondary employment per week 
(22 of these 32 work full-time in their primary employment; the remainder are part-time 
employed in their main employment). In the balanced sample of 109 civil servants, only 
1 of these engage in secondary employment (in 1998).
4.4 Saving R esults
Our baseline regression is
A srit = fit + 0xit +  rjtreatedij +  '4)i(csjreformt x csit) +  ^ ( csjreform t) 
+5iD(Kohl)t + 62 (D(Kohl)t x treatedift)
+ T iu n c e r ta in ty t -I- r2 (uncertaintyt x treatedi)t) +  a* +  Eit (4.1)
where Asrit is the change in the saving rate measured in percentage points, and (3t 
are household and time fixed effects respectively and xit is a vector of controls (for instance 
the change in household disposable income). The coefficient we are most interested in is 
r2 which captures the differential effect of uncertainty on the treatment group; it tells us 
whether the behavior of treated households - those affected by the increase in uncertainty 
- differs from the behavior of our controls. A positive value of r2 is a measure of the extent 
of precautionary saving.
As discussed in the previous section, the saving rates of the individual households in 
our sample display different trends and therefore to estimate the response of the household 
saving rate to the treatment, and to separate this effect from the trend behaviour, we 
use, as dependent variable, the change in the saving rate and include household fixed 
effects. An additional advantage of using the change in saving rates as our dependent 
variable is that those households who move from zero to positive saving, or vice versa, 
can be analysed in the same regression without worrying about the truncation at zero of 
our dependent variable.
However, we may still have the truncation problem resulting from the fact that some 
members of sample, whom we record as having zero saving, actually have negative saving. 
To the extent that these households have zero reported saving, when they are actually 
running down their wealth, we may overstate or understate the precautionary saving 
reaction we find. If households begin to report negative saving because of the uncertainty, 
then we would be overstating the effect. Similarly, if civil servants who report negative 
saving were to react to the uncertainty period by dissaving less (despite the fact that
148
the main sources of uncertainty do not affect them), then, by continuing to record them 
as (unchanged) zero savers, we would again overstate the effect of uncertainty. As there 
is no marked divergence in zero-saving between civil service and non-CS individuals in 
the uncertainty period, we do not believe that these potential problems are driving the 
results.
We also discussed above how there had been, prior to the uncertainty associated 
with the electoral campaign, two pension-related policy changes which may influence the 
behaviour of household saving of the treated and control groups in a differential way. It
is, therefore, necessary to control separately for these changes. For households in which
the head of the household is a civil servant, we control for the change in civil service 
pensions rules using a “reform” variable, and its interaction with a civil service dummy:
I 1 after January 1997 
cs-rejormt = <
I 0 otherwise
For the all other households, i.e. those in which the head-of-household is not a civil 
servant, we define a variable to control for the year in which the pension reform proposed 
by Chancellor Kohl was announced:
D (K  hi) {  ^ between August 1997 and September 1998 
1 0 otherwise
This variable is also interacted with the treatedit dummy. The coefficient T\ thus captures 
a more standard effect: the shift in the saving rate resulting from the announcement of 
Kohl’s pension reform by those households who were affected. A positive value of T\ 
indicates that households whose pension status was affected by Kohl’s reform increased 
their savings (more precisely shifted the change in their saving rate up) offsetting the cut 
in pension wealth.
Our baseline results use the standard definition of saving—reported saving as a percent 
of disposable income—and are obtained from the balanced panel extending over six years, 
1995-2000. The results are presented in Table 4.317. The first column of the table shows 
the baseline results: along with controls for unemployment and the change in income, 
the regression includes time and household fixed-effects. The estimate of 72 (reported in 
the second row of Table 4.3) is both statistically (at the 95% level) and economically 
significant. A coefficient of 3 indicates that the uncertainty induced treated households 
to, on average, increase the change in their saving rate by 3 percentage points per year.
17Some of the control variables are dropped automatically by Stata due to multicollinearity; this is 
especially the case when 0-1 dummies correlate perfectly with fixed effects variables. Such variables are 
marked with a in the coefficient cells of the tables.
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This means, for instance, that a treated household that previously was holding savings 
constant at 9.8% of disposable income (the average saving rate for the balanced sample 
in 1998) would, ceteris paribus, have a saving rate of about 15.8% by the year 2000.
Column (2) adds controls for the labour market: the included variables are worries 
about job security (discussed above), an indicator of whether the household lives in 
one of the new Lander, as well as a dummy variable indicating whether the head of 
household’s employment was in the construction industry. In column (3) we repeat the 
regression in column 2 but drop observations where the head of household is unemployed; 
dropping unemployed households ensures that the results are not driven by the presence of 
unemployed non-CS workers (since there are no unemployed civil servants in the sample).
Column (4) excludes any construction workers from the sample, and column (5) 
uses only non-construction workers living in the former West Germany; Fuchs-Schiindeln 
(2008) shows that East German households may still be reacting to the large shock of re­
unification. In all cases our uncertainty effect remains both statistically and economically 
significant.
In these regressions, our estimates of r\ (reported in the first row of Table 4.3) capture 
a time effect from the entire period of uncertainty and therefore, despite being negative 
and statistically significant, should not be interpreted in isolation from other year dum­
mies. The estimates of S2 indicate that households affected by Kohl’s reform do appear 
to have responded to the news by changing the path of their saving rate so as to offset 
the cut in pension wealth.18
We now run a few robustness tests concerning our uncertainty variable. Column (1) 
of Table 4.4 reproduces, for comparison, column (2) of Table 4.3 (balanced sample with 
labour market controls). Column (2) uses uncertaintyt = 1 between October 1998 and 
December 1999 (later start), Column (2) uses uncertaintyt = 1 between July 1998 and 
June 2000 (later end), and, finally, Column (4) uses uncertaintyt = 1 between October 
1998 and June 2000 (both later). In all cases the uncertainty effect remains statistically 
significant.
We next ask whether the identified effect on saving is age-dependent. Since our results 
suggest that greater uncertainty about the future of pensions induces higher precautionary
18This substitutability between private and public pension wealth is similar to the findings of Attanasio 
and Brugiavini (2003). They find that Italian households increased private saving in response to 1992 
pension reform which reduced public pension wealth.
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Table 4.3: Saving Regressions - Baseline results using the reported saving rate
(i) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
A SR A SR A SR A S R A SR
(% income) (% income) (% income) (% income) (% income)
uncertaintyt -5.0** -5.0** -5.1** -4.9** -4.8**
(-2.29) (-2.29) (-2.32) (-2.23) (-2.23)
uncertainty t x treated^ 3.0** 2.9** 3.0** 2 .8 ** 2.7**
(2.09) (2.07) (2.09) (2 .0 1 ) (1.97)
treated^ -0 .1 0 .0 -0 .2 0.1 -1.0
(-0.13) (0.0099) (-0.14) (0.069) (-0.81)
D (unemployed) -2  6 *** 7 ** - -1.5** -
(-4.75) (-2.53) (-2.15)
A  income -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(-10.4) (-10.4) (-1 0 .1 ) (-1 0 .6 ) (-8.40)
D(Kohl)t -3.6 -3.5 -4.1 -3.0 -3.4
(-1.23) (-1 .2 1 ) (-1.38) (-1 .0 1 ) (-1.17)
D(Kohl)t xtreatedij 2.7* 2.7* 2 .6 * 2.5 2.4
(1.78) (1.76) (1.72) (1.63) (1.61)
csjreform t -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.7
(-0.69) (-0 .6 8 ) (-0.96) (-0.58) (-1.05)
csjreform t x csit 2.7* 2 .6 * 2 .8 ** 2.4* 2.5*
(1.89) (1.85) (1.97) (1.70) (1.81)
Job Worries^ 0.3** 0.3** 0 .2 * 0.4**
(2.15) (2 .0 1 ) (1.67) (2.58)
D (Eastit) -1.9 -2 .8
(-0 .8 8 ) (-1.23)
D (Constructionit) 0.5 0 .1
(0.80) (0 .2 1 )
Constant -0.4 -0.5 -0 .1 -0 .1 -0.5
(-0.39) (-0.41) (-0.056) (-0.081) (-0.38)
Control Civil servants
Balanced Sample 1995-2000
Observations 11594 11594 10963 10602 7444
Number of households 1971 1971 1969 1919 1332
All regressions include household fixed-effects and time fixed-effects. 
t statistics in parentheses, *** pjO.Ol, ** pjO.05, * pjO.l. 
in the coefficient cells of the table indicates variables dropped automatically due to multicollinearity.
savings, we are interested in whether it occurs throughout the age distribution; Fuchs- 
Schiindeln (2008) shows that the impact of a change in economic regime, induced by Ger-
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Table 4.4: Saving Regression - Robustness Regressions
(i) (2 ) (3) (4)
A SR A SR A SR A SR
(% income) (% income) (% income) (% income)
uncertainty t . -5.0** -4.4 -4.1** -3.5*
(-2.29) (-0.85) (-2.52) (-1.90)
uncertainty t x treatedi^ 2.9** 2 .0 * 3.0** 2 .8 **
(2.07) (1.84) (2.18) (2 .0 2 )
treatedij 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0
(0.0099) (0 .0 0 2 2 ) (0.035) (0.026)
D (unemployed)^ 7 ** 7 ** 7 **
(-2.53) (-2.52) (-2.53) (-2.53)
A income -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(-10.4) (-10.4) (-10.4) (-10.4)
D{Kohl)t -3.5 -2.3 -3.1 -2.9
(-1 .2 1 ) (-0.67) (-1.09) (-1 .0 2 )
D(Kohl) t x treatedi>t 2.7* 1.1 2 .6 * 2 .6 *
(1.76) (1.06) (1.79) (1.72)
csjreformt -0.4 -0 .2 -0.3 -0.3
(-0 .6 8 ) (-0.35) (-0.64) (-0.61)
csjreformt x csit 2 .6 * 1.0 2 .6 * 2.5*
(1.85) (1.13) (1.90) (1.79)
Job Worries** 0.3** 0.3** 0.3** 0.3**
(2.15) (2.14) (2.13) (2.13)
D(Eastit) -1.9 -2 .0 -2 .0 -2 .0
(-0 .8 8 ) (-0.92) (-0.89) (-0.89)
D (Construction^) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
(0.80) (0.82) (0.81) (0.81)
Constant -0.5 2 .8 0 .1 -0 .0
(-0.41) (0.52) (0.049) (-0.0053)
Control Civil servants
Balanced Sample 1995-2000
Observations 11594 11594 11594 11594
Number of households 1971 1971 1971 1971
All regressions include household fixed-effects and time fixed-effects. 
t statistics in parentheses, *** pjO.Ol, ** pjO.05, * pjO.l. 
in the coefficient cells of the table indicates variables dropped automatically due to multicollinearity.
man reunification, affects different cohorts in a differential way. Gourinchas and Parker
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(2001) suggest that the precautionary saving motive should be especially important at 
young ages, while it should become negligible for older households who, on average, hold 
large amounts of liquid wealth. Their model however excludes pension wealth. Our data 
allows to test whether the precautionary saving induced by the uncertainty regarding 
the future of pensions affects individuals differently depending on their age. Relatively 
older individuals have a shorter working-life horizon and thus must save relatively more 
to achieve a given increase in wealth. We investigate whether the effect of uncertainty on 
saving is age-dependent by estimating:
Asrit = pt +  6.xit +  rj.treated^ +  ^(c s jre fo rm t  x csit) +  ^ 2(cs.reform t)
+  5\.D(Kohl)t + 62 (D(Kohl)t x treated^)
+ T\.uncertaintyt +  r2. (uncertaintyt x treated^)
+  r3. (Ageit x uncertaintyt) +  r4. (Agen x uncertaintyt x treated^)
+ at +  En (4.2)
The fixed effect regression is reported in column (1) of Table 4.5 and finds no significant 
effect of age on the extent to which households reacted to the uncertainty. However, 
including a time-varying age variable with fixed-effects may be problematic; demeaning 
age, as fixed effects does, would transform this variable in a year-of-birth-specific trend. 
Therefore, we have tested whether we could drop fixed effects; a Hausman test, which 
compares the consistent (though not necessarily efficient) fixed-effects model (FE) with 
a random effects model (RE), fails to reject the null hypothesis that the RE and the FE 
coefficients are identical (Prob > x 2 = 0.71). The random effects regression is reported 
in column 2 and our finding of no significant age effect is unchanged. We cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the effect of uncertainty on the treated group (r2 +  t 4 x Ageit), for 
the range of ages within our sample, is 3 percentage points-the same as we find in the 
earlier regressions.
We also, in column (3) and (4) of Table 4.5, run equation 4.2 using a dummy variable 
which is 1 if the head of household is older than 50 years of age. We, again, find no 
differential impact of age on the results reported already.
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4.5 Hours Results
As mentioned in the introduction, additional savings can be achieved either by consuming 
less or by working more. We analyze the effects on labour supply of the uncertainty by 
considering regressions similar to those just discussed but using, on the left-hand side, 
labour supply variables rather than the change in the saving rate. The German labour 
market is relatively rigid: it is unclear the extent to which work contracts allow employees 
to change their working hours; overtime is also strictly regulated. Workers however can 
adjust their labour supply using the margin offered to those in part-time employment or 
by taking 2nd jobs. As discussed above, around 10% of workers in our balanced sample 
are part-time workers, while very few work significant hours in second jobs - of the 2,046 
non-CS workers in full- or part-time employment, only 49 work on average 1 hour or more 
per week in a 2nd job in 1998 (this number is reasonably constant across years).
Using various measures of hours worked we estimate the following equation using a 
household fixed effects specification:
hoursit =  A +  O.xu + rj.treated^ +  ipi(cs-reformt x csit) -I- V>2(csjreform t) 
+6i.D(Kohl)t +  (D(Kohl)t x treatedijt)
+7i.uncertaintyt + r2. (uncertaintyt x treated^) +  ctj +  eit (4.3)
Relative to the baseline saving equation (equation 4.1), we omit the income control as 
this is endogenous to the amount of hours worked - the amount of hours worked is both 
determined by, and determines, the individual’s income19. We include industry fixed 
effects to control for industrial differences in hours variables. We report the results in 
Table 4.6. In columns (1) - (3) , the object of the analysis is the number of hours worked 
by the head of household (as shown in Table 3, the majority of households contain only 
a single worker). In column (1) we consider total weekly hours worked by the head of the 
household in her primary employment. In column (2) we restrict the analysis to heads 
of household for whom primary employment is part-time. In columns (3) we use all 
households where the head of household was a part-time worker in 1996; this is designed 
to capture the effects of part-time workers potentially moving into full-time employment.
The estimate of 72, the diff-in-diff effect on hours of the uncertainty, varies depending 
on whether the head of household works full time or part time. In general (column 1) 
there is no evidence of a labour supply response - a result which is consistent with the 
rigidity of German labour contracts. However household heads who work only part-time 
- and thus presumably have more flexibility - do appear to use this flexibility: following
19In the saving regressions above, we worry less about this as the change in saving rates has a much 
less clear impact on income; the causality runs much more clearly from income changes to savings.
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the revocation of the pension reform their hours increase significantly (at the 10% level); 
see columns (2) and (3). The point estimate, 9.1, means that a head of household working 
part-time, who previously worked 10 hours per week would have increased her hours to 
19 hours per week—an economically significant increase.
In column (4) and (5) of Table 4.6 we shift the focus to the hours worked by other 
household members (excluding the hours worked by the head of household); column (4) 
considers all possible households, while column (5) focuses on the households headed by 
part-time workers (as in column (2)). There is no evidence in either case of a labour supply 
effect for these workers. We obtained similar, insignificant results (not reported here) 
when we investigated whether the number of workers increased in households affected by 
the revocation of the reform. Moreover, there is no evidence that the hours response is 
dependent on age.
4.6 Conclusions
The results in this paper are of interest from three different perspectives. First, we provide 
a direct measure of the importance of precautionary saving studying how households 
respond to an exogenous increase in uncertainty about the path of future income. Our 
estimates of precautionary savings are the result of a quasi-natural experiment and thus 
overcome the identification problem that often affects such measures; they also control for 
individual characteristics and thus for heterogeneity across individuals. Second, we find 
evidence that faced with an increase in uncertainty households respond adjusting their 
labour supply: they do so - in a highly regulated labour market - using the only margin 
that has some flexibility, part-time employment; this effect however is only marginally 
significant. Finally, while independent of the reasons why uncertainty jumped in the 
run-up to the 1998 election, our results are suggestive of the economic effects of “wars 
of attrition”, i.e. situations in which reforms are delayed because political parties are 
unable to agree on how the burden of a reform should be shared between various groups 
in society. Delays in adopting a reform, or the possibility that a reform, after it has been 
adopted by one government may be revoked by another, raise uncertainty and induce 
households to save more: consumption may fall and the economy might slow down for 
no other reason than political uncertainty.
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Table 4.5: Looking for an age effect of precautionary saving
(i) (2 ) (3) (4)
A SR A SR A SR A  SR
(% income) (% income) (% income) (% income)
Fixed effects? FE RE FE RE
uncertainty t. -5.9 -6 .1 * -5.1** -4.5**
(-1.43) (-1.90) (-2.28) (-2.34)
uncertainty t x treatedij 4.2 4.7 3.1** 3.3**
(1.08) (1.57) (2.07) (2.49)
treatedi)t -0 .0 0 .2 -0 .0 0 .2
(-0 .0 2 2 ) (0.50) (-0.0070) (0.50)
D (unemployed)it -1 .2 ** 7 ** -1 .2 **
(-2.51) (-2.45) (-2.50) (-2.45)
A income -0.003*** -0 .0 0 2 *** -0.003*** -0 .0 0 2 ***
(-10.4) (-9.91) (-10.4) (-9.90)
D(Kohl)t -3.5 -3.0 -3.5 -3.0
(-1 .2 1 ) (-1.17) (-1 .2 2 ) (-1.17)
D(Kohl)t x treatedij 2.7* 2.7** 2.7* 2 .8 **
(1.76) (2 .0 2 ) (1.76) (2.03)
cs-reformt -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
(-0.67) (-0.96) (-0.67) (-0.96)
csjreform t x csit 2 .6 * 2.7** 2 .6 * 2.7**
(1.85) (2.17) (1.85) (2.18)
Job Worries^ 0.3** 0.1 0.3** 0 .1
(2.14) (1.25) (2.14) (1.25)
D (Eastit) -1.9 -0.3* -1.9 -0.3*
(-0 .8 8 ) (-1.71) (-0 .8 8 ) (-1.70)
D (Constructionit) 0.5 0 .0 0.5 0 .0
(0.82) (0.037) (0.82) (0.036)
Ageit x uncertainty t 0.018 0.039
(0.24) (0.67)
Ageit x uncertainty t x treatedi)t -0.029 -0.035
(-0.36) (-0.57)
D(Ageit) x uncertaintyt 0.181 0.310
(0 .1 2 ) (0.27)
D(Ageit) x uncertaintyt xtreateditt -0.559 -0.316
(-0.36) (-0.27)
Constant 0.633 -0.442 -0.529 1.328
(0 .2 2 ) (-0.19) (-0.40) (0.80)
Control Civil servants
Balanced Sample 1995-2000
Observations 11594 11594 11594 11594
Number of households 1971 1971 1971 1971
All regressions idcP&le time fixed-effects. 
t statistics in parentheses, *** pjO.Ol, ** pjO.05, * pjO.l. 
in the coefficient cells of the table indicates variables dropped automatically due to multicollinearity.
Table 4.6: Labour Hours Regression
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Head Non-Head
Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours
All workers Part-time Part-time All workers Part-time
uncertainty t . 0.0 -8.4 -12.1 0.8 -0.8
(0.0092) (-1.09) (-1.60) (0.81) (-0.12)
uncertainty t x treated*|t -0.9 9.1* 9.2* 0.3 1.0
(-0.78) (1.72) (1.81) (0.53) (0.21)
treatedij -2.1** -2.0 -7.1* 0.2 -0.0
(-2.24) (-0.33) (-1.83) (0.44) (-0.0070)
D (unemployed) - - -9 2*** - -
(-4.67)
D(Kohl)t -4.289* -7.678 -6.562 1.078 0.184
(-1.75) (-1.02) (-0.87) (0.76) (0.027)
D(Kohl)t xtreatedij 0.3 7.0 6.4 -0.1 0.8
(0.27) (1.27) (1.21) (-0.18) (0.16)
csjreform t -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.0 -1.4
(-0.17) (0.14) (-0.10) (-0.061) (-1.33)
csjreformt x csit -1.1 6.1 6.5 0.7 1.4
(-1.00) (1.09) (1.29) (1.09) (0.28)
Job Worries^ Q 4*** 0.5 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0
(3.02) (1.28) (-0.0011) (-1.22) (-0.13)
D (Eastit) -0.6 - - 0.5 -
(-0.31) (0.48)
D  (Constructionit) 0.2 12.6*** 9.2 1.5 0.2
(0.095) (2.60) (1.44) (1.28) (0.049)
Constant 45 7 *** 19.2** 40.8*** -0.8 3.8
(20.4) (2.06) (4.41) (-0.59) (0.45)
Control Civil servants
Balanced Sample 1995-2000
Observations 10520 611 629 10520 611
Number of households 1950 263 105 1950 263
All regressions include household fixed-effects, industry fixed effects and time fixed-effects. 
t statistics in parentheses, *** pjO.Ol, ** pjO.05, * pjO.l. 
in the coefficient cells of the table indicates variables dropped automatically due to multicollinearity.
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Conclusion
As discussed in the introduction, the focus of this thesis is on macroeconomic policy and 
economic performance. I have made four broad contributions in this thesis:
1. My simple model of inventory-in-motion does reasonably well at matching a number 
of the stylised facts. However, importantly, the introduction of inventories does, 
within this framework, generate amplification and propagation of economic shocks.
2. Following from this, although it seems that improved inventory management may 
have contributed to the behaviour of some of the macroeconomic variables over the 
past quarter of a century, my model suggests that it is unlikely that it is inventory 
management alone, or even in a large way, that is responsible for the great stability 
experienced prior to the “credit crunch”.
3. Using the combination of a theoretical model and the voting records of the the Bank 
of England MPC, it is shown in Chapter 3 that the commonly held intuition for 
why a mixed committee might outperform other committees does not necessarily 
hold true. In particular, there is evidence that despite the best attempts of the 
committee designer, if the committee members are worried about their reputation 
for various reasons, the gains of having a mixed committee can be reduced or even 
eliminated.
4. The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 gets around the problems that generally plague 
studies of precautionary saving by including household fixed effects to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, and, at the same time, making use of a quasi-natural 
experiment around the time of a general election that was difficult to call and was 
fought on two main policy issues that the parties had different views on. The 
results indicate that the uncertainty induced by such political uncertainty, and by 
the subsequent delays in adopting reforms, can have real macroeconomic effects.
The results in this thesis highlight the tight-rope walked by policymakers: the good 
times may, or may not, have had anything to do with policy; and trying to change
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institutions for the better may not actually improve decision-making. On the other hand, 
waiting to decide what to do may actually be very costly.
While these results represent clear contributions to our understanding, there remains 
yet more to be done.
Beginning with the last Chapter, there is considerable interest in the effects of un­
certainty on the macroeconomy and I believe that this paper provides further evidence 
that uncertainty, and perceptions of it, can have real economic effects. I would like to 
pursue a further analysis of whether the uncertainty induced changes are necessarily bed 
for welfare.
An obvious next step for the committee voting research set out in Chapter 3 is to 
develop a model that explicitly considers career concerns and the economic cycle. This 
would enable a full theoretical exploration of the potential interactions between the busi­
ness cycle and reputation effects.
Further, by extending the analysis to other environments, such as corporate boards, 
this would widen the scope and importance of the results that we have found.
Following the experimental analysis of Blinder and Morgan (2005) and Lombardelli, 
Proudman, and Talbot (2005), we would like to extend this laboratory environment to 
allow for internal and external members in order to better understand what aspects of 
the career concerns are important.
Finally, the analysis in Chapters 1 and 2 presents a number of opportunities for further 
research which I intend to follow up on.
I aim to extend the model to take account of both demand and supply shocks. Intro­
ducing both types of shocks would necessitate overcoming the computational difficulties 
introduced with a fourth state variable. Nonetheless, this remains a priority for future 
work as with demand shocks, I could explore the good monetary policy explanation in 
greater depth.
I also believe that recent papers, such as Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006) 
and Bullard and Singh (2009), which emphasise the issue of imperfect information may 
be important for further understanding the role that supply chains and inventories can 
have when they interact to generate greater volatility. I am beginning a project to explore 
these issues, and particularly to develop a general equilibrium business cycle model which 
takes the “bullwhip effect” of inventories seriously. This work could, potentially, reverse 
some of the results established in this paper about the role of inventories in the Great 
Moderation. In others words, this would allow me to take more seriously the impact of 
IT on improved forecasting of sales behaviour, and then see how this affects the volatility 
of GDP.
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In addition, I intend to develop further the time aggregation results explored in my 
model. One problem with the framework used in Chapters 1 and 2 is that investment and 
storage inventory are assumed to have the same horizon. This means that the two are 
substitutes for any output not consumed. To overcome the dominance of the decision to 
invest in capital, in this paper I have included capital adjustment costs in my model, and 
I discussed why investment irreversibility was inappropriate. As an alternative, I have 
started to investigate the situation where the decision to store goods and to invest in 
goods have different horizons. For example, investment decisions may take one quarter 
to yield a return (as is standard in RBC quarterly models) while inventory storage is 
available on a month to month basis. I believe that this may yield important dynamic 
interactions between investment and stock holding.
Analyses of inventory behaviour at the aggregate level are potentially troublesome; 
the data has been aggregated across many heterogeneous sectors (see, for example, Imbs, 
Mumtaz, Ravn, and Rey (2005) for a discussion of the effect of aggregation biases). As 
such, I would like to carry out some industry, or even firm level analyses of the inventory- 
in-motion phenomenon discussed in Chapter 1.
The current crisis has not just affected the economy, it has ignited a large debate 
about the future of business cycle research. While there is clearly a need for a greater 
understanding of the role of banks in our models, there is a larger debate about whether 
the current paradigm, including as applied in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, should 
continue to be the dominant conceptual framework. While I have not tried to answer 
this within this thesis, I hope to be able to continue to contribute positively to the field 
and, in doing so, help to tackle not only the challenges that we face now, but also those 
unforeseen challenges that we will face in the future.
160
Bibliography
A a d l a n d , D. (2001): “High frequency real business cycles,” Journal of Monetary Eco­
nomics, 48(2), 271-292.
A a d l a n d , D., and  K. X. D. H u a n g  (2004): “Consistent high-frequency calibration,” 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28(11), 2277-2295.
A b r a m a v it z , M. (1950): Inventories and Business Cycles. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, Mass.
A c e m o g lu ,  D., S. J o h n s o n ,  J. R o b in s o n , a n d  Y. T h a ic h a r o e n  (2003): “Institu­
tional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 50, pp. 49-123 .
A h m e d , S., A. L e v in , and  B.-A. W il so n  (2004): “Recent U.S. Macro Stability: Good 
Policies, Good Practices, or Good Luck?,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(3), 
824-832.
A r r o w ,  K . J ., T . H a r r i s ,  a n d  J . M a r s c h a k  (1951): “Optimal Inventory Policy,” 
Econometrica, 19, 250-272.
ASSOCIATES, K. S. (1993): “ECR: enhancing consumer value in the grocery industry,” 
Food Marketing Institute 23 October 2008, Washington (DC).
A t t a n a s i o ,  O. P ., an d  A. B r u g ia v in i  (2003): “Social Security And Households’ 
Saving,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3), 1075-1119.
B a n e r j e e , A. V. (1992): “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 107(3), 797-817.
B a r k e r , K. (2007): “Interest Rate Changes - Too many or too few?,” Speech at CBI 
North East Dinner, 20 March.
BARNICHON, R. (2007): “Productivity, Aggregate Demand and Unemployment Fluctu­
ations,” CEP Discussion Papers dp0819, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
161
B e a n ,  C. (2003): “Inflation Targeting: The UK Experience,” Speech at the Annual 
Congress of the German Economic Association, University Zurich-Irchel in Switzerland 
1 October 2003, Bank of England.
B e l l m a n ,  R . (1956): “On the Theory of Dynamic Programming-A Warehousing Prob­
lem,” Management Science, 2(3), 272-275.
B en a ti, L. (2004): “Evolving post-World War II UK economic performance,” Journal 
of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36(4), 691-717.
BERNANKE, B . S. (2004): “The Great Moderation,” Remarks by Governor Ben S. 
Bernanke at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, DC 
February 20, 2004, Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
B e s l e y ,  T., N. M e a d s ,  a n d  P. S u r ic o  (2008): “Insiders versus Outsiders in Monetary 
Policymaking,” American Economic Review, 98(2), 218-23.
B h a t t a c h a r j e e ,  A., an d  S. H o l l y  (2005): “Inflation Targeting, Committee Decision 
Making and Uncertainty: The Case of the Bank of England’s MPC,” Discussion paper, 
Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge.
B la c k b u r n ,  J. D . (1991): Time-Based Competition: The Next Battleground in Amer­
ican Manufacturing. Irwin, Homewood, IL.
B l a c k w e l l ,  D., an d  L. D u b in s  (1962): “Merging of Opinions with Increasing Infor­
mation,” Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 33(3), 882-887.
B l a n c h a r d ,  O., a n d  J. S im on  (2001): “The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output 
Volatility.,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 135-174.
BLANCHARD, O. J. (1983): “The Production and Inventory Behavior of the American 
Automobile Industry,” Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 365-400.
B l in d e r ,  A. S. (1981): “Retail Inventory Behavior and Business Fluctuations,” Brook­
ings Papers on Economic Activity, 12(1981-2), 443-505.
B l in d e r ,  A. S. (1986): “Can the Production Smoothing Model of Inventory Behavior 
Be Saved?,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(3), 431-53.
B l in d e r ,  A. S. (2007): “Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?,” European 
Journal of Political Economy, 23(1), 106-123.
B l in d e r ,  A. S., an d  L. J. M a c c in i  (1991): “Taking Stock: A Critical Assessment of 
Recent Research on Inventories,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 73-96.
162
B l in d e r ,  A. S., a n d  J. M o r g a n  (2005): “Are Two Heads Better than One? Monetary 
Policy by Committee,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 37(5), 789-811.
BLOOM, N. (2007): “Uncertainty and the Dynamics of R&D,” American Economic 
Review, 97(2), 250-255.
----------- (2009): “The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks,” Econometrica.
B o e r i ,  T .,  A. B o r s c h -S u p a n ,  an d  G. T a b e l l i n i  (2001): “Would you like to shrink 
the welfare state? A survey of European citizens,” Economic Policy, 16(32), 7-50.
BORSCH-SUPAN, A. (2003): Life-Cycle Savings and Public Policy: A Cross-National 
Study of Six Countries. Academic Press, New York.
B o r s c h -S u p a n ,  A., A. R e i l - H e ld ,  R . R o d e p e t e r ,  R . S c h n a b e l ,  and  J . W i n t e r  
(2001): “The German Savings Puzzle,” Research in Economics, 55(1), 15-38.
B o r s c h -S u p a n ,  A. H., a n d  K. S t a h l  (1991): “Life Cycle Savings and Consump­
tion Constraints: Theory, Empirical Evidence, and Fiscal Implications,” Journal of 
Population Economics, 4(3), 233-55.
B r o w n in g ,  M., L. P. H a n s e n , a n d  J. J. H e c k m a n  (1999): “Micro data and gen­
eral equilibrium models,” in Handbook of Macroeconomics, ed. by J. B. Taylor, and 
M. Woodford.
B r o w n in g ,  M., and  S. L e t h - P e t e r s e n  (2003): “Imputing consumption from income 
and wealth information,” Economic Journal, 113(488), F282-F301.
B u i t e r ,  W. (2000): “Letter to the Right Honourable Gordon Brown MP, Chancellor 
for the Exchequer,” http://www.hm-treasury.gov.Uk/press_16_00.htm#letter.
B u l l a r d ,  J. B., and  A. S in g h  (2009): “Learning and the Great Moderation,” Working 
Papers 2007-027, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
B u r e a u  o f  E c o n o m ic  A n a ly s i s  (2008): “Concepts and Methods of the U.S. National 
Income and Product Accounts,” Discussion paper, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
B u r k h a u s e r ,  R. V., B . A. B u t r i c a ,  M. C. D a ly ,  an d  D . R. L i l l a r d  (2001): 
“The Cross-National Equivalent File: A product of cross-national research,” in Soziale 
Sicherung in einer dynamsichen Gesellschaft. Festschrift fr  Richard Hauser zum 65. 
Geburtstag, ed. by I. Becker, N. Ott, and G. Rolf, Frankfurt/New York. Campus.
C a g e t t i ,  M. (2003): “Wealth Accumulation over the Life Cycle and Precautionary 
Savings,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 21(3), 339-53.
163
C a r r o l l , C. D., and  M. S. K im b a l l  (2007): “Precautionary Saving and Precaution­
ary Wealth,” in Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and Finance. Palgrave.
C h a r i , V. V., P. J. K e h o e , and  E. R. M c G r a t t a n  (2000): “Sticky Price Models 
of the Business Cycle: Can the Contract Multiplier Solve the Persistence Problem?,” 
Econometrica, 68(5), 1151-1180.
C h r is t ia n o , L. J., and  J. D. M. F ish e r  (2000): “Algorithms for solving dynamic 
models with occasionally binding constraints,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, 24(8), 1179-1232.
C h r is t ia n o , L. J., and  T. J. F it z g e r a l d  (1989): “The magnitude of the speculative 
motive for holding inventories in a real business cycle model,” Discussion Paper /  
Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 10, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
C o p a c in o , W . (1988): “Managing Inventory in Motion,” in Supply Chain Management: 
The Basics and Beyond, ed. by W. Copacino. CRC Press, 1997.
D e n  H a a n , W. (2007): “Parameterized Expectations,” Lecture notes, University of 
Amsterdam.
D e n  H a a n , W ., and  A. M a r c e t  (1990a): “Accuracy in Simulations,” Review of 
Economic Studies, 61, 3-17.
---------- (1990b): “Solving the Stochastic Growth Model by Parameterizing Expecta­
tions,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 8, 31-34.
F is h e r , M ., and  A. R a m a n  (1996): “Reducing the Cost of Demand Uncertainty 
Through Accurate Response to Early Sales,” Operations Research, 44(1), 87-99.
F o r r e s t e r , J. (1961): Industrial Dynamics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
F u c h s-S c h u n d e l n , N. (2008): “The Response of Household Saving to the Large Shock 
of German Reunification,” American Economic Review, 98(5), 1798-1828.
F u c h s-S c h u n d e l n , N., and  M. S c h u n d e l n  (2005): “Precautionary Savings and Self- 
Selection: Evidence from the German Reunification ”Experiment” ,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 120(3), 1085-1120.
G a l i , J. (1999): “Technology, Employment, and the Business Cycle: Do Technology 
Shocks Explain Aggregate Fluctuations?,” American Economic Review, 89(1), 249- 
271.
164
G e r a a t s ,  P. M . (2006): “Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice,” 
CESifo Economic Studies, 52(1), 111-152.
G e r l a c h -K r is t e n , P. (2003): “Insiders and Outsiders at the Bank of England,” Cen­
tral Banking, XIV(l), 96-102.
  (2006): “Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting,” European Eco­
nomic Review, 50(2), 487-507.
---------- (2009): “Outsiders at the Bank of England’s MPC,” Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, Forthcoming.
G ia v azzi, F .,  and  M . M c M a h o n  (2008): “Policy Uncertainty and Precautionary Sav­
ings,” NBER Working Papers 13911, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
G il m o r e , D. (2008): “Supply Chain News: The 10 Best Quotes from CSCMP 2008,” 
Supply Chain Digest 23 October 2008.
G o u r in c h a s , P.-O ., a n d  J. A. P a r k e r  (2001): “The Empirical Importance of Pre­
cautionary Saving,” American Economic Review, 91(2), 406-412.
---------- (2002): “Consumption Over the Life Cycle,” Econometrica, 70(1), 47-89.
G r a n g e r , C. W. J ., and  P. L. S ik lo s  (1995): “Systematic sampling, temporal ag­
gregation, seasonal adjustment, and cointegration theory and evidence,” Journal of 
Econometrics, 66(1-2), 357-369.
G r e e n e , W. H. (2003): Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey.
GROSSMAN, S. J. (1981): “The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure 
about Product Quality,” Journal of Law and Economics, 24(3), 461-83.
H a r r is ,  M., an d  C. S p e n c e r  (2008): “Decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting 
behavior of Bank of England MPC members,” MPRA Paper 9100, University Library 
of Munich, Germany.
H e a t o n , J. (1993): “The Interaction between Time-Nonseparable Preferences and Time 
Aggregation,” Econometrica, 61(2), 353-85.
HM TREASURY (2003): “Bank of England Appointments,” h ttp ://w w w .h in —tr e a s u r y , 
g o v . u k /n e w s r o o m _ a n d _ s p e e c h e s /p r e s s /2 0 0 3 /p r e s s _ 2 8 _ 0 3 . cfm.
165
H o l t ,  C., F . M o d ig l ia n i ,  J. M u th ,  an d  H . S im o n  (1960): Planning, Production, 
Inventories and Work Force. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Im bs, J., H . M u m ta z , M. R a v n , a n d  H . R e y  (2005): “PPP Strikes Back: Aggregation 
and the Real Exchange Rate,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(1), 1-43.
J a m e s , P. (2000): “The 1998 German Federal Election,” Politics, 20(1), 33-38.
J a p p e l l i ,  T., an d  F. M o d ig l ia n i  (2007): “The Age-Saving Profile and the Life-Cycle 
Hypothesis,” in The Collected Papers of Franco Modigliani, vol. 6, Cambridge, Mass. 
MIT Press.
J u d d , K. (1998): Numerical methods in economics. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
J u s t in ia n o ,  A., AND G. E. P r im ic e r i  (2006): “The Time Varying Volatility of 
Macroeconomic Fluctuations,” NBER Working Papers 12022, National Bureau of Eco­
nomic Research, Inc.
K a h n , J., M. M c C o n n e l l ,  a n d  G. P e r e z - Q u ir o s  (2002): “On the Causes of the 
Increased Stability of the U.S. Economy,” FRB New York Policy Review, May, 183-202.
K a h n , J. A. (1987): “Inventories and the Volatility of Production,” American Economic 
Review, 77(4), 667-79.
K a l a i ,  E ., an d  E . L e h r e r  (1994): “Weak and Strong Merging of Opinions,” Journal 
of Mathematical Economics, 23(1), 73-86.
K e y n e s ,  J. (1936): The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Palgrave 
Macmillan, UK.
K h a n , A., a n d  J. K . T h o m a s  (2007a): “Explaining Inventories: A Business Cycle 
Assessment Of The Stockout Avoidance and (S,s) Motives,” Macroeconomic Dynamics, 
11(05), 638-664.
---------- (2007b): “Inventories and the Business Cycle: An Equilibrium Analysis of (S,
s) Policies,” American Economic Review, 97(4), 1165-1188.
K in g , R . G., a n d  S. T. R e b e lo  (1999): “Resuscitating real business cycles,” in Hand­
book of Macroeconomics, ed. by J. B. Taylor, and M. Woodford.
K y d la n d ,  F. E., an d  E. C. P r e s c o t t  (1982): “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluc­
tuations,” Econometrica, 50(6), 1345-70.
166
L a m b e r t , R. (2006): “Who sets our interest rates?,” http://ww w .bankofengland.co. 
uk /publications/o ther/m onetary /inside_m pc.pdf.
L e v y ,  G. (2007): “Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and 
Voting Rules,” American Economic Review, 97(1), 150-168.
Li, H., S. R o s e n , a nd  W. S u e n  (2001): “Conflicts and Common Interests in Commit­
tees,” American Economic Review, 91(5), 1478-1497.
L i p p i , M ., and  L . R e ic h l in  (1991): “Trend-Cycle Decompositions and Measures of 
Persistence: Does Time Aggregation Matter?,” Economic Journal, 101(405), 314-23 .
L o m b a r d e l l i , C., J. P r o u d m a n , and  J. T a l b o t  (2005): “Committees Versus In­
dividuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making,” Interna­
tional Journal of Central Banking, 1(1).
L o n g , J. B. D., and  L . H. S u m m e r s  (1986): “The Changing Cyclical Variability 
of Economic Activity in the United States,” NBER Working Papers 1450, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
L u s a r d i , A. (1998): “On the Importance of the Precautionary Saving Motive,” Ameri­
can Economic Review, 88(2), 449-53.
M a c c in i , L. J., B. J. M o o r e , and  H. S c h a l l e r  (2004): “The Interest Rate, Learn­
ing, and Inventory Investment,” American Economic Review, 94(5), 1303-1327.
M a C u r d y , T. E. (1983): “A Simple Scheme for Estimating an Intertemporal Model of 
Labor Supply and Consumption in the Presence of Taxes and Uncertainty,” Interna­
tional Economic Review, 24(2), 265-89.
MARCELLINO, M . (1999): “Some Consequences of Temporal Aggregation in Empirical 
Analysis,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 17(1), 129-36.
M c C a r t h y , J., AND E. Z a k r a js e k  (2007): “Inventory Dynamics and Business Cycles: 
What Has Changed?,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39(2-3), 591-613.
M c C o n n e l l ,  M ., a n d  G. P e r e z - Q u ir o s  (2000): “Output Fluctuations in the United 
States: What Has Changed Since the 1980s?,” American Economic Review, 90(5), 
1464-1476.
M e a d e , E., and  D. S t a sa v a g e  (2008): “Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to 
Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve,” Economic Journal, 118(528), 695- 
717.
167
M e t z l e r , L. A. (1941): “The Nature and Stability of Inventory Cycles,” The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 23(3), 113-129.
MlLGROM, P. R. (1981): “Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and 
Applications,” Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 380-391.
M il l s , E. S. (1957): “Expectations and Undesired Inventory,” Management Science, 
4(1), 105-109.
M ir o n , J. A., and  S. P. Z e l d e s  (1988): “Seasonality, Cost Shocks, and the Production 
Smoothing Models of Inventories,” Econometrica, 56(4), 877-908.
O k u n o - F u j iw a r a ,  M., A. P o s t l e w a i t e ,  a n d  K. S u z u m u r a  (1990): “Strategic 
Information Revelation,” Review of Economic Studies, 57(1), 25-47.
O t t a v i a n i ,  M., a n d  P. S o r e n s e n  (2000): “Herd Behavior and Investment: Com­
ment,” American Economic Review, 90(3), 695-704.
P o l l a r d , P. (2004): “Monetary Policy-Making around the World,” Presentation, Fed­
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
P o t e r b a , J. M. (1994): “Introduction,” in International Comparisons of Household 
Saving, ed. by J. M. Poterba, Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Re­
search.
PULZER, P . (1999): “The German federal election of 1998,” West European Politics, 
22(3), 241-249.
R a m e y , V. A. (1989): “Inventories as Factors of Production and Economic Fluctua­
tions,” American Economic Review, 79(3), 338-54.
----------- (1991): “Nonconvex Costs and the Behavior of Inventories,” Journal of Political
Economy, 99(2), 306-34.
R a v n , M. O., and  H. U hlig  (2001): “On Adjusting the HP-Filter for the Frequency 
of Observations,” CEPR Discussion Papers 2858, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
R ic h a r d s o n , H. (1995): “Control Your Costs then Cut Them,” Transportation and 
Distribution.
R o s s a n a ,  R. J., a n d  J. J. S e a t e r  (1992): “Aggregation, Unit Roots and the Time Se­
ries Structure on Manufacturing Real Wages,” International Economic Review, 33(1), 
159-79.
168
SAVAGE, L. J. (1972): The Foundations of Statistics. Dover, New York, New York, 
second edn.
SCHARFSTEIN, D., a n d  J. S t e in  (1990): “Herd Behavior and Investment,” American 
Economic Review, ADD(ADD), ADD.
S c h u lz e ,  I., a n d  S. J o c h e m  (2007): “Germany: Beyond Policy Gridlock,” in Handbook 
of West European Pension Politics, ed. by M. I. Ellen, M. A. Karen, and I. Schulze, 
Oxford. Oxford University Press.
SHIBAYAMA, K. (2008): “Inventory Cycles,” Studies in Economics 0804, Department of 
Economics, University of Kent.
SlBERT, A . (2002): “M onetary policy  w ith  uncertain central bank preferences,” European 
Economic Review, 46(6), 1093-1109.
---------- (2003a): “Monetary policy committees: individual and collective reputations,”
Review of Economic Studies, 70(3), 649-665.
---------- (2003b): “Monetary policy committees: individual and collective reputations,”
Review of Economic Studies, 70(3), 649-665.
------------ (2006): “Central Banking by Committee,” International Finance, 9(2), 145-168.
S p e n c e r , C. (2006): “The Dissent Voting Behaviour of Bank of England MPC Mem­
bers,” Department of Economics Discussion Papers 0306, Department of Economics, 
University of Surrey.
S t e r m a n , J. (1989): “Modeling Managerial Behavior: Misperceptions of Feedback in a 
Dynamic Decision Making Experiemnt,” Management Science, 35(3), 321-339.
S t o c k ,  J ., a n d  M. W a ts o n  (2002): “Has the Business Cycle Changed? Evidence and 
Explanations,” Discussion Paper 9127, National Bureau of Economic Research.
S u m m e r s , L. H. (1981): “Comments on Blinder’s Retail Inventory Behavior and Busi­
ness Fluctuations,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 12(1981-2), 513-517.
S u r ic o , P. (2007): “The Fed’s monetary policy rule and U.S. inflation: The case of 
asymmetric preferences,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31(1), 305-324.
T a y l o r , J. (2000): “Remarks for the Panel Discussion on Recent Changes in Trend 
and Cycle,” in Structural Change and Monetary Policy. Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
169
V a n  N ie u w e r b u r g h ,  S., a n d  L. V e ld k a m p  (2006): “Learning asymmetries in real 
business cycles,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(4), 753-772.
W r i g h t ,  B . D .,  a n d  J. C. W il l ia m s  (1982): “The Economic Role of Commodity 
Storage,” Economic Journal, 92(367), 596-614.
---------- (1984): “The Welfare Effects of the Introduction of Storage,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 99(1), 169-92.
170
